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1 Introduction
This thesis collects five studies that are related to pensions, retirement and
the financial position of the elderly. The five studies each aim to contribute
to the understanding of pensions, retirement and the financial position
of the elderly. The chapters in the thesis can be read independently.
This introductory chapter provides the motivation for this thesis’ topics
(section 1.1) followed by the research questions underlying each of the
chapters (section 1.2) and a summary of the main findings of each chapter
(section 1.3).
Motivation 1.1
Long-term trends, such as the aging of the population and the increased
life-expectancy, and the consequences of the recent financial crisis, have
raised concerns about the sustainability of pension systems. The aging of
the population increases the old-age dependency ratio thereby increasing
the pressure on the working population. This effect on the dependency
ratio is enforced by the low and decreasing fertility rates. Whereas this
dependency ratio was 29 in 2010, it is expected to increase to 55 in 2040,
meaning that there are 55 persons over the age of 65 for every 100 persons
of age 15-64. The increased life-expectancy implies that people, on average,
receive pension benefits for a longer period. The recent financial crisis has
had a large impact on the capital reserves of pension funds which resulted
in pension benefits cuts accordingly. Current pension systems are not
well-prepared to face the long-term trends and the short-term volatility.
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Consequently, many OECD countries have proposed and implemented
reforms to alleviate the pension system from the pressure of demographic
aging and to create sustainable pension systems for the future (OECD
2011b). Many of the reforms implemented to alleviate the pension systems
from the consequences of aging populations are related to increasing
both the statutory and effective retirement age, making pension benefits
less generous and increasing contributions. Increasing the retirement age
aims to increase the labor supply at older ages such that older people
postpone receiving pension benefits and contribute to the pension system
for a longer period. One of the most prominent measures taken to induce
labor supply at older ages is making the options to retire earlier than
the statutory retirement age less available and less generous. Decreasing
the benefits and increasing the contributions of pensions means that the
accumulation of pensions per contributory year decreases.
These reforms imply that public- and private pensions have become
less generous. As a consequence, the proposed and implemented reforms
have raised a lot of discussion about the financial position of current and
future retirees. What are the effects of the reforms on current retirees? Do
we expect future retirees to have an adequate pension for consumption
needs? Do people need to retire later while working more hours during
their career? What are the consequences of making early retirement less
available and less generous? What jobs are needed to retire later? This
thesis aims to understand the effects of aging on people’s retirement
behavior and the adequacy of their (future) pensions.
1.2 Research questions
Reforms are complicated by institutional path dependency and long-term
contracts. Therefore, reforms implemented to combat the negative conse-
quences of aging to society, such as increases in the statutory retirement
age, are often politically controversial and difficult to implement. Hence,
the approach that many countries have initially taken is to privatize pen-
sions which entails a shift from the relative importance of public- to private
pensions and from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) sys-
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tems (Barr and Diamond 2009, OECD 2009b, Orenstein 2011). This shift
reduces the pressure of demographic aging on the public finances, as
mandatory public pensions are usually financed by a PAYG system, but it
may increase inequality of income of the elderly.
Chapter 2 addresses the research question Do shifts from public- to private
pension provision lead to higher levels of income inequality or poverty among
older people? The chapter explains that private pension plans are generally
less redistributive than public pension plans. Therefore, it is expected that
the observed shifts from public- to private pension plans has led to higher
levels of income inequality among the elderly. Chapter 2 empirically
analyzes the distributional effects of shifts from public- to private pension
provision by relating the relative importance of the public- and private
pensions to indicators of income inequality and poverty among elderly
in 15 European countries for the period 1995-2007. This approach allows
us to draw conclusions about the consequences of reforming the pension
system for the financial well-being of the elderly.
To assess the financial well-being of the elderly, Chapter 3 focuses on the
questions Do Dutch households save adequately for retirement? Which pension
components are important, and what are the vulnerable groups? The chapter
argues that it is important to assess the adequacy of pensions based on
analyzing microdata which allows us to investigate the heterogeneity and
taking into account the pension that people accumulate in the current
system. Prior assessments of the adequacy of pension systems calculated
replacement rates for a fictitious person who earns a median income
during his career and who is assumed to accumulate a pension during
a full career (Mercer 2013, OECD 2013c). According to these studies,
the Netherlands are ranked high among pension systems that give an
adequate income during retirement. However, the question arises whether
adequacy is still that high when the adequacy of retirement income is
based on microdata and taking into account the pension that people
actually accumulate in the current system.
Chapter 3 develops a much needed integral method to assess the
adequacy of retirement savings of Dutch households based on actual
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accumulation in the current system by taking into account private wealth1
next to wealth accumulated in public (1st pension pillar) and private
pensions (2nd and 3rd pension pillar). Taking into account private wealth
is important since different forms of assets may act as substitutes for one
another. Solely focussing on public and private pensions may therefore
underestimate the income available at retirement as (housing) wealth may
be annuitized for consumption purposes during retirement. Analysis of
the adequacy of retirement savings is decomposed for different generations
and potentially vulnerable groups such as the self-employed.
The analysis identifies the mandatory (occupational) private pensions
(2nd pension pillar) as one of the main components of retirement income.
These mandatory private pensions are accumulated over the life-cycle
according to an earnings related pension formula in the Netherlands. Life-
cycles wage profiles are therefore crucial in determining income available
at retirement. This line of reasoning also holds for other countries where
earnings related pension formulas also (partly) determine the accumula-
tion of wealth in public pensions (1st pension pillar).2 Wage profiles are a
central component in life-cycle models of consumption and savings since
income uncertainty is derived from the deterministic component in wages
over the life-cycle (Gourinchas and Parker 2002, Scholz et al. 2006) and
so for the analysis of the adequacy of income during retirement. Based
on a life-cycle model, Scholz et al. (2006) conclude that the extent and
magnitude of undersaving is generally small in the US, although younger
cohorts tend to be less likely to have saved sufficiently for retirement.
The conclusions of life-cycle models depend on the correct specification
of the life-cycle wage-profile. However, life-cycle models do not consider
selection effects into work. Wages are likely to be observed non-randomly
over the life-cycle, e.g. wages are observed for people who are working.
These individuals may earn a different potential wage than the individuals
who are not working. Neglecting this non-random selection into work
may bias estimated wage-profiles (Casanova 2010, 2013). For the analysis
of the adequacy of retirement savings in the Netherlands, this is important
1Housing wealth and other private savings such as net savings account, securities,
stocks substantial shareholders and business assets.
2For example, Norway, France, the UK and the US.
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because accumulation in mandatory private pensions is based on these
life-cycle earnings. Since only people in paid-employment earn a wage and
accumulate mandatory private pensions,3 a biased estimation of the wage-
profile leads to incorrect assumptions regarding the future accumulation
in mandatory private pensions.
Chapter 4 proposes a new panel data sample selection estimator correcting
for simultaneous decisions in participation and working hours decisions.
Whereas prior panel data sample selection estimators only include a
selection correction for work versus non-work (Dustmann and Rochina-
Barrachina 2007, Kyriazidou 1997, Rochina-Barrachina 1999, Semykina and
Wooldridge 2010, 2011, Wooldridge 1995), we add additional information
about part-time and full-time work. Adding information regarding part-
time versus full-time work decisions provides extra information regarding
the individuals’ unobserved characteristics that may influence their wages
(e.g. tastes, preferences, ability, effort). This is especially relevant when
analyzing life-cycle wages as part-time employment is often chosen among
women raising children (Booth and Van Ours 2008, Gregory and Connolly
2008). Men, on the other hand, often use part-time employment as partial
retirement mechanism (Cahill et al. 2006, Ruhm 2006) with substantial
decreases in wages as a consequence (Aaronson and French 2004, Casanova
2013). The proposed new estimator is used to estimate wage-profiles over
the complete life-cycle for both men and women and to show the existence
of selection effects in life-cycle wage profiles.
Existence of selection over the life-cycle would suggest that earlier
estimates of wage profiles, without selection correction4 or with binary
selection correction can be improved. The new estimator can be applied to
estimate selection corrected life-cycle wage profiles to assess the savings
adequacy for retirement in both life-cycle models (Scholz et al. 2006)
and microsimulation models (Borella 2004). The new panel data sample
3Although it depends on the pension fund to what extent unemployed and disabled
persons can also accumulate private pensions.
4A huge strand of literature uses prime-aged men to estimate wage profiles and
assume that non-random selection in work is negligible among this group. However, the
assumption is arguable and the consequence of this approach is that the results of the
wage-profile can not be generalized to women and old-age men.
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selection model forms the basis for the Dutch contribution to the OECD
Retirement Savings Adequacy project (OECD 2014).
Whereas Chapter 4 analyzes selection effects into part-time employment
and full-time employment and the consequences for life-cycle wages,
Chapter 5 focuses on the extent to which non-standard employment, such
as part-time employment, may postpone early retirement. The research
question that is dealt with in Chapter 5 is Did the rise in non-standard
employment, such as self-employment and part-time employment, contribute
to the increased labor force participation observed among older workers across
Europe? Early labor market withdrawal has contributed substantially to
the decreasing working lives observed in Europe (Brugiavini and Peracchi
2005). Pestieau (2003) argues that the financial sustainability of pension
systems is substantially affected by these low participation rates of older
workers. Barr (2006) argues that ‘The problem [of the financial sustainability of
pension systems] is not that people are living longer, but that they retire too early.’
Longer working lives would alleviate some of the pressure of population
aging on the sustainability of pension systems (Maestas and Zissimopoulos
2010). Inducing longer working lives can be attained by either increasing
the statutory retirement or decreasing early labor market withdrawal (or
both). Longer working lives have two effects on the sustainability of
pensions: 1) increases the number of years to accumulate pensions5 and 2)
reduces the number of years to pay benefits. In relation to the adequacy of
retirement savings as analyzed in Chapter 3, the results of Angelini et al.
(2009) suggest that increasing participation rates among older workers
may also increase the adequacy of pensions to finance consumption in
retirement.
Gruber and Wise (1998) argue that the low participation rates of older
workers have been a consequence of large disincentives to work at older
ages. Formal early retirement programs as well as social insurance pro-
grams, that were often used to smooth transitions from work to retirement
in practice, are prominent explanations of the relatively low participation
rates among older persons. Since the 1990s, many governments have
5Increasing the statutory retirement age by a year does, however, not imply an increase
in the effective retirement age of one year because of early retirement possibilities.
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started to reform formal and informal early retirement possibilities (Casey
et al. 2003). Hence, the participation rates of older workers have been
rising for both men and women in many European countries, although the
participation rates are still low compared to those of prime age workers.
Simultaneously, rapid increases in non-standard forms of employment,
such as part-time employment and self-employment, have been observed
since then and especially among people aged 50-64 (Chen et al. 2013). Both
forms of non-standard employment provide flexibility in working hours
and may therefore be used as gradual retirement mechanisms to bridge
the period between full-time employment and full retirement (Bruce et al.
2000, Cahill et al. 2006, Ruhm 2006). Morris and Mallier (2003) show that
the high and increasing importance of such non-standard employment
opportunities among this age-group in European countries can be related
to the countries’ patterns in labor force participation at older ages. Chapter
5 captures this idea into a formal retirement model and estimates a reduced
form empirical model at the country-level so to analyze the effect of part-
time employment rates and self-employment rates on early retirement
measured at both the extensive (e.g. participation decision) and intensive
margin (e.g. hours decision).
Insight in this relationship between non-standard employment and
postponement of retirement is relevant for policy-makers because of two
main reasons. Firstly, policy makers can increase the possibilities of
non-standard work for older workers to increase the sustainability of the
pension system. Secondly, non-standard work may be used to supplement
pension income at older ages. Regarding this second reason, the financial
well-being of elderly may not only be evaluated by pension wealth (as
in Chapter 2 and 3) and private wealth (as in Chapter 3), but also by the
ability to postpone retirement and to supplement the income streams from
pension wealth and private wealth. Next to private (housing) wealth and
informal care by children and grandchildren, the ability to postpone full
retirement may contribute to the financial well-being of elderly besides
the income streams from public and private pensions.
Thus far, it is argued that the increase in non-standard employment is
related to voluntary decisions to decrease working hours prior to retire-
ment. However, the increase in non-standard employment is also likely to
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be in anticipation to declining opportunities in both (full-time) employ-
ment (Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2010) and early retirement possibilities such
as disability- and unemployment insurance (Casey et al. 2003). Reforms in
early retirement schemes may have shifted persons towards non-standard
employment as early retirement schemes may no longer be available or
as generous as prior to the reforms. Chapter 5’s analysis takes into ac-
count such spill-over effects between early retirement and non-standard
employment, but does not try to explain the nature of the increases in
non-standard employment.
Chapter 6, on the other hand, does try to shed some light on the reasons of
choosing non-standard employment, more specifically self-employment,
at older ages by answering the question Is there evidence for necessity-driven
self-employment at the end of working life? Self-employment is found to be
relatively important among the 50+ population, compared to younger
age groups (Hurd 1996, Karoly and Zissimopoulos 2004, Zissimopoulos
and Karoly 2007). One of the main explanations for the relatively high
importance of self-employment among older persons is that older persons,
who tend to have stronger preferences for leisure (Kantarci and Van Soest
2008), primarily choose a period of self-employment before full retire-
ment as a gradual retirement route in which they are able to decumulate
the number of hours worked.6 However, the 50+ population also faces
difficulties finding a new job once unemployed (Chan and Stevens 2001,
Maestas and Li 2006). Chapter 6 sheds a new light on the often assumed
gradual retirement function of self-employment by constructing three
testable hypotheses related to the labor market dynamics of older workers
in order to analyze the importance of necessity-driven self-employment at
older ages. The three testable hypotheses all relate to ending or avoiding
unemployment at older ages which is often associated with the necessity
of self-employment.7
6This is suggested by Bruce et al. (2000), Fuchs (1982), Giandrea et al. (2008), Gu (2009),
Hurd (1996), Morris and Mallier (2003), Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007).
7Such as suggested by Earle and Sakova (2000), Glocker and Steiner (2007), Kellard
et al. (2002), Kuhn and Schuetze (2001), Reize (2000), Rissman (2003), Taylor (1999).
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Main findings 1.3
This section provides the answers to the questions raised in section 1.2.
Chapter 2 hypothesizes that the relative shifts from public to private pen-
sions in order to relieve the pressure on the public finances from the aging
population has led to higher levels of income inequality among the elderly.
A priori shifts from public to private pensions are expected to have such an
effect as private social security plans are generally less redistributive than
public social security. Using macroeconomic information on 15 European
countries over the period 1995-2007 does not confirm this hypothesis. No
evidence is found that shifts from public to private pension provision are
associated with higher levels of income inequality and poverty among
elderly people. Intriguingly, this is not in line with findings in the lit-
erature on pension reform and income inequality (Arza 2008, Fukawa
2006, Hughes and Stewart 2004, Milligan 2008, Oshio and Shimizutani
2005, Weller 2004) and with literature on the redistributive effects of public
and private social security in general (Caminada and Goudswaard 2005,
Goudswaard and Caminada 2010).
Nevertheless, this chapter is the first to analyze the relationship be-
tween public- and private pensions and income inequality using pooled
cross-section and time-series data which should provide more informa-
tion on the true relationship between the public/private pension mix and
income inequality than analyses solely based on cross-sectional (Brown
and Prus 2004, Fukawa 2006, Weller 2004) or time-series data (Milligan
2008, Myles 2000, Oshio and Shimizutani 2005, Schirle 2009).8 Chapter 2
discusses a number of tentative explanations that are conceivable for not
finding a positive effect of shifts from public to private pension provisions
on income inequality among elderly using our analysis.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the adequacy of retirement savings of Dutch
households. To investigate the adequacy of retirement savings, this chapter
analyzes not only public and occupational private pension rights, but also
8In a cross-sectional approach, the effects of pension reform cannot be analyzed over
time. Studies taking a time-series approach in one country have difficulties examining
whether the findings also hold for other comparable pension reforms in other countries.
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annuity insurances, housing wealth and private savings. The adequacy
of the total of available pension income at retirement is determined by
replacement rates and absolute levels of pension annuities. Taking into
account the total of pension annuities and summing over all age- and
socioeconomic groups gives a median gross replacement rate of 83% and a
median net replacement rate of 101%. Average and median total resources
available at retirement are 33,000 and 27,000 euros per year respectively.
By only taking into account public- and private pensions, the median
gross replacement rates would be 71%.
Regarding the relative importance of each pension component, public
and occupational pensions each account for more than 35% of total pen-
sion annuities. Private non-housing assets account for 14% and imputed
rental income from net housing wealth accounts for about 10%. Assuming
that households deplete their housing wealth during retirement would
increase the median gross replacement rate by another 5%-points. The
relative importance of the pension components differs between genera-
tions: younger generations tend to have higher accumulated occupational
pensions while the older generations tend to have a relatively larger share
of their wealth in private savings and housing.
In the literature, it is often assumed that a 70% gross replacement
rate of previous earnings is the norm for an adequate pension (Haveman
et al. 2007). Using a replacement rate of 70% of current gross income,
31% of all households face an inadequate income during retirement when
taking into account the total of pension annuities. Based on relatively low
replacement rates and low absolute levels of pension income available at
retirement, the chapter identified several potentially vulnerable groups
in terms of retirement savings adequacy such as the self-employed, first-
generation immigrants, single women and recipients of social assistance-,
unemployment- and disability benefits.
Aforementioned results regarding the adequacy of retirement savings
of Dutch households are sensitive to the assumptions made for the future.
Deviating from an intermediate scenario, young generations would benefit
most from an optimistic future scenario but also suffer more from a
pessimistic scenario compared to older generations.
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A different approach to assess the adequacy of retirement income is
taken by Scholz et al. (2006) who base their analysis on the estimation
of a life-cycle model of consumption and savings. Like in all life-cycle
models, conclusions regarding consumption and saving depend on the
correct specification of the wage-profile as the earnings process is the most
important determinant of income over the life-cycle. However, most life-
cycle models do not correct for non-randomness in observed wages. As a
consequence, corrections for non-random selection into work might are
necessary to get unbiased estimates of the life-cycle wage profile (Casanova
2013). Unbiased estimates of life-cycle wages are not only important in
life-cycle models (Gourinchas and Parker 2002, Scholz et al. 2006) but
also in other models that depend on life-cycle earnings processes such as
earnings inequality models (Cappellari 2004) and microsimulation models
of future pension accumulation (Borella 2004).
Chapter 4 argues that the proposed new estimator improves estimates of
life-cycle wage-profiles compared to models without selection or with
binary selection as it allows to take into account more unobserved hetero-
geneity from working hours decisions. Applying the proposed method
to Dutch administrative data showed that conclusions regarding selec-
tion into work over the life-cycle are different from applying the method
suggested by Rochina-Barrachina (1999). Whereas the binary selection
model of Rochina-Barrachina (1999) suggests negative selection into work
for both men and women, the proposed ordered selection model finds
positive selection among men and less pronounced negative selection
among women. Positive selection suggests that persons with more affluent
observed and unobserved characteristics work. The difference indicates
that it is important to take into account both participation and hours
decisions to account for non-randomness in observed wages.
Analyzing selection effects into part-time and full-time employment
and decomposing the analysis for educational levels shows that the impor-
tance of the selection may differ between part-time and full-time employ-
ment and across educational levels, but the direction of the selection effects
is generally positive. Persons with beneficial characteristics select them-
selves in part-time and full-time employment. This applies to both low-
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and high-educated persons. The existence of such selection effects should
be corrected for in models that depend on estimating wage processes.
Furthermore, the application of the model indicates that career breaks
have a substantial negative effect on life-cycle wages with an average effect
of 11% (men) and 7% (women) of the first year which increases up to
21% (men) and 17% (women) from the third year. Also, the model finds
substantial part-time wage penalties in life-cycle wages of about 30% for
women. For men, we do not find such a part-time wage penalty.
Causal effects between the rise in non-standard work and the decline in
early retirement across Europe are analyzed in Chapter 5. The analysis
finds that part-time employment decreases the labor market withdrawal of
older men. More specifically, an increase in the part-time employment rate
of 1%-point leads to a reduction in early retirement of 1.7% according to
our definition of early retirement in the baseline specification. The results
suggest that this is mainly because of the possibility to reduce working
hours as we find that specifically voluntary part-time employment induces
labor force participation at older ages. However, we do not define whether
this reduction in working hours is due to phased retirement (e.g. a
reduction in working hours in the same job) or bridge-jobs (e.g. a change
in a less demaning job often associated with fewer working hours and a
lower wage). Part-time employment as retirement mechnism is also found
by Cahill et al. (2006), Gustman and Steinmeier (1984), Kim and DeVaney
(2005), Quinn and Kozy (1996), Ruhm (1990, 2006).
Among women, the role of part-time employment in early retirement
is somewhat more ambiguous. Effects of part-time employment on early
retirement are smaller if significant at all. This finding is in line with the
gender differences in gradual retirement found by Peracchi and Welch
(1994) and the fact that part-time employment serves a different role over
the life-cycle among women (Booth and Van Ours 2008, Gregory and
Connolly 2008).
The results at the intensive margin follow a similar pattern as the results
at the extensive margin: part-time employment significantly increases the
average hours worked of persons aged 55-64 but only for men. Hours
effects of part-time employment are not found for women. According to
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these results, labor force participation of older men can be increased by
creating opportunities for gradual retirement. One such opportunity may
be part-time pensions, although it does not increase the labor supply of
the elderly per se (Wadensjo 2006). The analysis does not suggest that
variation in self-employment has a statistically significant effect on early
retirement despite the fact the self-employment is often regarded as a
gradual retirement mechanism (Bruce et al. 2000, Fuchs 1982, Giandrea
et al. 2008, Gu 2009, Hurd 1996, Morris and Mallier 2003, Zissimopoulos
and Karoly 2007).
Chapter 6 rejects the often assumed hypothesis of self-employment being a
gradual retirement mechanism by testing whether there is evidence for
necessity-driven self-employment prior to retirement. For this purpose
Chapter 6 analyzes three testable necessity-hypotheses: 1) whether tran-
sitions from unemployment to self-employment are relatively important
and increase with age, 2) whether high unemployment rates push workers
from paid-employment to self-employment, and 3) whether the introduc-
tion of job search requirements for unemployed older workers increases
self-employment.
Regarding the first necessity-hypothesis, unemployed and inactive
individuals have a higher probability to enter self-employment at the
end of working life than those in paid-employment. The probability of
moving from paid-employment to self-employment is relatively low and
does not increase with age (as would be the case when self-employment
would be chosen out of opportunity to reduce working hours at the end
of working life). Testing the second necessity-hypothesis suggests that
the unemployment rate has a positive effect on transitions from paid-
employment to self-employment among men, which suggests that men in
paid-employment become self-employed at older ages in order to avoid
a period of unemployment. For women, on the other hand, we find
a negative effect of the unemployment rate on transitions from paid-
employment to self-employment. The third necessity-hypothesis suggests
that the introduction of job search requirements at the end of working life
have stimulated people to exit unemployment and discouraged people to
enter unemployment. This reform, however, did not increase necessity or
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opportunity driven self-employment. Individuals that are confronted with
search requirements are partly able to find a job, but there are also large
substitution effects between unemployment and inactivity (mostly early
retirement) which suggests that these options are still more attractive than
using self-employment as (voluntary) retirement mechanism.
Based on the three testable hypotheses, the findings in Chapter 6
suggest that at the end of working life individuals with a relatively weak
labor market position are more likely to switch to self-employment. The
results do not suggest that self-employment is used as a gradual retirement
route in the Netherlands despite the many evidence found for the US
(Bruce et al. 2000, Fuchs 1982, Giandrea et al. 2008, Gu 2009, Hurd 1996,
Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2007). It is likely that these different findings
can be explained by the fact that part-time employment is generally more
likely in Europe than in the US (OECD 2014). As a consequence, bridge
jobs are much less important in European countries (Brunello and Langella
2012) which may explain the higher incidence of transitioning to self-
employment at older ages in the US.
Together with Chapter 6, Chapter 5 suggests that part-time (paid) employ-
ment possibilities may especially be used as gradual retirement route (for
men) in the Netherlands. As long as such part-time work at older ages
induces labor supply (as suggested by Chapter 5) part-time employment
possibilities may complement the income streams available at old age,
thereby increasing the adequacy of resources available in retirement (as
analyzed in Chapter 3) as well as the resilience of financial well-being
to reforms in the pension system (as mentioned in Chapter 2). However,
Chapter 4 indicates that individuals with more affluent characteristics self-
select themselves into part-time employment. This means that individuals
with less affluent characteristics, who are likely to be more vulnerable to a
low income during retirement, have fewer opportunities and/or do not
choose to exploit the advantages of part-time employment.
2 Pension reform and income
inequality among the elderly in
15 European countries
Abstract
The ageing of populations and hampering economic growth increase
pressure on public finances in many advanced capitalist societies. Conse-
quently, governments have adopted pension reforms in order to relieve
pressure on public finances. These reforms have contributed to a relative
shift from public to private pension schemes. Since private social security
plans are generally less redistributive than public social security, it can
be hypothesized that the privatization of pension plans has led to higher
levels of income inequality among the elderly. This study contributes to
the income inequality and pension literature by empirically analysing the
distributional effects of shifts from public to private pension provision in
15 European countries for the period 1995-2007. We do not find evidence
that shifts from public to private pension provision lead to higher levels
of income inequality or poverty among elderly people. The results appear
to be robust for a wide range of econometric specifications.
A journal version of this chapter is published in the International Journal of Social Wel-
fare (Van Vliet et al. 2012). Different versions of this chapter are published as Goudswaard
et al. (2012), Van Vliet et al. (2011). The chapter is co-authored by Olaf van Vliet, Koen
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den, 8-10 June, 2011 and the NAKE Researchers Day 2011. We would like to thank the
participants, in particular Bjørn Hvinden, Tim van Rie, Frank Vandenbroucke and Peter
Whiteford, for their helpful suggestions. In addition, thanks to Marike Knoef and Ben
van Velthoven for their useful comments.
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2.1 Introduction
The ageing of populations has triggered pension reform in many indus-
trialized countries over the past decades. Plans to alleviate the pressure
of ageing on public finances have resulted in a trend towards more pri-
vate pension provision (OECD 2009b, Orenstein 2011). In the pension
literature, remarkably little attention has been paid to the distributive
effects of these reforms for the elderly. Since private social security ar-
rangements generally entail less income redistribution than public social
security (Goudswaard and Caminada 2010), it could be expected that
shifts from public to private in the pension provision lead to higher lev-
els of income inequality and poverty among elderly people (Arza 2008).
This would imply a trade-off between alleviating the pressure on public
finances on the one hand and income inequality among the elderly on
the other. The empirical literature in this field exists mainly of either
cross-national studies at one moment in time (for example Smeeding and
Williamson 2001) or descriptive analyses for a single country (for example
Milligan 2008). As a consequence, relatively little insight has been gained
about how pension reforms have influenced income inequality and poverty
among the elderly in advanced capitalist countries over the past decades.
The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between
the developments in pension systems and the variation in income inequal-
ity and poverty among the elderly across countries and over time. First, we
analysed to what extent reforms have resulted in a trend towards relatively
more private pension provision across advanced capitalist countries. To
that end, we used the most recent release of the OECD Social Expenditure
database (OECD 2010b). Indeed, in the pension systems of many countries,
there have been shifts from public to private in the period 1995-2007, but
there is substantial variation across countries. Subsequently, we examined
to what extent these shifts have influenced income inequality levels and
poverty rates among the elderly, based on a number of pooled time series
cross-section regression analyses. Our focus on annual macro data for a
relatively short period implies that this article does not contain an integral
income redistribution analysis based on the discounted values of lifetime
income, contributions paid and benefits received. The main result of our
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analysis is that a relatively higher private share of pension provision in a
country is not associated with higher levels of income inequality or poverty
in that country. With respect to inequality and poverty, the analysis has
relied mainly on EU ECHP/SILC data (Eurostat 2011b), but the results
appear to be robust for other data and for a wide range of econometric
specifications.
The article is structured as follows. In section 2.2, the relationship
between pension reform and income inequality among elderly people is
introduced. Section 2.3 describes the data, measures and method used in
the study. Descriptive statistics, the results of the regression analyses and
the sensitivity analyses are presented in section 2.4. In the fifth section,
some explanations for our findings are discussed and the article closes
with the conclusions in the sixth and last section.
Pension reforms 2.2
Public and private pensions 2.2.1
In an era of ageing populations, relieving public finances is one of the
most important drivers of pension reform. An increase in the number
of pensioners relative to the labour force leads to increasing budgetary
pressure. Budgetary problems as a consequence of cyclical shocks, such as
the recession of 2008-2009, may increase the pressure to reform (public)
pension systems even further. However, even though the pressure to
reform pensions is high, pension reforms are in reality often unruly. Since
pensions are based on long-term contracts, reforms are complicated by
institutional path dependency (Myles and Pierson 2001). Changes as
higher statutory pension ages or reductions of pension benefits are often
controversial from a political viewpoint and therefore difficult to realize.
Hence, many countries have chosen for a different approach to pension
reform. This approach, which is often labelled pension privatization,
entails shifts from public pension provision to a mix of public and private
pension provisions and a change from the defined benefit to the defined
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contribution system (OECD 2009b, Orenstein 2011).1 In Germany, for
instance, the 2001 pension reform consisted of a reduction of the public
pension levels and the introduction of state-subsidised, voluntary private
pension schemes (Natali and Rhodes 2008). Based on a comparative case
study, Arza (2008) showed that this is the type of pension reform that has
also been opted for in Italy, Sweden, Poland and the United Kingdom.
The relevant question here is how relative shifts in the pension provi-
sion affect the income distribution among elderly people. Public pension
plans are generally based on income-related funding and flat rate benefits,
which relatively strongly benefit lower income groups. Therefore, public
pensions are expected to generate a more equal income distribution and
less poverty among the elderly. In a number of OECD countries, the level
of public pension benefits is such that a relatively small percentage of
pensioners has fallen below the poverty line. Private pension plans, in con-
trast, are based on a link between contributions paid and benefits received
and therefore are not expected to contain elements of (ex ante) income
redistribution. A private pension insurance is actuarially fair as a rule.
This means that each individual is provided with benefits whose actuarial
value is equal to his contributions, given the chance of the insured event
occurring. This is the case for individual private pension insurances that
have a defined contribution character. However, private earnings-related
pension schemes (in the second pillar) may not be actuarially fair and may
contain elements of redistribution. This is often the case when (supple-
mentary) private schemes are negotiated by social partners in collective
labour contracts. These schemes are mandatory for (a group of) work-
ers. Defined benefit pension schemes, for example, generally redistribute
resources both within generations (for instance through redistributive ele-
ments such as thresholds or ceilings) and across generations (risk sharing,
back service). Also, tax advantages (to households or to employers) can
be used to stimulate the provision of private pensions. This is often the
case in supplementary pension programs, where contributions are tax
1A shift from public to private pension provision alleviates the pressure on public
finances, but it does not solve financing problems of the pension system. If a deficit of the
pension system is considered as unsustainable, the only solution to make it sustainable is
reducing benefits, increasing contributions, or both, either publicly or privately (Barr and
Diamond 2009).
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exempt (Yoo and De Serres 2004). The fiscal advantages related to, for
example, supplementary private pension plans are positively related to
income levels in most countries and thus favour the rich (Goudswaard
and Caminada 2010). In general, as Ferrarini and Nelson (2003) showed,
social insurance is less equalising after taxation in all countries.
In summary, it seems plausible that private pension schemes will
generate less income redistribution from rich to poor than public programs,
although at this stage their distributional impact in a cross-country analysis
is not fully clear. In other words, there are good reasons to expect that
relative shifts from public to private pensions lead to higher income
inequality among the elderly.
Earlier findings 2.2.2
Much literature analyses the relationship between social security and
income inequality in general. Based on a cross-national study at the
macro level Smeeding and Williamson (2001) concluded that high levels of
public social spending are associated with low levels of income inequality
and poverty. Caminada and Goudswaard (2005) and Goudswaard and
Caminada (2010) compared the redistributive effects of public and private
social security. Taking a broad definition of social security and based on an
international comparative analysis, they concluded that the redistributive
effect of private social security is smaller than that of public social security.
However, Caminada et al. (2012) found no significant effects of private
social expenditure on poverty rates.
Interestingly, the findings for pensions seem to be less ambiguous than
for social security in general. A number of cross-sectional studies indicate
that income inequality among elderly people is lower as larger shares
of the income of the elderly consist of public pension benefits (Brown
and Prus 2004, Fukawa 2006, Weller 2004). The number of studies on
the income effects of private pensions is considerably smaller, but Schirle
(2009) found for Canada that a larger private share in the pension provision
is associated with an increasing income inequality among elderly people.
Combining the results of the studies on public and private pensions, it
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seems plausible that a shift from public to private leads to more income
inequality among the elderly.
Comparable effects of shifts in the public/private-mix of pensions
were found for poverty among elderly people. Based on country-specific
analyses over time, Oshio and Shimizutani (2005) and Milligan (2008)
concluded that a larger public share in the pension provision is related
to less poverty among elderly people. Hughes and Stewart (2004) found
that increases in the private share are associated with an increase in the
poverty rate among elderly people.
From a methodological perspective, the empirical literature on pension
reform and income inequality can be divided into two types of studies.
The first type consists of cross-sectional studies, comparing a number of
countries in a certain year (Brown and Prus 2004, Fukawa 2006, Weller
2004). In these studies, the effects of pension reform cannot be analysed
over time. The second type of studies is mainly focused on developments
over a longer period but, for a single country (Milligan 2008, Myles 2000,
Oshio and Shimizutani 2005, Schirle 2009). In these studies, it is quite
difficult to examine whether the findings also hold for other comparable
pension reforms in other countries. Therefore, in this study the dimension
time will be incorporated into a cross-sectional analysis.
2.3 Data, measures and method
2.3.1 Public and private pension expenditure
Most comparative studies on welfare states rely on social expenditures as
indicator to analyse welfare state reforms across different countries. To
examine changes in the public/private-mix of pension provision, we used
data from the most recent OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD
2010b). This database contains social expenditure data on both public
and private pension schemes. In this database, programmes are classified
as social when two conditions are simultaneously satisfied (Adema 2010,
Adema and Ladaique 2009). First, they have to be intended to serve a social
purpose, such as old-age. Other policy areas with a social purpose are:
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survivors, incapacity related benefits, health, family, active labour market
policies, unemployment, housing and a category of other social security
areas. Second, they have to involve either interpersonal redistribution
or compulsory participation. Hence, purely private old-age plans which
are the result of direct market transactions by individual people are not
included. The distinction between public and private social security is
based on the institution that controls the financial flows, namely public
agencies or private bodies.
Our study analysed public and private social pension expenditure, both
expressed as percentage of GDP and as millions of U.S. dollars (constant
(2000) prices, ppp) per pensioner. A relevant measure is the share of
private social pension expenditure as percentage of total social pension
expenditure. This measure provides a good indication of shifts in the
public/private-mix. The measure for private social pension expenditure
indicates the total of expenditures on mandatory and voluntary pension
schemes.2 Furthermore, the indicators include expenditures on incomes of
people who retired at the statutory retirement age and of early retirees.3
Expenditures on survivor pensions are not included in the indicators.
In a cross-national analysis at the macro-level, expenditure indicators
have some limitations (Van Vliet 2010). First, differences in expenditure
patterns may be driven by differences in demographic trends across coun-
tries. When increases in pension expenditure fall short of increases in the
number of retirees, this may have negative consequences for the incomes of
elderly people and for the income inequality among the elderly. To control
for the ageing of populations, we included a control variable measuring
the percentage of population aged 65 and above. For this measure,we
used data from Eurostat (2011a). Second, expenditures do not indicate
institutional differences in pension systems, such as a pay-as-you-go ver-
2The OECD Social Expenditure Database also provides the possibility to present
expenditures on mandatory and voluntary private pension separately. However, since
the classification of private pension spending into mandatory and voluntary pension
schemes is not unequivocal, we mainly use the total of these two categories. As a
robustness check, we also analysed the income effects of mandatory and voluntary
pension schemes separately, which did not alter the results (reported below). Note that
the classification into public, mandatory private and voluntary private pensions coincides
with the classification into first, second and third pillar pensions respectively.
3Expenditures on public pensions also include spending on some other services for
the elderly (see Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011).
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sus a funded system, or a defined benefit versus a defined contribution
system. Third, the variation in the tax treatment of contributions and
benefits across countries was not taken into account. Ideally, we would use
net expenditure on pensions, after tax, but international standardised data
for such an indicator are unfortunately not available for a longer period.
Despite these limitations, pension expenditures can give an indication of
shifts from public to private pensions.
2.3.2 Income inequality and poverty among the elderly
For income inequality and poverty among the elderly, the study relied on
two indicators provided by Eurostat (2011b). Income inequality among
the elderly was measured by the S80/S20 ratio of people aged 65 and over.
This indicator is constructed by dividing the total disposable income of
the top 20 percent incomes of elderly by the total equivalized disposable
income of the bottom 20 percent incomes of people aged 65 and over. A
higher value of this indicator implies a higher inequality among the elderly.
Although this indicator gives a good indication of income inequality at
the extremes of the distribution, it neglects shifts between other quintiles.
Therefore, the Gini-coefficient and the Atkinson index may be preferred
measures of income inequality. However, data on income inequality
among elderly measured by either the Gini coefficient or the Atkinson
index are not available for a reasonable number of years.
Poverty among the elderly is measured by the percentage of people
aged 65 and over who live below the poverty line of 60 percent of median
equivalized (disposable) income of the total population. This poverty line
of 60 percent is also officially used as poverty measure by the European
Union. A higher value of this indicator implies a higher rate of poverty
among elderly. Note that this indicator is a relative poverty line and can
therefore be seen as a detailed representation of income inequality for the
lower part of the income distribution.
Section 2.3 Data, measures and method 23
Method 2.3.3
To examine the relationship between pension reform and income inequality
among the elderly, we run a number of pooled time series cross-section
regression analyses. Our estimations take the following form:
Qit = α + βXit + δZit + µi + λt + εit (2.1)
In equation (2.1), Q represents the dependent variables of income inequal-
ity (S80/S20) or poverty (PL 60) among the elderly. Variables describing
the pension system, public pension expenditures, private pension expen-
ditures and total pension expenditures (all as a percentage of GDP) and
the private share of pension expenditures (private pension expenditures
as percentage of total pension expenditures), are represented in vector X.
The control variables ageing (share of people aged 65 and over relative
to total population) and real GDP per capita (constant (2000) prices ppp)
are represented in vector Z. For the latter variable, we used data from the
OECD (OECD 2011a). Recognising that the variation in income inequality
and poverty among the elderly may be related to unobserved country-
and year-specific effects, country (i) and year (t) dummies are modelled by
µ and λ, respectively. The error-term ε follows an AR(1)-process to correct
for autocorrelation. In addition, we used panel-corrected standard errors
to correct for panel-heteroskedasticity and simultaneous spatial correlation
(Beck and Katz 1995).
Constrained by data availability, the study covered 15 European coun-
tries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden
and the United Kingdom) for the years 1995 up till 2007. In the dataset,
a number of observations were missing. This is in particular the case for
the income inequality and poverty data and especially for Scandinavian
countries. However, all countries were included in the regression analyses.
Several sensitivity tests, which are discussed below, indicate that results
did not suffer from the missing data.
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2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 illustrates the developments in pension expenditures for the
included countries from 1995 up till 2007. On average, social expenditures
as a percentage of GDP on both public and private pensions have been
increased. Hence, total pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP has
increased too. Furthermore, the data show an increase in the private
share of total pension expenditure, albeit to a limited extent. Private
spending as a share of total pension expenditure rose on average from 14.3
percent in 1995 to 14.9 percent in 2007. This indicates a relative shift from
public to private in the pension provision. More interestingly, there is
substantial variation in the developments of private pension expenditure
as a share of total pension expenditure across countries. In Belgium for
instance, social expenditures on private pensions increased more than
expenditures on public pensions. This has resulted in a shift from public
to private in the total pension expenditure. This trend fits well with the
trend that is reported in Peeters et al. (2003), which is based on data from
national sources. In other countries, such as Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, shifts in the public/private-mix are
the result of opposing trends in public and private pension expenditure.
Indeed, there is a negative correlation between yearly changes in private
and public pension expenditure of -0.22 which is significant at the 1
percent level.
Table 2.2 shows a general trend towards less income inequality and less
poverty among the elderly in the period 1995-2007.4 In 2007, the average
income inequality among elderly (mean 12 countries) has decreased by
4These results should be interpreted with caution, because there is a disruption in
the time series of inequality and poverty indicators presented in table 2.2. Until 2001,
data were provided by the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP). Since
2005 all EU-15 countries provide data from the new European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). During the transitional period poverty indicators were
provided by national sources which were harmonized ex-post as closely as possible
with EU-SILC definitions by Eurostat. Despite the fact that most EU-SILC variables are
defined in the same way as the corresponding ECHP variables, some differences arise.
The transition from ECHP to EU-SILC possibly explains the large number of missing
observations in this period. See for more details Eurostat (2005).
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almost 18 percent compared to 1995. A decreasing trend over time is also
shown by the poverty rate among the elderly which has decreased by
almost 9 percent on average. There is some variation in trends between
countries still. Greece and Portugal, for example, have shown a huge
decline in poverty rates among elderly over time. However, Finland and
Ireland have faced a relatively large increase in poverty among elderly
in the same period. These trends are robust with respect to the poverty
lines applied (50, 60 or 70% of median equivalized income). Nevertheless,
different patterns of poverty can be seen within countries. Germany and
the Netherlands, for example, have shown a decrease in poverty rates
among elderly when using poverty line of 50 percent, while both countries
have shown an increase in poverty rates in the same period when using a
poverty line of 60 and 70 percent. These observations imply that relatively
more elderly live at risk of poverty in 2007 compared with 1995, but less
elderly find themselves at the absolute bottom of the income distribution.
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Regression results 2.4.2
The social outcomes presented above suggest that there is no evidence that
an increasing share of private pensions leads to higher income inequality
and poverty among elderly. In Belgium, for instance, the country with the
largest relative shift from public to private, income inequality and poverty
among the elderly decreased. In Italy, the country with the largest relative
shift from private to public, an increase in income inequality and poverty
rates among the elderly can be observed. In order to take our analysis
beyond the descriptive statistics, we continue with regression analyses on
the 15 European countries over the years 1995-2007.
The results of the regression analyses are presented in table 2.3 and
table 2.4. The effects of public pension expenditure as percentage of GDP
on income inequality among the elderly are negative, but not significant.
Model 7 indicates that public pension expenditure as percentage of GDP
is negatively and significantly related to poverty among the elderly. Con-
sistent with our expectations based on the literature, this suggests that
higher social spending on public pensions is associated with lower poverty
rates among the elderly. However, the results in Models 9 and 11 indicate
that there is only weak evidence for this relationship.
With respect to private pension expenditure as percentage of GDP, the
results do not indicate a positive effect of private pension expenditure
on income inequality. In contrast, the negative coefficients suggest that
private pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP is negatively related
to income inequality among the elderly. Model 2 indicates also a negative
coefficient for private pension expenditure as percentage of total pension
expenditure, but the Models 3 and 5 show a positive effect for the private
share of the pension provision, albeit not significant. However, when
pension expenditure is expressed in dollars per pensioner, to exclude any
denominator effect of GDP, the results indicate a negative effect for the
private pension expenditure as a share of total pension expenditure again.
This implies that higher spending on private pensions in general, and
a shift from public to private pensions in particular, are not associated
with higher income inequality among the elderly. Turning to poverty, all
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Table 2.2: Trends in social outcomes among elderly people, 1995-2007
Income inequality among Poverty among the
the elderly (S80/S20) elderly (PL 60)
1995 2007 Change 1995 2007 Change
95-07 95-07
Austria 4.0 3.2 -0.8 20.0 14.0 -6.0
Belgium 4.9 3.4 -1.5 25.0 23.0 -2.0
Denmark - 2.7 - - 17.7 -
Finland 3.0 2.9 -0.1 12.0 21.6 9.6
France 4.8 4.0 -0.8 19.0 13.1 -5.9
Germany 4.9 4.2 -0.7 15.0 16.2 1.2
Greece 7.6 4.8 -2.8 35.0 22.9 -12.1
Ireland 3.9 3.4 -0.5 19.0 28.3 9.3
Italy 4.6 4.7 0.1 18.0 21.9 3.9
Luxembourg 4.1 3.2 -0.9 12.0 7.2 -4.8
Netherlands 4.2 3.2 -1.0 8.0 9.5 1.5
Norway - 2.8 - - 14.1 -
Portugal 6.6 6.0 -0.6 38.0 25.5 -12.5
Sweden - 2.8 - - 9.9 -
United Kingdom 4.9 4.4 -0.5 32.0 27.6 -4.4
Mean (all countries) 4.8 3.7 -1.1 21.1 18.2 -2.9
Mean (12 countries) 5.2 4.3 -0.9 23.0 21.0 -2.0
Note: Mean 12 countries excluding Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Eurostat SILC-database (Eurostat, 2011a) and own calculations.
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measures for private pension provision are not significantly related to
poverty among the elderly.
The results for total pension expenditure are comparable to the case of
public pension expenditures. Total pension expenditure as a percentage of
GDP, which consists of the sum of public and private pension expenditure,
is negatively and significantly correlated with poverty among the elderly,
while no significant correlation can be observed between total pension
expenditures and income inequality among the elderly.
As to graying populations, the results indicate that the effect of graying
on income inequality and poverty among the elderly is limited. It seems
that the percentage of the population aged 65 and over is slightly negatively
correlated with income inequality among the elderly, while no correlation
can be observed between this variable and poverty among the elderly.
The results suggest that there is no clear linkage between GDP per capita
and income inequality among the elderly. However, GDP per capita
is positively and significantly associated with poverty rates among the
elderly.
In summary, the results of the regression analyses suggest that higher
private expenditure for pensions as a percentage of GDP, per pensioner
and as a share of total pension expenditure are not associated with higher
levels of income inequality among the population aged 65 and above.
Furthermore, the regression analyses indicate a poor linkage between
private provisions of pension schemes and poverty rates among the elderly.
Taken together, these results do not provide evidence for the expectation
that shifts from public to private pension provision are associated with
higher levels of income inequality.
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2.4.3 Sensitivity analyses
Since the results are not in line with our expectations based on both theoret-
ical and empirical literature on pension reform and income inequality, we
perform a variety of robustness checks. First, we examine the dependence
of the results on different specifications of the empirical model. Estima-
tions without correction for autocorrelation or panel-corrected standard
errors do not alter the result that shifts towards more private pensions
are not correlated with higher income inequality or poverty levels among
the elderly. With respect to the most important independent variable, the
share of private pension expenditure as percentage of total pension expen-
diture, it should be noted that the variation within countries over time is
rather small. In combination with country fixed-effects, this reduces in
itself the chance to find any significant effects for this variable. Therefore,
we ran the analyses also without country fixed-effects, which did not alter
the results. Other specifications that we applied, such as first differences,
log-transformations, lagged variables or the exclusion of year fixed-effects
did not change the results. Neither do the results change if an independent
variable as graying is excluded or if a measure for a country’s wealth such
as GDP per capita is included.
To further probe the robustness of our results, we took into account
that our analyses were based on unbalanced panels owing to a number of
missing observations. This is especially the case for Scandinavian countries
with regard to the inequality and poverty indicators. This could lead to
biased results, since Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have below
average poverty and inequality levels. Therefore, we also ran regressions
in which the number of observations is extended. We employed regression
analyses in which both the dependent and the independent variables are
linearly inter- and extrapolated and analyses in which only the dependent
variables are inter- and extrapolated. Since extrapolation is associated
with more uncertainty than interpolation, we also ran regressions for only
interpolated dependent variables. In addition, we used more sophisticated
techniques such as cubic- and cubic-spline interpolation.5 All analyses
5We use several inter- and extrapolation techniques such as linear inter- and extrap-
olation, cubic interpolation and cubic spline interpolation. For applications of linear
interpolation, see for example L’horty and Rault (2003), Clarke et al. (2008), Stern (2005)
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indicate that our results are not biased by the missing observations. This
is also confirmed by the results of regression analyses in which the group
of Scandinavian countries is omitted. These results are in line with the
findings of Gustafsson and Johansson (1999), who found that the group of
Scandinavian countries do not influence the results of regression analyses
on income inequality and social expenditure very strongly. Moreover,
the results are neither affected by excluding the countries one by one in
the regression analyses. We also tested to what extent the results are
driven by the countries with the largest shifts in the public/private-mix,
namely Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. Regressions without these
three countries yielded similar results.
Finally, we examined the sensitivity of the results for the use of alter-
native indicators and data sources. With regard to poverty, the results of
estimation of poverty lines among the elderly of 50 and 70 percent are
comparable to the results of the poverty line of 60 percent. Subsequently,
we ran our main empirical specification for four different indicators for in-
come inequality among the elderly based on data from the OECD (OECD
2008).6 Our results with respect to the linkage between the share of private
pension expenditure and income inequality among the elderly appear to
be robust for Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers, the
standard coefficient of variation and the mean log deviation. Addition-
ally, the replication of the results presented in table 2.3 and 2.4 with Gini
coefficients and poverty lines7 among the elderly from the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS 2011) confirm our empirical results based on Eurostat
data. As to the independent variable, the measures for private pension
expenditure can be disaggregated into mandatory and voluntary private
pension expenditure. The results of the regression analyses with the dis-
and Toroj (2008). An example of cubic-spline interpolation in economics, which is based
on polynomial instead of linear methods, can be found in Nanda and Ross (2008).
6The main advantage of these OECD data is the availability of more sophisticated
income inequality indicators. However, the most important disadvantage of these data is
that at most 6 data points per country are available in the waves from mid 1970s till mid
2000s. Another advantage is that these data are available for a longer period and a larger
group of countries than the Eurostat data (Eurostat 2011b). Our results also hold for this
larger country group and longer period.
7The Gini coefficient among the elderly is provided by Wang and Caminada (2011)
who constructed this indicator from the micro data. The 40, 50 and 60 percent poverty
lines among the elderly are taken from the LIS Key Data (LIS 2011).
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aggregated measure do not differ from the results with the aggregated
measures. In summary, the combined evidence of these robustness checks
suggest that our results are robust with respect to different specifications,
variables and data sources.
2.5 Discussion
A number of tentative explanations is conceivable for our main finding
that shifts towards relatively more private pensions are not related to
higher levels of income inequality among the elderly. The level of sup-
plementary pension benefits is often strongly related to the income level
during working life. A more private pension provision therefore leads
to a higher supplementary pension for higher incomes than for lower
incomes. But it could be possible that even though the absolute increase
in private pension benefits is smaller for lower incomes than for higher
incomes, the relative increase for lower incomes is much larger than for
higher incomes. This is illustrated by Myles and Pierson (2001) in a study
on pension reform in Canada in the beginning of the 1990s. Burtless
(2006) also stated that the effects of changes in the public/private-mix
of pensions on replacement rates, the income from pensions relative to
income from work in the past, vary along the income distribution. A
possible scenario is that the coverage of private pensions has increased
and that this is mainly the case for lower income groups. This could be an
explanation for the fact that we did not find a relationship between shifts
in the public/private-mix of pensions and income inequality and poverty
among the elderly. Hence, further research at the macro-level could be
focused on specifying the effects of pension reform for different quintiles
of the income distribution.
In addition, it should be noted that the analyses in this study do
not account for determinants of income at the individual level. On the
one hand, this concerns general personal characteristics which determine
income such as education. On the other hand, current individual pension
benefits are determined by long-term effects such as previous wages,
contributions paid and macro-economic conditions in the past. It is hardly
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possible to capture this time dimension in a macro-level analysis. Another
factor that might influence pension benefits and incomes of elderly people
is the prevalence of deficiencies in contributions paid in the past (Esping-
Anderson and Myles 2006). Future empirical research based on micro-data,
in which it is possible to control for individual characteristics, may provide
more insight into the relationship between pension reform and income
inequality.
Finally, the use of pension expenditure data at the macro-level implies
some restrictions. Much information can be lost in classifying pension
programmes into pillars (Whitehouse 2002). Moreover, as mentioned
above, shifts in pension expenditure can only give a rough indication of
changes in institutional characteristics of pension systems.
Conclusion 2.6
In many industrialized countries, public pension systems have been re-
formed in order to alleviate the pressure on public finances resulting from
ageing populations. This has often led to shifts in the pension provision
from public to private. The average magnitude of these shifts remains
limited, but in a number of countries there have been substantial changes.
Since private pensions are probably less redistributive than public pen-
sions, these shifts could be hypothesized to lead to more income inequality
among retirees. This study contributes to the income inequality and pen-
sion literature by empirically analyzing the income effects of shifts in the
public/private-mix of pensions in 15 European countries for the period
1995-2007, using pooled time series cross-section regression analyses. The
most important finding is that shifts in the pension provision from public
to private do not (yet) seem to entail higher levels of income inequality
or poverty among people aged 65 and older. Intriguingly, this finding
is not in line with expectations in the literature on pension reform and
income inequality (Arza 2008, Fukawa 2006, Hughes and Stewart 2004,
Milligan 2008, Oshio and Shimizutani 2005, Weller 2004) and with litera-
ture on the redistributive effects of public and private social security in
general (Caminada and Goudswaard 2005, Goudswaard and Caminada
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2010). A tentative explanation for this finding is that more people in lower
income deciles have been covered by private pension plans. As a result,
the increases in the pension benefits of people with lower incomes were
relatively larger than for people with higher incomes.
The policy implication of our findings seems to be that the pressure of
the pension expenditures on public finances can be alleviated without seri-
ous consequences for income inequality or poverty among elderly people.
However, this policy implication should be taken with much caution, even
though the results are robust for other data sources and a broad range of
alternative econometric specifications. As suggested before, our results
could be explained by increases in the coverage of private supplementary
pension schemes rather than policy reforms. A higher coverage of private
programs also causes a shift from public to private, but will probably have
a rather different distributional impact compared to cutting public pension
benefits. In addition, empirical research at the macro-level goes along
with a number of limitations with respect to institutional characteristics of
pension systems and individual characteristics of pensioners.
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis does not include the years
after 2007. This implies that we have no prospect of the income effects
of the pension reforms which are triggered by the credit crisis at the
beginning of the 21st century. The results of this study provide no reason
to expect that recent reforms in many European countries will lead to more
income inequality and higher poverty rates among the elderly. Future
research should provide more insight into the answer to this question.
2.A Sensitivity analyses
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 of the main text present the results of panel data
regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly
(65+). Tables 2.5 to 2.15 below present the result of several robustness
checks:
Table 2.5: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social
outcomes among the elderly (65+) excluding graying (population aged 65
and over, % total)
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Table 2.6: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social
outcomes among the elderly (65+) including GDP per capita
Table 2.7: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social
outcomes among the elderly (65+) with linearly inter- and extrapolated
dependent and independent variables
Table 2.8: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social
outcomes among the elderly (65+) with linearly inter- and extrapolated
independent variables
Table 2.9: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social out-
comes among the elderly (65+) with linearly interpolated independent
variables
Table 2.10: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social out-
comes among the elderly (65+) with cubically interpolated independent
variables
Table 2.11: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social
outcomes among the elderly (65+) with cubically spline interpolated
independent variables
Table 2.12: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social
outcomes among the elderly (65+) excluding Scandinavian countries
Table 2.13: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and different
poverty lines (PL 50, PL 70) among the elderly (65+)
Table 2.14: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and income
inequality among the elderly (65+) using income distribution variables
of OECD (2010) instead of Eurostat (2011)
Table 2.15: Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social
outcomes among the elderly (65+) using a decomposition of private
pension expenditures into mandatory and voluntary expenditures









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 Measuring Retirement Savings
Adequacy; Developing a
multi-pillar approach in the
Netherlands
Abstract
The Dutch pension system is highly ranked on adequacy. These rankings,
however, are based on fictitious replacement rates for median income
earners. This paper investigates whether the Dutch pension adequacy
is still high when we take into account the resources that people really
accumulate, using a large administrative data set. A comprehensive
approach is followed: not only public and private pension rights, but also
private savings and housing wealth are taken into account. Summed over
all age- and socioeconomic groups we find a median gross replacement
rate of 83% and a net replacement rate of 101%. At retirement age, 31%
of all households face a gross replacement rate that is lower than 70% of
current income. Public and occupational pensions each account for more
than 35% of total pension annuities. Private non-housing assets account
for 14% and imputed rental income from net housing wealth accounts
for about 10%. Some vulnerable groups, such as the self-employed, have
A journal version of this chapter is published in the Journal of Pension Economics and
Finance (Knoef et al. 2014). Different versions of this chapter are published as Been et al.
(2014), Knoef et al. (2013b,c,d). The chapter is co-authored by Marike Knoef, Rob Alessie,
Koen Caminada, Kees Goudswaard and Adriaan Kalwij and is part of an international
comparative study regarding Retirement Savings Adequacy organized by the OECD. We
thank Netspar and Instituut Gak for their financial support. We would like to thank
seminar participants at the OECD Paris, WRR Den Haag, FISS Sigtuna, CPB Den Haag
and IIPF Taormina. More specifically, we are indebted to anonymous referees, Pablo
Antolín, Roel Beetsma, Lans Bovenberg, Monika Buetler, Flavia Coda Moscarola, Frank
den Butter, Elisabeth Eenkhoorn, Ben Geurts, André Knottnerus, Sylvia Kok-de Vries,
Stéphanie Payet, Harry ter Rele, Lou Spoor, Raun van Ooijen, Eduard Ponds, Arthur
van Soest, Daniel van Vuuren, Mathijn Wilkens, and Juan Yermo for providing us with
valuable comments.
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below average replacement rates. Results are fairly similar to results found
in the UK, indicating that we should be careful in evaluating the adequacy
of pensions systems on the basis of fictitious replacement rates.
3.1 Adequate retirement savings
In many Western countries, pension systems are affected by demographic
aging (OECD 2013c) and reforms are needed to keep the system sus-
tainable and adequate. A good pension system protects people against
poverty and smooths people’s income over their life-cycle. To achieve
these goals countries organize their pension system in very different ways.
Considerable effort has been made to compare pension systems across
countries and to identify strengths and weaknesses of different systems
(Allianz 2011, EC 2012, Mercer 2013, OECD 2013c). In these comparisons
the current Dutch pension system compares very favorably with regard to
pension adequacy.1 This is due to a relatively high flat-rate public pension,
but also to a high replacement rate for a fictitious person who earns a
median income during his whole career and accumulates a pension for
45 years.2 In practice, however, there are few Dutch people who actually
accumulate a pension for the full 45 years. The question arises whether
adequacy is still that high when we base adequacy on pension rights that
people actually accumulate in the current system. This paper therefore
examines the public and private pension rights that households have ac-
cumulated. We also investigate the role of private savings and housing
1In Mercer (2013) the Netherlands achieves the first place with regard to adequacy.
The EC (2012) shows that the Netherlands have one of the highest replacement rates and
lowest poverty rates for future retirees compared to other European countries. According
the Allianz (2011), the Netherlands ranks fifth, just after Australia, Sweden, Denmark
and New Zealand, in terms of the Pension Sustainability Index. This index does not take
into account the adequacy of pensions.
2OECD (2013c) produces replacement rates for fictitious persons who earn a median
income in several OECD countries. The Netherlands achieves the first place with a
gross replacement rate of 91.4% and a net replacement rate of 103.8%. These kind of
numbers are being used in pension system indicators such as the Melbourne Mercer
Global Pension Index (Mercer 2013).
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wealth could play during retirement. This gives us necessary integrated
results regarding the available resources to finance retirement.3
To be able to evaluate adequacy we need to know how much resources
retirees need. A variety of standards can be chosen against which to
judge adequacy. The Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) is the main theoretical
framework for assessing the adequacy of savings (Banks et al. 1998). In
this model, consumption is not determined by current income, but by
(expected) lifetime resources. According to the LCH, it is optimal for
individuals or households to save (or borrow) to the extent that, after
discounting, the marginal utility of consumption is smoothed over the life
cycle. However, the model does not provide straightforward predictions
on how much people save in various stages of their lives. Households
with identical lifetime incomes might choose different levels of savings
for a number of reasons - including uncertainty over future incomes and
over future needs, different degrees of risk aversion, variations in time
preference rates, the possible existence of liquidity constraints and bequest
motives. The model is therefore consistent with a substantial degree of
inequality in saving.
Several studies have used the life cycle model to analyze retirement
readiness. Bernheim et al. (2001) found a decline in consumption at re-
tirement that is highly correlated with the household income replacement
ratio. Households appear to discover that their resources after retirement
are insufficient to maintain their standards of living, and adjust their
consumption downward accordingly. In other words, people do not save
enough to smooth their consumption. Engen et al. (1999) argued that
smoothing marginal utility of consumption may have a different impact
on saving behavior than smoothing consumption as such. They developed
a stochastic life cycle model in which people save both for retirement and
for precautionary reasons, including uncertain lifespan. They conclude
that savings are adequate for a majority of households. Scholz et al. (2006)
developed an extensive stochastic life cycle model that also incorporates
government transfers and taxes, as well as medical expenses. They found
3Knoef et al. (2013a) simulate household income of the elderly in 2020. Compared
to Knoef et al. (2013a), we add analyses about private savings, housing wealth and the
composition of pension entitlements. Knoef et al. (2013b) preluded this project.
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that the model provides a good representation of households’ savings
behavior in the US. Fewer than 20% of the households save less than their
optimal levels, and the extent of under-saving is generally small.
A common element of these approaches is that people should save
enough to maintain their living standards after retirement. This does not
imply that consumption after retirement should be equal to consumption
before retirement. Consumption requirements are likely to fall when peo-
ple retire (Scholz et al. 2006). The most commonly used measure of relative
well-being after retirement is the income replacement rate. This is the
ratio of some post-retirement income (from pensions, annuitized wealth
holdings and so forth) to some pre-retirement income (such as earnings
during the years preceding retirement, or average earnings during the
career). Replacement rates are an important indicator of pension systems.
(OECD 2013c), for example, shows replacement rates for fictitious persons
in several countries with median earnings throughout their working life.
Boskin and Shoven (1987) argued that a replacement rate of less than unity
is consistent with the life cycle theory. Haveman et al. (2007) indicated that
a widely accepted standard in the literature is having a retirement income
equal to or greater than 70% of previous earnings. This is regarded as the
income necessary to maintain preretirement consumption. Binswanger
and Schunk (2012) investigated minimum acceptable income replacement
rates using surveys in the US and the Netherlands, and found that these
rates range from 95% to 45% across income quintiles in the US, and from
75% to 60% across income quintiles in the Netherlands. In this study
we also use (expected) replacement rates as a key indicator of savings
adequacy and retirement readiness. The standard is set at 70%, but we
can also show the results for alternative replacement rates. A second
approach is to set a social standard for adequacy. In this approach, retire-
ment income is considered adequate when it is equal to or greater than
poverty levels of income (Haveman et al. 2007). There are three ways of
setting the poverty line: an absolute standard, a relative standard and a
subjective standard (Caminada et al. 2012). The US poverty line is based
on an absolute standard, which remains fixed over time in real terms.
The EU-agreed relative poverty line is set at a fixed percentage of the
median income in each country. The at-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as
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the share of persons with an equivalized disposable income below 60%
of the national median equivalized disposable income. In several OECD
studies the poverty line is set at 50% of the median equivalized disposable
income. The subjective poverty line is based on respondents’ answers to
questions regarding what they consider to be an adequate standard of
living. Walker (1987) introduced the consensual budget standards method,
where members of the public together with some experts reach agreement
(consensus) about what people need as a minimum and then draw up
budgets to meet those needs. Hoff et al. (2009) applied this method for
the Netherlands and found, for example, that in 2008 a single man of
age 75 needed about 800 euro per month. De Bresser and Knoef (2014),
on the other hand, show that half of the respondents in a representative
Dutch household panel expect that they would need between 1.095 en
1.825 euros per month to meet their own minimal expenditure needs (in
2008 euros and equivalized to a single person household).
Another issue is that resource adequacy at the time of retirement does
not necessarily mean that incomes are adequate throughout a person’s
remaining lifetime. Resources may increase during retirement - due
to additional asset accumulation, bequests and so forth. But resources
may also deteriorate during retirement - due to cuts in pension benefits,
for example, or bad investments or increasing uncovered health costs.
Haveman et al. (2007) therefore examined the resource adequacy at two
points in time: at the time of retirement and ten years later. VanDerhei
and Copeland (2010) also measured retirement readiness at several points
in time. They argued that replacement rate measures are useful, but that
it is difficult to accurately integrate the concepts of longevity risks, post
retirement investment risks and uninsured healthcare risks. They follow
an approach in which a household is considered to run short of money
if its resources are not sufficient to meet minimum retirement expenses
plus uncovered expenses from the nursing home and healthcare. Expenses
are derived from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, based on actual
observed expenditure of the elderly for different family sizes and income
levels. This approach has its advantages, but the problem is that observed
consumption patterns of retirees are constrained by their resources. If
their resources fall short, their observed expenses may not reflect their real
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needs in retirement. Consequently, the method used by VanDerhei and
Copeland cannot provide the (only) benchmark against which to judge
the adequacy of resources.
This paper uses a large administrative data set to scrutinize the re-
sources that households of different generations have accumulated to
finance retirement. This is in stark contrast with the approach taken in
OECD (2013c) where a fictitious person is analyzed. To develop a more
comprehensive view on pension adequacy not only public and private
pensions, but also private savings and housing wealth are taken in to
account. Private savings and housing wealth are annuitized, taking into
account household age, age differences between household members, and
economies of scale. Furthermore, because of the large administrative data
set, we can draw credible conclusions for specific vulnerable groups. To
investigate the bandwidth of the results, we investigate several scenarios
as to what will happen from the time of observation until retirement. This
multi-pillar approach is highly applicable to other countries, although
the implementation of the approach may be limited by the availability of
country-specific data.
When we only consider public and occupational pension income we
find a median gross and net replacement rate of 71% and 84%, respectively.
Private savings and housing wealth can play a substantial role to increase
adequacy, but even when these are taken into account about 31% of the
households do not reach a gross replacement rate of 70%. The results are
fairly comparable to the results of Crawford and O’Dea (2012), who per-
form a comparable type of analysis for the UK. So, although the pension
system of the UK achieves a much lower international rank on adequacy
than the Dutch pensions system,4 the results are fairly comparable when
we consider adequacy on the basis of real pension savings. This shows
that that we should be cautious in drawing conclusions about the perfor-
mance of pension systems across countries on the basis of indices that use
fictitious replacement rates.
4The UK achieves the 8th place in the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index and
has a gross replacement rate of 37.9% and a net replacement rate of 48.0% for a median
earner. The Netherlands achieves the 1st place with a gross replacement rate of 91.4%
and a net replacement rate of 103.8% for a median earner.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the Dutch
pension system and section 3.3 introduces the data. Section 3.4 shows
descriptive statistics of income and wealth in 2008 and section 3.5 describes
our method. Section 3.6 predicts financial resources during retirement
and replacement rates. Section 3.7 focuses on several vulnerable groups,
such as self-employed households, immigrants and households on social
assistance. Section 3.8 analyzes the sensitivity of the results with regard to
assumptions about indexation, real rates of return, housing prices and the
depletion of housing wealth. Finally, section 3.9 concludes.
The Dutch Pension System 3.2
As in many European countries, the Dutch pension system consists of
three pillars. The first is a pay-as-you-go system and involves a flat-rate
public pension benefit for all residents as from the statutory retirement
age of 65 onwards. The level of the public pension is linked to the net
minimum wage and depends on the number of years that a person has
resided in the Netherlands. Each pensioner living in a couple household
who has lived in the Netherlands between the ages of 15 and 65 receives
50% of the minimum wage, and single pensioners receive 70% of the
minimum wage. For people with a low pension income and almost no
wealth, the first pillar is topped up with social assistance to guarantee a
social minimum.
Several OECD countries have recently increased their statutory pension
age, or will do so in the coming decades (OECD 2013c). In the Netherlands,
the statutory retirement age increased by one month as of January 2013,
and will gradually increase to 66 in 2019 and 67 in 2023. It has been
proposed to increase the statutory retirement age more rapidly: to 66 in
2018 and 67 in 2021.
The Dutch second pillar consists of capital-funded occupational pen-
sions, of which the primary responsibility lies with employers and em-
ployees. Mandatory occupational pension accumulation is agreed upon
in collective labor market agreements in the Netherlands. As a conse-
quence, 90% of all employees have a pension scheme with their employer.
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Occupational pensions mainly consist of defined-benefit pension plans.
Until the beginning of the 21st century, most pension plans aimed to pay
a pension income of 70% of final gross wage from the age of 65 onwards if
an employee had worked fulltime for at least 40 years. From 2003 onwards,
pension funds have lowered their ambition, and they now aim to pay 70%
of the average career salary, instead of 70% of the final gross salary (includ-
ing public pension benefits). The recent financial crisis has shown that the
Dutch pension system is vulnerable to shocks in financial markets. Many
pension funds have had difficulties achieving their indexation ambitions,
and several funds recently were even compelled to cut nominal pension
rights. Also, annual tax-favored pension accruals have been reduced from
2.25% to 2.15% and will be reduced further to 1.875%. This means that
the percentage by which pensions are built up each year is reduced and
that one has to work more years to achieve the same pension income.
Furthermore, the age that forms the basis for the determination of the
pension premiums increased from 65 to 67 as of 2014. Early retirement will
consequently become financially less attractive, and the pension income of
future retirees is likely to become less generous.
The third pillar is formed by private individual pension products (such
as life annuities) and other private savings. Until a major tax reform in
2001, everyone could buy life annuities at tax beneficial terms up to a
certain limit (e.g. premiums up to 2,808 euro were fiscally attractive in
the year 2000). After the tax reform, this limit was reduced in 2002 to
1,069 euro, and only the self-employed and individuals with a gap in
their pension entitlements were allowed to buy life annuities at fiscally
attractive terms up to higher amounts. Other pillars are housing wealth
or an extension of working life on a part-time or fulltime basis. People
who have amortized part of their mortgage benefit from lower housing
costs during retirement. Although not commonly done by the current
generation of elderly, people may move or use reverse mortgages to deplete
housing wealth.
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Data 3.3
To estimate the extent of financial resources available to the current labor
force upon entering retirement, we combine administrative data with
assumptions as to what will happen from the time of observation until the
day of retirement. This section describes the data that are used. We com-
bine as many wealth components as possible in evaluating the retirement
readiness of the Dutch population: public pension rights (PAYG), occupa-
tional pension rights, individual annuity insurances, housing wealth and
private savings. The most recent data about occupational pension rights
come from 2008. Therefore, a representative sample of households in 2008
forms the basis of all of our data.
To assess the pension rights accumulated in public old-age pensions,
we take administrative data from the 2008 ‘Dutch statistics on public
pension entitlements’ (in Dutch: Algemene Ouderdomswet aanspraken
totaal, AOWA). These data contain information about the public pension
entitlements that have been built up by people between the ages of 15 and
64.
Concerning occupational pensions, we use of the 2008 ‘Dutch statistics
on occupational pension entitlements’ (PA). These data provide informa-
tion about the occupational pension entitlements that have been built up
by people between the ages of 15 and 64. This information is gathered by
Statistics Netherlands from occupational pension funds in the Netherlands.
Pension funds deliver data to Statistics Netherlands about the annuity that
participants would receive in case they remain employed in their current
job with their current wage rate until the statutory retirement age of 65.
Not all pension funds have provided data to Statistics Netherlands, but the
aggregate amount of pension entitlement in the Netherlands is available
from the Dutch Central Bank (DNB), and Statistics Netherlands used this
information, together with employment data, to correct the individual
pension entitlements (Eenkhoorn and Zijlmans 2010). After a divorce,
occupational pension benefits are often partly paid out to the ex-partner.5
5Either an ex-partner receives part of the occupational pension benefits when the ex-
husband or ex-wife becomes 65, or entitlements are converted directly after the divorce
into two separate entitlements for both members of the divorced couple. Then, for
example, the benefits can start at different moments in time. Conversions are included
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To assess information about income and other wealth assets, admin-
istrative data were taken from the 2008 Dutch Income Panel data (IPO),
with wealth information from the tax office, banks and social security
administrations. Banks have to deliver data about savings accounts that
exceed 500 euro or yield interest of more than 15 euro a year. Checking
accounts are not included. Furthermore, the data contain information on
stocks, bonds and wealth from an own business. With regard to housing,
the data include information about the value of the house and the mort-
gage, the value of secondary houses and some moveable properties such
as houseboats.
Whereas the AOWA and PA data set contain information about the
entire Dutch population, IPO contains a representative sample of Dutch
households that are followed over time. We therefore merge AOWA and
PA to the IPO sample. Major advantages of these administrative data are
a very low attrition rate and a high level of representativeness. Attrition
takes place only because of immigration or death. Another advantage
of administrative data is that the observed variables are measured with
a high degree of accuracy. In this progress report we merged only the
2008 data, since this is the most recent year for which AOWA and PA are
available.
The data have some shortcomings. They do not, for example, provide
information about assets accumulated in personal defined-contribution
pension plans (third pillar). Data is available, however, regarding contri-
butions made to third pillar pension plans as from 1989, which provides
information about the wealth accumulated in third pillar pension plans
(Caminada 2000). Furthermore, young generations in the Netherlands of-
ten seek to avoid taxes through an endowment mortgage or an investment-
based mortgage. This means that the mortgage is not paid off during the
term of the mortgage. Instead, money is paid to an insurance company or
a bank, such that (part of) the mortgage can be paid off at the end of the
term. The money accumulated at the insurance company or at the bank is
not observed by the tax office, and is not available in the data.6 Also, we
in the data but there is no information regarding pensions that are partly paid out to
ex-partners when the participant becomes 65.
6In 2008, about 30% of the mortgages were endowment- or investment-based mort-
gages (Dijkhuizen 2013).
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do not know which households own an endowment or investment-based
mortgage.
Descriptive analysis 3.4
This section describes current income (3.4.1) and wealth (3.4.2) observed
for several age groups.
Income 3.4.1
Table 3.1 describes gross equivalized household income and the proportion
of households receiving income from the various income sources in 2008.
Income is measured in 2010 euros using the consumer price index. In
order to standardize household income to a single-person household, we
use the equivalence scale provided by Statistics Netherlands (Siermann
et al. 2004), which assumes that two adults need 37% more income than
a single adult to achieve the same welfare level.7 The households’ key
person, who is randomly drawn from the Dutch population and who is
followed over time in the IPO data set, determines the age category of the
household.
As expected, labor income is the most important income component
and is highest for people between the ages of 50 and 54. Average disability
and unemployment benefits increase until the statutory retirement age of
65. This growth is a combination of age, period and cohort effects, which
cannot be distinguished. Furthermore, older individuals have longer
unemployment durations on average, which lead to higher unemployment
benefits per year. Public pension benefits are received as from the age
of 65, so before the age of 65 we only observe public pension benefits of
household members that are 65 or older (e.g. partners or parents in the
same household). In the age group 60-64, early retirement income becomes
important and seems to replace labor income at least partly. Non-labor
income includes interest received from bank accounts, dividends from
7Kalmijn and Alessie (2008) found that the modified OECD scale and the equivalence
scale of Statistics Netherlands yield very similar results.
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Table 3.1: Household income, 2008a
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70+ All
Average income
Labor income 32,332 35,776 31,767 15,992 4,388 1,507 22,908
Disability insurance 696 1,534 2,121 2,769 611 92 1,106
Unemployment insurance 294 382 667 843 204 26 353
Public pension (AOW) 206 220 365 1,545 10,853 12,545 3,495
Private pension 451 1,264 3,623 13,342 13,276 9,263 5,027
Non-labor income -2,242 -642 176 1,344 2,092 2,657 -129
Profit from business 3,974 4,091 3,816 3,392 1,435 306 3,028
Social assistance 538 582 595 606 192 149 458
Child- and study allowances 732 487 185 49 27 13 376
Other transfersb 268 287 239 277 280 461 304
Gross income 37,249 43,980 43,854 40,160 33,357 27,019 36,926
Disposable income 24,968 28,892 28,623 26,965 25,194 21,788 25,502
Median income
Labor income 29,808 33,603 28,661 4,286 0 0 18,019
Disability insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unemployment insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public pension (AOW) 0 0 0 0 13,001 13,033 0
Private pension 0 0 0 6,377 8,699 5,333 0
Non-labor income -1,823 -578 -25 11 289 469 0
Profit from business 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Social assistance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Child- and study allowances 718 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other transfersb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gross income 32,208 38,332 37,472 32,581 26,361 21,288 30,769
Disposable income 22,542 26,169 25,484 22,918 21,360 18,465 22,349
Proportion of households receiving various income components
Labor income 0.91 0.90 0.84 0.60 0.30 0.11 0.67
Disability insurance 0.10 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.01 0.12
Unemployment insurance 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06
Public pension (AOW) 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.30
Private pension 0.09 0.16 0.29 0.67 0.93 0.87 0.40
Non-labor income 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.91
Profit from business 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.13
Social assistance 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06
Child- and study allowances 0.67 0.41 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.34
Other transfersb 0.34 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.25
Gross income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Disposable income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Observations 22,245 6,645 6,277 6,479 4,620 10,299 56,565
a Equivalized household income in 2010 euros. The age of the key person in the households determines the age category of the
household.
b Rental house allowance, home owner grant, alimony and study costs allowance.
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stocks, income from bonds, imputed rent, mortgage interest, and income
from other property such as second houses. By using imputed rent (as
defined in IPO) and mortgage interest, we take into account that those
who paid off their mortgage take advantage of low housing expenses.
Mortgage interest explains the negative values for non-labor income in
the young age groups. Among the 70+ population, total gross income
is relatively low, which may be related to cohort effects. Finally, since
the income distribution is positively skewed, mean income is higher than
median income, which means that higher deciles earn a proportionally
larger share of total income.
Wealth 3.4.2
Table 3.2 presents average household wealth, median household wealth
and the proportion of households owning various wealth components in
2008. Wealth is measured in 2010 euros using the consumer price index
and is not equivalized to a one-person household.
The results indicate that wealth in savings accounts increases with
age, at least until the age of 70. Debts other than mortgage are owned
by somewhat more than 10% of the sample and are highest in the 55-59
age category. Stocks from a substantial holding are relatively high, but
only owned by not more than 1% of the sample. Securities, however, are
owned by more than 25% of the sample, and increase on average from
about 11,638 euro in the age category 35-49 to 25,641 euro in the 70+ age
category.
Property is owned by 65% of the sample. Most of them (78%) also have
a mortgage. The proportion of homeowners with a mortgage is high in the
35-49 age category (67/72=93%), but also in the 70+ category 41% of the
homeowners still have a mortgage. Net housing wealth (property value
minus the mortgage) is substantial and varies over age categories: it is
lowest in the 35-49 age category and highest in the 60-64 age category, with
an average of 206,066 and a median of 142,433 euro. The relatively high
levels of net housing wealth among older generations can be explained
by amortization of mortgages but also by home price increases before
2008. Between the beginning of the 1990s and 2008 home prices increased
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Table 3.2: Household wealth, 2008ab
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70+ All
Average wealth
Savings account 33,836 41,911 51,498 60,199 60,441 57,215 46,194
Debt other than mortgage 16,036 17,729 21,777 18,992 16,905 8,065 15,830
Stocks substantial shareholders 22,764 22,523 33,633 41,561 22,072 11,526 23,992
Securities 11,638 19,802 22,294 23,933 24,427 25,641 18,782
Mortgage 144,295 103,716 85,120 64,963 42,896 14,676 91,992
Property 248,294 270,271 272,856 271,029 248,363 160,313 240,192
Business assets 5,468 6,849 6,017 5,670 5,163 989 4,874
Net housing wealth 103,999 166,555 187,736 206,066 205,467 145,637 148,200
Mortgage to property ratio 0.63 0.43 0.37 0.27 0.20 0.10 0.43
Total wealth 161,669 239,910 279,401 318,437 300,664 232,943 226,211
Median wealth
Savings account 9,378 11,452 17,922 21,232 24,115 24,175 14,987
Debt other than mortgage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stocks substantial shareholders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Securities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mortgage 117,420 64,049 39,760 8,100 0 0 23,251
Property 227,579 234,051 229,736 222,186 201,693 0 211,401
Business assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net housing wealth 40,604 108,895 125,952 142,433 136,797 0 66,220
Mortgage to property ratio 0.63 0.37 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.36
Total wealth 70,826 136,023 155,577 181,251 173,095 68,523 105,828
Proportion of households owning various wealth components
Savings account 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.90
Debt other than mortgage 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.11
Stocks substantial shareholders 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Securities 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.26
Mortgage 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.51 0.41 0.18 0.53
Property 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.62 0.44 0.65
Business assets 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.10
Total wealth 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.93
Observations 22,245 6,645 6,277 6,479 4,620 10,299 56,565
a Household wealth in 2010 euros. The age of the key person in the households determines the age category of the household.
b 7% of the households do not have any wealth according to the IPO data. These households may only own checking accounts (with unlimited
amounts of money) and/or savings accounts that do not exceed 500 euro (or yield interest of more than 15 euro).
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substantially, with an increase of about 180% between 1995 and 2008. This
was at least partly due to decreasing mortgage interest rates and reduced
borrowing constraints (before the 1990s, income from second earners was
only taken into account for five years, and this became 30 years). The
share of homeowners decreases after the age of 65; therefore, also average
net property value decreases after the age of 70. A possible explanation
for this is that people’s health or the death of a partner forces them to
move to a nursing home or a smaller house. In addition, cohort effects
may play a role (homeownership is relatively low in old cohorts). Due
to fiscally attractive mortgage constructions, described in section 3, we
underestimate housing wealth. Housing wealth is rather illiquid, however,
and is therefore often excluded in empirical studies on savings adequacy
(Venti and Wise 1991). People in the Netherlands strongly prefer to stay
in their own home as long as possible (De Graaf and Rouwendal 2012).
Reverse mortgages could be used to access a portion of home equity, but
are still rare in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, housing wealth is very
important in saving for retirement. Persons owning a house, given that
they have repaid part of the loan on the house, need less income to finance
their necessary expenses than persons who live in a rental house.
Method and assumptions 3.5
This section explains the method and assumptions that we use to predict
financial resources during retirement for future generations of retirees.
Households may deplete wealth to finance their retirement. In view of
this we first describe how we annuitize household wealth. Secondly, we
describe the assumptions that we make for the pension components.
Annuitizing household wealth 3.5.1
Whereas pension rights and annuity insurances are observed at the in-
dividual level, private savings and housing wealth are observed at the
household level. We do not know how the members of a couple divide
their wealth over each other. Therefore, to determine pension savings
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adequacy we assume that couples smooth their wealth over time and
over each other. In the annuitization process we take into account that
members of a couple are often of different age and do not have the same
life expectancy. Furthermore, we take into account economies of scale to
reckon that when one of the partners dies, the remaining widow(er) needs
to deplete relatively more wealth to be equally well off as before, since he
or she loses economies of scale.
To investigate pension savings adequacy we project financial resources
as from the age of 65.8 To take both economies of scale and the age
difference between members of a couple into account, we distinguish
between the period where only the oldest member of the couple is 65 years
or older and the period where both members are 65 or older. When the



















where K is the amount of capital needed for annuity A as from the age
of 65. am is the age of the man, a f is the age of the woman, pn a f is the
probability that a woman of age a is still alive after n years and qn am
is the probability that a man of age a is still alive after n years. T is
the maximum life expectancy and E reflects the equivalence scale (how
much extra income a two-person household needs to be as well-off as
a one-person household). We standardize the annuity to a one-person
household. The first term of equation (3.1) reflects the period in which
the man already reached the age of 65 and the woman is younger than
65. In case the woman is no longer alive, the man needs an annuity A;
in case the woman is still alive, we assume the man needs 0.5× E of an
8The baseline scenario analyzes all pension components as from the age of 65. Sec-
tion 3.8 shows the results when all components are computed as from the age of 64 and
67. We do not differentiate the retirement age between cohorts, although young cohorts
may be better equipped to work longer than older cohorts are.
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annuity, because of the economies of scale. The second term of equation
(3.2) reflects the period in which both the man and the woman are of
age 65 or older. In case only the man or only the woman is alive, the
household needs annuity A. In case both are alive they need E× A. The




















When both men and women have the same age we only keep the second
term of equation (3.1) or (3.2), because there is no period in time where one
of the members is 65 or older and the other member has not yet reached
the age of 65 in this situation.
Assumptions 3.5.2
This section describes the assumptions for each pension component. With
regard to the first pillar we assume that people stay in the Netherlands as
from 2008 until the age of 65. To compute the public pension benefit that
households receive we use the full gross public pension benefit level of
2008, measured in 2010 euros (13,033 euro per year for singles and 17,993
euro per year for couples). We include social assistance benefits that are
used to guarantee a social minimum (e.g. for immigrants), and we assume
that public pension benefits will be indexed. Finally, the public pension
eligibility age is higher for future generations of retirees. To be able to
compare public pensions across generations, we compute public pension
benefits for everyone as if they are received as from the age of 65, using an
actuarially neutral reduction rate for young generations that have a public
pension eligibility age higher than 65.9
9The Dutch public pension system has no flexible public pension retirement age.
However, since in this paper we analyze all pension components as from the age of 65,
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Regarding occupational pensions, we use the data of Statistics Nether-
lands about occupational pension rights, which assume that people remain
employed in their current job with their current wage rate until the age
of 65. In future research we will test how robust the results are with
respect to this assumption by estimating and simulating wage profiles and
labor market transitions, taking into account part-time work and stochastic
non-employment spells. For the moment, we have to bear in mind that
we do not take into account wage growth for younger workers and that
we do not take into account unemployment and early retirement for this
group (not all people will be working until the age of 65). In general,
occupational pension entitlements in the Netherlands are nominal rights
with price indexation conditional on the financial situation of the pension
fund. Because of the poor financial situation of most pension funds in
the Netherlands in recent years, pension funds have been unable to make
inflation corrections. For the future we assume that 50% of the inflation
will be corrected and that inflation amounts to 2% per year.10 Furthermore,
we make the rather optimistic assumption that no pension cuts take place.
For 65+ individuals we do not observe second pillar pension entitlements,
but we do observe the amount of second and third pillar pension benefits
that they receive.
To approximate wealth accumulated in third pillar pension plans, we
use the yearly contributions made to third pillar pension products as
from 1989 and add a fictitious real return of 1% (after tax) per year. For
the future we assume that, until the age of 65, people deposit the same
amount into the pension product every year as they did on average during
2006-2010 (in real terms). We assume a future real rate of return of 1%
(after tax) per year.11
we also compute public pensions as from the age of 65, as if households can borrow
against their future public pension income. In this way, all results are based on the same
retirement age.
10We assume an indexation of 50% in the baseline scenario. Section 3.8 shows calcula-
tions with no indexation (pessimistic scenario) and full indexation (optimistic scenario).
11We assume a yearly real rate of return of 1% in the baseline scenario. Section 3.8
shows the calculations with 0% (pessimistic scenario) and 2% (optimistic scenario).
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For the annuitization of private savings we use an annual real rate of
return of 1% after tax,12 and the most recent mortality rates per cohort
predicted by Statistics Netherlands (December 17th 2010).13 Mortality
differences between men and women and between cohorts are taken into
account. We do not consider differential mortality by income (Kalwij
et al. 2013) and we assume that the remaining lifetimes of couples are
independent. As for the future, we assume that no additional private
savings are being made to finance retirement.
With regard to housing, we assume an average yearly drop in real
property prices of 1%. This means that an individual of age 40 in 2008
experiences a drop in the real value of his house of 22% between now and
the age of 65. The average drop in housing prices was already 20% (in
real terms) between the year 2008 and 2013. So, for this person real house
prices should stay more or less constant after 2013 for this assumption
to be true. Homeowners who have amortized part of their mortgage
have relatively low housing costs. We take this into account by a small
percentage (4%) of the net capital accrued in property (imputed rent). With
an inflation of 2% we have an imputed rent in real terms of 2% (4%-2%).
Until the age of 65, imputed rental income increases net housing wealth
(e.g. by amortizing the mortgage). It can be seen as a return on housing
wealth.
We assume that no additional private savings and mortgage amorti-
zations will be made between 2008 and the year in which people reach
the age of 65 to finance retirement. Thus, for the present we look only at
current savings to determine pension savings sufficiency, and we compare
current savings with current income. Also, we assume that retirement is
the only savings motive for households, although other motives may exist,
such as bequests (Van Gilst et al. 2008). We also assume that children have
left the household at the time the key person of the household reaches
the age of 65. Furthermore, we allow for widowhood, but assume that
couples stay together and singles remain single. To standardize household
12We vary this annual real rate of return over different scenarios in section 3.8. An
annual real interest rate of 0% is used in the pessimistic scenario and 2% in the optimistic
scenario.
13We assume that remaining lifetimes of couples are independent.
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income we use the equivalence scale provided by Statistics Netherlands
(Siermann et al. 2004), described above.
3.6 Results
Section 3.6.1 shows the results for future retirement income. Next, we
compare these with current gross and net income (3.6.2 and 3.6.3), and in-
vestigate poverty during retirement as an indicator of how well households
are prepared for their retirement (section 3.6.4).
3.6.1 Future retirement income
Table 3.3 shows equivalized pension annuities. We see that - for most
households - public pension benefits and occupational pensions are the
most important sources of income after retirement. These components
together provide 65% of the average total annuitized wealth. Despite
the relatively high percentage of households that have voluntary pension
products, the holdings in these accounts are small and therefore contribute
to the total pension wealth only marginally. Second pillar pension entitle-
ments are highest in the two youngest age categories. There are several
reasons for this. First, the pension coverage for young cohorts is higher
than for old cohorts (especially among women). Second, we assume that
people keep their current job until the age of 65, while older people have
had more time to run into a gap, caused by a period of part-time em-
ployment or unemployment. Also, they may already have retired early,
which decreases the occupational pension they receive as from the age
of 65. If we would take into account the possibility that young cohorts
will also run into unemployment, disability and/or early retirement, then
their occupational pension would also be lower. Finally, a reduction of tax
favored pension accruals will especially influence younger cohorts.
The mean and median occupational pension benefits show that the
distribution of occupational pension entitlements is skewed to the right
(private pensions are distributed unequally such that high deciles receive
a proportionally larger share of total private pensions). The distribution of
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public pension entitlements, however, is evenly distributed (most people
receive a full state pension that consists of a flat rate).
Annuitized wealth from net savings accounts and securities is relatively
high among the 70+ population because their remaining life expectancy is
relatively low. Note that in this paper we assess whether current savings
are adequate. We make no predictions about the extent of resources
available to individuals at age 65, but estimate how much they would have
in light of their current resources. We have to keep in mind that younger
generations have more time to supplement their private savings. Also,
private savings are probably higher especially for those persons who have
an occupational pension gap.
Figure 3.1 shows the average annuitized wealth components over the
income distribution, where households are sorted from low- to high gross
income. As expected, public pensions are flat over the entire income
distribution. All other wealth components increase with gross income,
with a large peak at the higher end of the income distribution. The
importance of net savings accounts and securities increases at the higher
end of the income distribution.
Gross replacement rates 3.6.2
As a first measure of pension savings adequacy, we divide predicted
retirement income by gross current income. This gives a replacement
rate for households, using their current income, their current wealth,
and the assumption that people keep their current job with their current
wage and do not build up more capital (other than first and second pillar
entitlements). Basically, we indicate to what extent current savings can
replace current income conditional on the current job and wage.
Table 3.4 shows three different replacement rates. The first replacement
rate only takes into account public and occupational pension benefits. The
second includes voluntary pension products and other financial wealth,
and the third also includes the imputed rental income of net housing
wealth. These three replacement rates indicate the importance of different
wealth components and provide insight into the replacement rates when
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Table 3.3: Predicted yearly retirement income (annuitized wealth)a
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70+ All
Wealth: average annuity
Public pensionb 11,141 11,233 12,107 12,817 12,533 12,955 11,895
Occupational pensionc 14,431 13,474 12,107 8,806 669 73 9,678
Voluntary pension productsd 779 915 917 752 47 5 606
Private pension benefits 65+ e 22 150 375 2,159 12,685 9,254 3,036
Net savings account 873 1,120 1,235 1,692 1,973 5,578 1,982
Stocks SH 1,048 1,021 1,373 1,649 952 820 1,101
Securities 547 955 983 962 1,086 2,905 1,164
Business assets 255 299 250 223 211 72 219
Imputed rent 2,584 3,789 4,061 4,252 4,037 2,601 3,202
Total pension annuity 31,680 32,955 33,408 33,313 34,193 34,263 32,884
Wealth: median annuity
Public pensionb 11,426 11,426 12,384 13,033 13,075 13,033 11,426
Occupational pensionc 12,485 11,026 9,306 5,377 0 0 6,333
Voluntary pension productsd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Private pension benefits 65+ e 0 0 0 0 8,293 5,352 0
Net savings account 379 421 626 719 973 2,020 656
Stocks SH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Securities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Business assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imputed rent 1,035 2,472 2,735 2,947 2,679 0 1,558
Total pension annuity 27,926 28,511 28,109 26,990 27,442 24,416 27,275
Proportion of households with entitlements from various pension arrangements
Public pensionb 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Occupational pensionc 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.87 0.16 0.02 0.71
Voluntary pension productsd 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.04 0.00 0.33
Private pension benefits 65+ e 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.92 0.86 0.26
a Equivalized household income in 2010 euros. The age of the key person in the households determines the age category of the household.
b We assume that persons reside in the Netherlands at least until the age of 65.
c For persons younger than 65 we observe the annuity that participants would receive in case they remain employed in their current job with their
current income until the age of 65 (no career/income developments).
d Pension rights accumulated in the third pillar are approximated using yearly contributions as from 1989.
e For persons of age 65 and older we do not observe occupational pension rights and the amount of wealth accumulated in voluntary pension products,
but we do observe the sum of actual private pension income.
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Figure 3.1: Composition of pension annuities over the income
distribution
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Table 3.4: Gross replacement rates, 2008ab
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 All
1st and 2nd pillars
ratio p25 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.55
ratio p50 0.76 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.71
ratio p75 0.91 0.77 0.78 0.87 0.87
1st and 2nd pillars and private wealth
ratio p25 0.66 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.61
ratio p50 0.82 0.69 0.70 0.77 0.77
ratio p75 0.98 0.84 0.85 0.96 0.94
Total pension annuity
ratio p25 0.70 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.66
ratio p50 0.87 0.76 0.77 0.84 0.83
ratio p75 1.06 0.93 0.95 1.08 1.03
a The three replacement rates in this table give an impression of the importance of 1st
and 2nd pillar pensions, privately saved wealth and property to finance retirement.
However, it should be noted that the ratios cannot be compared mutually, because of
the rearranging of the quartiles with respect to the wealth components that are taken
into account in calculating the replacement rates.
b The table reports three quartiles (p25, p50 and p75) of the distribution of the replace-
ment rates (replacing current gross income). At the bottom, 25% of the households
have a replacement rate below the first quartile (p25). p50 indicates the median re-
placement rate. At the top, 25% of the households have a replacement rate higher than
p75.
households do or do not deplete financial wealth.14 Table 3.4 shows that
the total median gross replacement rate is 83% (p50). Half of the sample
has a total gross replacement rate between 66% and 103% (p25 and p75,
respectively). The ratio is relatively high for the youngest age category as
well as for the category 60-64. This can partially be explained by the fact
that current income is relatively low among these households, as observed
in table 3.1. If we only take into account wealth in the first and second
pension pillars, replacement rates become substantially lower in all age
categories. This substantial contribution of non-pension wealth, including
housing, to retirement income is also found by Crawford and O’Dea (2012),
who performed a comparable analysis for the UK.
Table 3.5 shows that when account is taken only of public and occu-
pational pensions, a considerable share of the households (49%) has a
14Net housing wealth can also be depleted by moving to a smaller or rental house or by
a reverse mortgage. Among current retirees this is not very common but it may become
more common in the future. Section 3.8.2 describes the scenario in which households
deplete housing wealth.
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Table 3.5: Share of households below 70% and 100% gross replace-
ment rates, 2008
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 All
Share below 70% gross replacement rate
1st and 2nd pillars 0.40 0.63 0.61 0.52 0.49
Idem, including private wealth 0.31 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.39
Total pension annuity 0.26 0.41 0.38 0.30 0.31
Share below 100% gross replacement rate
1st and 2nd pillars 0.85 0.94 0.93 0.85 0.87
Idem, including private wealth 0.77 0.89 0.88 0.78 0.81
Total pension annuity 0.68 0.81 0.80 0.68 0.72
gross replacement rate below 70%. When account is taken of the third
pillar, private wealth and imputed rental income from net housing, this
percentage decreases to 31%. On the other hand, 28% (=100%-72%) of the
households can replace at least their current income using the total of their
pension annuities.
Figure 3.2 presents the development and variation of the gross replace-
ment rate over the income distribution. Figure 3.2a focuses on the ratio of
public and private pensions to gross current income. Here, it should be
noted that high replacement rates of about 100% for low gross incomes
are institutionally determined with the ‘social minimum’.
The replacement rate declines over the income distribution from a
median replacement rate of 95% at the lower end of the income distribution
to a median replacement rate of 34% at the top of the income distribution.
Figure 3.2b shows the ratio of the total pension annuity compared to
current gross income. Comparison of figures 3.2a and 3.2b reveals that
wealth from voluntary pension products, private savings and property
has a substantial positive effect on replacement rates; as from the 25th
income percentile, replacement rates are approximately 15%-points higher
when taking into account voluntary pension products, private savings and
property. The replacement rate even increases by about 25%-points for the
top quartile of the replacement rate (the dashed line) because of including
private savings and housing wealth. The increase in the replacement rate is
less substantial (about 8%) for the bottom quartile (the solid line). Finally,
the decline in replacement rates over the income percentiles is lower when
74 Measuring Retirement Savings Adequacy Chapter 3
Figure 3.2: Replacement rates over the income distribution
(a) First and second pillar
(b) Total pension annuity
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we take into account private wealth and housing. As might be expected,
the replacement rates that include the total pension annuity show a larger
variation than the replacement rates that only take into account first- and
second pension pillars.
Net replacement rates 3.6.3
The analysis thus far has focused on gross income and gross replacement
rates, and has not considered the Dutch labor income tax and benefits
system. However, net replacement rates that take into account the taxes
and benefits system may give a better indication of the extent to which
households are adequately prepared for their retirement. Individuals
above the statutory retirement age face lower marginal tax rates in the first
two brackets of the income tax system and do not pay premiums for social
insurance and social security. This means that net replacement rates are in
general higher than gross replacement rates.
Total disposable income (the denominator of the net replacement rate)
is easily determined by summing primary income minus taxes plus trans-
fers in the IPO database. To compute net pension annuities (the numer-
ator), we compute the average tax burden of 65+ singles and couples in
different income deciles. We distinguish homeowners and renters, since
mortgage interests are tax deductible. The appendix describes the tax
burdens found in IPO, which are reasonably comparable to those found
in Microtax (a model that simulates Dutch taxes, CPB (2008)). We apply
these tax burdens to the sum of predicted pension annuities in the first,
second and third pillar. We do not tax annuities from financial wealth
and housing wealth (actually, they were already taxed at the moment they
were received as income). Wealth taxation is 1.2% of the financial wealth
above the threshold of 20,000 euro per person. We do not take into account
wealth taxation explicitly, but implicitly: when we use a real rate of return
of 1% we assume that this is net of taxes.
Table 3.6 shows net replacement rates. Whereas the median replace-
ment rate of first and second pillar pensions was 71% in gross terms
(table 3.4), this is 84% in net terms, indicating that the majority of house-
holds are able to replace 84% of their current disposable income with net
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Table 3.6: Net replacement rates, 2008ab
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 All
1st and 2nd pillars
ratio p25 0.73 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.67
ratio p50 0.90 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.84
ratio p75 1.06 0.91 0.92 1.00 1.01
1st and 2nd pillars and private wealth
ratio p25 0.79 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.75
ratio p50 0.97 0.84 0.86 0.92 0.92
ratio p75 1.15 1.01 1.02 1.12 1.11
Total pension annuity
ratio p25 0.84 0.76 0.79 0.83 0.81
ratio p50 1.04 0.94 0.96 1.03 1.01
ratio p75 1.27 1.15 1.16 1.28 1.24
public and occupational pension benefits. The median net replacement
rate increases to 92% when we take into account voluntary third pillar
pensions and private wealth, and to 101% when we also add the imputed
rental income of net housing.
Table 3.7 shows that only 24% of the households face a net replacement
rate that is lower than 80% when all pension annuities are taken into
account. When we only take into account first and second pillar pensions,
this percentage is substantially higher (43%). Furthermore, table 3.7
indicates that 51% of all households are able to fully replace current
disposable income with net pension annuities.
For international comparison, Crawford and O’Dea (2012) find that
53% of the individuals have a replacement rate below 80% in the UK in
2008, taking into account pension income alone. If the authors take into
account all sources of wealth, only 21% of UK individuals fall below a
replacement rate of 80%. Based on households, for the Netherlands we
find that 43% (first and second pillars) and 24% (total pension annuity)
fall below the 80% replacement rate in the Netherlands in 2008. Both
calculations are based on a nominal interest rate of 3%.
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Table 3.7: Share of households below 80% and 100% net replace-
ment rates, 2008
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 All
Share below 80% gross replacement rate
1st and 2nd pillars 0.35 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.43
Idem, including private wealth 0.26 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.32
Total pension annuity 0.21 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.24
Share below 100% gross replacement rate
1st and 2nd pillars 0.67 0.85 0.84 0.75 0.74
Idem, including private wealth 0.55 0.74 0.73 0.61 0.61
Total pension annuity 0.45 0.59 0.56 0.46 0.49
Poverty 3.6.4
Whereas Sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 focused on replacement rates, high re-
placement rates do not necessarily reflect high incomes during retirement.
For example, low-income households may face relatively high replacement
rates because public pensions and social security benefits provide almost
everyone with a social minimum. On the other hand, relative poverty may
be high among them.
Unlike the relative poverty thresholds used by the EU, the Netherlands
uses an absolute poverty line as official poverty indicator. The official
poverty line in the Netherlands is the absolute social minimum proposed
by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP). The social minimum
implies that a single person aged 65 or over is in poverty if the person’s
income is lower than 928 euro (net, excluding holiday allowance) a month
in 2008. Pensioners have a low probability to fall in official poverty, since
a full public pension equals the social minimum. An individual who
has not lived in the Netherlands all of the years between age 15 and 65
may have an incomplete public pension, but in the event that household
income is lower than the social minimum and household wealth is lower
than 5,325 euro per person, he is supplemented with social assistance
benefits up to the social minimum (homeowners may own an additional
amount of wealth of 44,950 euro). Due to these supplements up to the
social minimum there are almost no elderly households living in absolute
poverty. Only if someone has not lived in the Netherlands all of the years
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between the age of 15 and 65 and his income or wealth is above these
thresholds, or if someone does not possess the Dutch nationality or if that
person is in detention he will not receive social assistance to supplement
income to the social minimum. Furthermore, the take-up rate of these
social assistance supplements is not 100%. Those who do not take-up the
social assistance supplement live in poverty.
Our predictions of retirement income indicate that approximately 4%
of all households that are currently in the age group 35-64 will need social
assistance when they are retired, in order to top up public pension benefits
to the social minimum. Among first-generation immigrant households,
about 34% will need social assistance. Those who do not take up social
assistance will live in poverty. Furthermore, low-income but wealthy
households who do not receive a complete public pension may live in
poverty according to the social minimum income definition, because they
do not receive a social assistance supplement. Considering their wealth,
however, these households may not really be said to live in poverty. Finally,
some low-income households with relatively high mortgage rents and
low imputed rents may fall into poverty according to the social minimum
income definition.
Official poverty lines of the EU are based on 60%, 50% and 40% of
median equivalized household income (MEI). For the Netherlands, these
EU indicators of poverty imply that households fall into poverty when
they have a yearly income lower than 12,003, 10,003 or 8,003 euro15 for
a poverty line based on 60%, 50% and 40% of MEI, respectively. These
EU poverty thresholds are lower than or about the same as the social
minimum. This means that only the above-mentioned households who do
not take up social assistance, who have a low income but a high wealth
level, or those with relatively high mortgage rents, may fall into poverty
according to the EU definitions.
15In 2010 euros. Non-deflated poverty lines for 2008 as reported by EU-SILC are 11,713,
9,761 and 7,809 euro respectively.
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Vulnerable groups 3.7
This section focuses on several potentially vulnerable groups. We study
households with self-employment, since self-employed individuals do
not have to participate in a pension fund (in contrast to most Dutch paid
workers), and the vulnerability of immigrants, single women, renters, and
households that faced unemployment or disability for at least two years
between 1989 and 2008. First-generation immigrants may be vulnerable
since they have not fully accumulated public pension entitlements. Fur-
thermore, single women may be potentially vulnerable because of small or
non-existent occupational pensions due to part-time work and providing
care to their children. Recipients of unemployment insurance or social
assistance may be vulnerable, since in general they do not accumulate
occupational pension rights. For persons in disability insurance this is
different. In nearly all pension funds individuals in disability insurance
build up occupational pension rights as if the person still works in his
previous job, with a dispensation from paying occupational pension pre-
miums. Finally, renters are in general low-income households and they do
not build up housing wealth (relatively tax beneficial).
To construct a robust indicator of a vulnerable group we use not only
information of the year 2008, but also the years 1989 to 2007. Year-to-year
movements in and out of social insurance, for example, are substantial.16
Clearly, there is a large overlap between these groups. For example,
36% of the households with at least one first-generation immigrant and
14% of the single women received social assistance for at least one year
between 1989 and 2008. This percentage is even higher for households
with a single female first-generation immigrant (44%).
Table 3.8 presents median pension annuities and gross median replace-
ment rates of the potentially vulnerable groups. The first column of the
table indicates that most of the potentially vulnerable groups have a rela-
tively low annuity from pensions, private wealth and housing. The lowest
retirement income is observed among households that experienced at least
one year of social assistance. Among these households, retirement income
16We do not present net replacement rates in this section. Especially the self-employed
have extensive tax facilities. Compared to the wage employed they have a relatively low
tax pressure.
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is generally not much higher than the basic public pension. The table
also indicates that second pillar pensions are substantially lower among
self-employed households than among all working age households. Renter
have a relatively low median pension annuity and this difference is not
completely due to the nonexistence of housing wealth.
The second column shows median gross replacement rates. We see
that all potentially vulnerable groups except the self-employed have a
replacement rate that is close to or above 70%, indicating that current
income can to a large extent be maintained after retirement. Note, however,
that high replacement rates among these groups are caused by relatively
low current income levels, such that receiving a public pension may
already be sufficient to replace current income. This seems to be especially
the case for households that received at least one year of social assistance.
By comparing three types of replacement rates we find that first-generation
immigrants and households on social assistance have barely accumulated
non-pension wealth, while those in unemployment or disability insurance
have accumulated non-pension wealth.
The median self-employed household is expected to replace only 50%
of current income when taking into account just first and second pillar
pensions (this is 71% for all working age households). Adding third pillar
pensions, private wealth and imputed rental income from net housing re-
duces the gap. Adding these components allows the median self-employed
household to replace 74% of their current income after retirement (com-
pared to 83% for all working age households). The spread around this
median replacement rate is larger for the self-employed than for the gen-
eral population.
Column 3 shows the percentage of households that fall below a replace-
ment rate of 70%. Assuming that a replacement rate of 70% is sufficient,
we observe that about 40% of the households in the potentially vulner-
able groups do not reach a sufficient replacement rate. This is about
10%-points more than for all working age households. Single women and
households on social assistance perform relatively well. For households
on social assistance this is due to a construct of the social insurance system
in which social assistance benefits are equal to the state pension. Self-
employed households, on the other hand, are more often confronted with
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a gross replacement rate below 70%. 46% of the self-employed households
have a gross replacement rate lower than 70%, when taking into account
all wealth components (31% for all working age households). So, the
self-employed are less likely to maintain their standard of living. Also,
due to extensive tax facilities for the self-employed, the replacement rate
will not increase that much when moving from gross to net replacement
rates. Note, however, that current income is on average substantially
higher among self-employed households than among all working age
households.
Scenario analyses 3.8
This section analyzes the sensitivity of pension savings adequacy to the
assumptions made. Section 3.8.1 presents an optimistic and a pessimistic
scenario in which we vary the indexation of occupational pensions, the
real rate of return on non-housing wealth, the real return on property,
and the retirement age. In the optimistic scenario, all factors are set
optimistically. The opposite is the case in the pessimistic scenario. Hence,
the two scenarios provide upper- and lower bounds on the resources
available at retirement that actual outcomes are likely to fall into.
Section 3.8.2 uses the parameters of the baseline scenario again and
shows the effect of housing wealth depletion after retirement (instead of
only taking into account the imputed rental income from net housing).
Optimistic and pessimistic scenarios 3.8.1
Table 3.9 shows the parameters of the baseline, pessimistic and optimistic
scenarios. Several assumptions remain constant across the scenarios. In
all three scenarios we assume an inflation rate of 2%, a nominal imputed
rent of 4% and real return on past third pillar payments of 1% after tax.
Other assumptions vary by scenario. The pessimistic scenario assumes
no indexation of occupational pensions, such that the real value of occupa-
tional pension rights declines 2% every year due to inflation. The baseline
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Table 3.8: Median pension annuity (PA) and gross replacement rates (GRR) of
potentially vulnerable groups, 2008a
Group (share of all households, 35-64) Median PA Median GRR GRR< 70%
Self-employed (12%)
1st and 2nd pillar 18,488 0.50 0.73
Idem, including private wealth 24,689 0.62 0.58
Total pension annuity 30,016 0.74 0.46
First generation immigrants (8%)
1st and 2nd pillar 13,818 0.72 0.46
Idem, including private wealth 14,190 0.74 0.43
Total pension annuity 14,524 0.76 0.41
Persons with no homeownershipb(35%)
1st and 2nd pillar 16,622 0.72 0.46
Idem, including private wealth 17,410 0.75 0.41
Total pension annuity 17,453 0.75 0.41
Single women (16%)
1st and 2nd pillar 15,209 0.73 0.44
Idem, including private wealth 16,471 0.77 0.37
Total pension annuity 17,540 0.80 0.32
At least two years experience of unemployment (5%)
1st and 2nd pillar 20,180 0.67 0.56
Idem, including private wealth 21,732 0.72 0.47
Total pension annuity 24,105 0.78 0.39
At least two years experience of disability (11%)
1st and 2nd pillar 18,168 0.64 0.61
Idem, including private wealth 19,872 0.69 0.52
Total pension annuity 22,138 0.75 0.42
At least one year experience of social assistance (2%)
1st and 2nd pillar 12,048 0.81 0.33
Idem, including private wealth 12,164 0.81 0.32
Total pension annuity 12,185 0.82 0.31
All households, 35-64 (100%)
1st and 2nd pillar 22,699 0.71 0.49
Idem, including private wealth 25,006 0.77 0.39
Total pension annuity 27,905 0.83 0.31
a Equivalized household income in 2010 euros.
b Renters do not reiceve income from imputed rent; some renters, however, own real estate (holiday homes or a houseboat).
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scenario assumes 50% indexation. Real occupational pension rights are
not reduced in the optimistic scenario, where full indexation takes place.
We assume a real rate of return of 0%, 1% and 2% in the pessimistic-,
baseline- and optimistic scenarios, respectively. Furthermore, the average
real rate of return on property from 2008 until retirement is -2%, -1% and
0% in the pessimistic-, baseline- and optimistic scenarios, respectively.
This means that in the pessimistic scenario, an individual of age 40 in 2008
experiences a drop in the real value of his house of almost 40% between
now and the age of 65; in the optimistic scenario, the drop is 0% (which
entails a positive average real rate of return on property as from 2012 until
the age of 65, since real housing prices have decreased between 2008 and
2012).
Finally, we assume different retirement ages in the three scenarios. A
relatively low retirement age has a negative effect on retirement income
and is, therefore, assumed in the pessimistic scenario. On the other hand,
a relatively high retirement age has a positive effect on retirement income,
and this is assumed in the optimistic scenario. People stop working and
start using their pension annuity as from the age of 64 in the pessimistic
scenario, 65 in the baseline scenario and 67 in the optimistic scenario. We
adjust accumulated pension rights in an actuarially neutral way, using the
factors of CPB (2009). This means that we cut occupational pension rights
by 8% when the retirement age is 64, and increase occupational pension
rights by 2 x 8=16% when the retirement age is 67. For public pensions
we use an actuarially fair adjustment rate of 6.5% per year, and private
savings are annuitized at age 64 in the pessimistic scenario and at age 67
in the optimistic scenario.
Table 3.10 shows median pension annuities in the pessimistic and opti-
mistic scenarios. The table shows that the different assumptions have the
highest impact on occupational pensions and imputed rent (induced by the
indexation assumption, the retirement age, and the assumed development
of housing prices).
The pessimistic scenario is most harmful to the young cohorts, since
they have a longer period without indexation and with decreasing housing
prices until they reach retirement. Older cohorts, who are closer to retire-
ment, are relatively well-off in the pessimistic scenario compared to the
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Table 3.9: Assumptions in the pessimistic, baseline and optimistic sce-
nario
Scenarios Pessimistic Baseline Optimistic
Inflation 2% 2% 2%
Indexation 0% 50% 100%
Real return assets (after tax) 0% 1% 2%
Real return property (after tax) -2% -1% 0%
Imputed rent 4% 4% 4%
Past real return 3rd pension pillar 1% 1% 1%
Future real return 3rd pension pillar 0% 1% 2%
Retirement age 64 65 67
households in the 35-49 age category. On the other hand, in the optimistic
scenario, young cohorts have a relatively long period until retirement in
which they can benefit from returns on investments and housing wealth.
Compared to the baseline scenario presented in table 3.3, older cohorts
perform relatively well in the pessimistic scenario, young cohorts perform
relatively well in the optimistic scenario, while the baseline scenario is
slightly in favor of the younger age groups. This relatively good position
of the younger age group can primarily be explained by relatively high
occupational pensions. We may, however, overestimate the occupational
pension accumulation of the young due to the assumption that individuals
remain in their current job until the age of 65 (64 or 67 in the other two
scenarios). In practice it is observed that persons tend to reduce working
hours as from the age of 50 (women) or 55 (men), and to retire or become
unemployed before the age of 65.
Table 3.11 presents gross replacement rates in the pessimistic and op-
timistic scenarios, and shows similar patterns as table 3.4. As expected,
median replacement rates including all components are lower in the pes-
simistic scenario (0.70) and higher in the optimistic scenario (1.04) relative
to the baseline scenario (0.83) presented in table 3.4. Replacement rates are
lower for young cohorts compared to the older cohorts in the pessimistic
scenario, while the reverse is true for the baseline and optimistic scenarios.
All in all, we can conclude that results regarding retirement savings ade-
quacy are sensitive to different future scenarios. Young generations benefit
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Table 3.10: Median pension annuities in the pessimistic- and optimistic
scenariosa
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 All
Pessimistic
Public pension 10,573 10,573 11,530 12,186 10,573
Occupational pension 9,027 8,826 7,748 4,690 8,246
Voluntary pension products 0 0 0 0 0
Private pension benefits 65+ 0 0 0 0 0
Net savings account 256 313 492 594 332
Stocks substantial shareholders 0 0 0 0 0
Securities 0 0 0 0 0
Business assets 0 0 0 0 0
Imputed rent 812 2,178 2,519 2,849 1,456
Total pension annuity 22,508 24,293 24,829 24,727 23,380
Optimistic
Public pension 13,134 13,134 14,091 14,728 13,134
Occupational pension 18,530 14,831 11,945 6,598 14,954
Voluntary pension products 0 0 0 0 0
Private pension benefits 65+ 0 0 0 0 0
Net savings account 592 599 850 926 676
Stocks substantial shareholders 0 0 0 0 0
Securities 0 0 0 0 0
Business assets 0 0 0 0 0
Imputed rent 1,360 2,930 3,067 3,158 2,147
Total pension annuity 37,170 35,410 33,712 31,059 35,432
a Equivalized household income in 2010 euros.
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most from an optimistic scenario but also suffer more from a pessimistic
scenario, compared to older generations.
Table 3.11: Gross replacement rates in the
pessimistic- and optimistic scenar-
ios
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 All
Pessimistic
1st and 2nd pillars
ratio p25 0.50 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.47
ratio p50 0.62 0.54 0.56 0.63 0.60
ratio p75 0.75 0.67 0.70 0.80 0.74
1st and 2nd pillars and private wealth
ratio p25 0.54 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.51
ratio p50 0.66 0.58 0.61 0.69 0.65
ratio p75 0.79 0.72 0.75 0.88 0.79
Total pension annuity
ratio p25 0.57 0.52 0.55 0.60 0.56
ratio p50 0.71 0.65 0.68 0.77 0.70
ratio p75 0.86 0.80 0.84 0.99 0.86
Optimistic
1st and 2nd pillars
ratio p25 0.79 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.68
ratio p50 0.99 0.78 0.76 0.80 0.89
ratio p75 1.21 0.95 0.93 1.00 1.11
1st and 2nd pillars and private wealth
ratio p25 0.86 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.76
ratio p50 1.08 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.97
ratio p75 1.31 1.05 1.02 1.11 1.21
Total pension annuity
ratio p25 0.91 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.82
ratio p50 1.15 0.94 0.92 0.98 1.04
ratio p75 1.42 1.16 1.13 1.24 1.32
3.8.2 Depletion of housing wealth
Throughout the paper the assumption has been made that households
receive an imputed rental income on net housing wealth, but that house-
holds do not deplete housing wealth. So, households neither move to
a smaller house or rental house, nor use reverse mortgages to finance
retirement with housing wealth. This section assumes that net housing
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wealth will be depleted after retirement. At the retirement age people
buy an annuity from their net housing wealth, in the same way as we
assumed for private wealth (explained in section 3.5.1). Thus, households
still receive an imputed rental income, but also ‘eat up’ their housing
wealth. Compared to table 3.3, table 3.12 shows that the total median
pension annuity is substantially higher when net housing wealth will be
depleted. This holds especially for older generations, who have a relatively
high net housing wealth. For the age category 60-64, the median total
pension annuity increases more than 3,000 euro per year.
Table 3.12: Median pension annuities and gross replacement rates
when housing wealth will be depleteda
Age group 35-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 All
Net housing annuity 1,976 4,795 5,278 5,729 3,339
Total pension annuity 29,825 31,637 31,270 30,337 30,340
Gross RR, 25th percentile 0.70 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.66
Gross RR, median 0.87 0.76 0.77 0.84 0.83
Gross RR, 75th percentile 1.06 0.93 0.95 1.08 1.03
a Equivalized household income in 2010 euros.
The higher total pension annuity due to the depletion of housing wealth
also translate into higher gross replacement rates. Taking into account
the depletion of housing wealth instead of only taking into account the
imputed rent increases the median replacement rate from 0.83 to 0.88,
indicating that the median household can replace about 90% of current
gross income during retirement if one takes into account pensions, private
wealth and the depletion of housing wealth. Half of the households have
a gross replacement rate between 69% and 112%.
Summary and conclusions 3.9
The performance of pension systems on adequacy is often evaluated on
the basis of fictitious replacement rates for median earners. This study
indicates that, although the Dutch pension system is very highly ranked
on adequacy, results on adequacy are somewhat less promising when we
use microdata to examine the pension that people actually accumulate
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in the current system. Results on projected replacement rates are fairly
comparable to the UK, despite the fact that the UK pension system has
a much lower rank on pension savings adequacy. This suggests that we
should be careful in evaluating the adequacy of pensions systems on the
basis of fictitious replacement rates.
This study examines the extent of the resources people have available
for retirement. Our results show that equivalized financial resources
during retirement are on average about 33,000 euro per year and have a
median of 27,000 euro per year. Young generations own relatively more
occupational pension rights, whereas older generations have accumulated
more private wealth and housing wealth. Private wealth and housing
wealth raise median replacement rates substantially. Whereas the median
gross replacement rate from public and private pensions is 71%, this
increases to 83% when account is taken of all pension annuities.
The large-scale administrative data used in this study make it possible
to focus on several vulnerable groups, such as households with self-
employment. Self-employed households have relatively low occupational
pension rights, but relatively high voluntary pensions, private savings and
net housing wealth. The total pension annuity has a median of about
30,000 euros. This is somewhat higher than the pension annuities in
the total population, however, which also includes inactive households.
Replacement rates of the self-employed are relatively low, with a median of
74% for all pension components together. Other vulnerable groups include
first-generation immigrants, single women and households that have faced
unemployment, disability and/or social assistance. Whereas households
with first-generation immigrants and households with social assistance
rely almost fully on public pensions (and potentially a supplement from
social assistance), households with unemployment or disability often own
private wealth, which increases their median replacement rate by more
than 10%-points.
Assumptions about indexation, housing prices and the retirement age
influence the results. Occupational pension rights decrease dramatically
when no indexation takes place between now and retirement, and develop-
ments in housing prices influence the imputed rental value of households’
net housing wealth. The median total pension annuity varies from 23,000
Section 3.9 Summary and conclusions 89
euro in our pessimistic scenario to 35,000 euro in our optimistic scenario.
Associated median replacement rates vary between 70% and 104%. If
people were to deplete net housing wealth, the median pension annu-
ity in the baseline scenario would increase by about 3,000 euro per year,
which implies an increase in the median gross replacement rate of about
5%-points.
This study represents a first step in the assessment of retirement savings
adequacy on the basis of microdata for the Netherlands. There are several
important issues to bear in mind when interpreting the results. First, we
use the data of Statistics Netherlands about occupational pension rights,
which assume that people stay employed in their current job until a fixed
retirement age. A natural next step involves taking into account how
future wages and labor force participation will evolve. In the current
analysis, we are likely to overestimate the occupational pension rights of
the young generation since it is questionable whether they will work until
the age of 65 and tax favored pension accruals decrease.
Second, we currently assume that no additional private savings will be
made. In reality, private savings may increase, especially when households
know that the second pillar will become less generous. For example,
Alessie et al. (2013) suggested that social security wealth and pension
wealth partly displace private savings, and Jia and Zhu (2012) found
that this displacement is higher among high-income households than
among low-income households. So, cuts in occupational pensions will
partly be compensated by private savings, especially among high-income
households. Structural models can be estimated to explain private saving
behavior of Dutch households, and these models can be used in policy
simulations.
Third, this study focuses on retirement income at the retirement age.
Pension cuts after that age are not taken into account.
Fourth, we do not take into account that life expectancies differ sub-
stantially among income classes. Remaining life expectancy at age 65 is
on average 2.5 years shorter for a low-income individual compared to a
high-income individual (Kalwij et al. 2013). This means that on average
annuitized private savings will be higher for low-income groups and lower
for high-income groups.
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Finally, whereas current simulations show deterministic outcomes,
they are surrounded by uncertainty. In addition to existing uncertainty in
future earnings, uncertainty in second pillar pension benefits will increase
because risk of return and increases in life expectancy (macro longevity
risk) will be deferred to participants of second pillar pension schemes.
This is an interesting track for future research.
Given the pension- and long-term care reforms still to come, we argue
that it is important to extend this research to convincingly evaluate the
effect of several policy-relevant scenarios on a wide variety of households.
3.A Taxes
Table 3.13 shows the median tax burden of 65+ singles and couples in
different income deciles. We also distinguish homeowners and renters,
since mortgage interests are tax deductible. The median tax burden varies
between 10 percent for the lower income deciles and 36 percent for the
highest income decile.











































































































































































































































































4 Estimating a panel data sample
selection model with part-time
employment: Selection issues in
wages over the life-cycle
Abstract
This paper proposes a new panel data sample selection model for estimat-
ing wages over the life-cycle. The new estimator is an extension of the
work of Rochina-Barrachina (1999) who proposed an estimator for panel
data selection models where both the selection and the wage equation
contain individual effects allowed to be correlated with the observable
variables. Instead of solely correcting for systematic differences between
those who work and those who do not work (binary selection), we extend
the model by taking into account part-time and full-time work (ordered
selection). Since part-time employment decisions provide additional in-
formation about unobserved characteristics. Our proposed method is
likely to estimate improved wage profiles compared to models that use a
binary selection indicator. The newly proposed estimator is applied to a
large administrative data set based on Dutch tax records (2001-2011). The
application allows us to analyze selection effects in part-time and full-time
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employment as well as the part-time wage penalty over the life-cycle.
Education-specific life-cycle wage profiles show the existence of positive
selection. For the average man, we do not find a part-time wage penalty.
For the average low- and high-educated woman, we find part-time wage
penalties of about 30%.
4.1 Introduction
Aging of the population confronts society with a growing number of
dilemmas regarding the sustainability of public finances and collective
arrangements. In OECD countries, pension systems are affected by de-
mographic aging (OECD 2011b) and many countries have implemented
or proposed reforms to alleviate the stress on the sustainability of the
system primarily by increasing the statutory retirement age, making pen-
sion benefits less generous and increasing contribution rates. Forecasting
the resources that people have available for post-retirement consumption
is crucial when evaluating the impact of these reforms on government
finances and financial well-being of retirees.
Since most pension formulas for pension accumulation are based on
earnings during working life, life-cycle wage profiles are crucial in de-
termining income available at retirement. Wages and wage processes
are therefore a central component in life-cycle models. Especially, wage
uncertainty and the persistence of income shocks play an important role
in life-cycle models of consumption- and savings behavior that are used
to evaluate retirement savings adequacy (Scholz et al. 2006). A life-cycle
earnings model can also be used to simulate future (occupational) pen-
sion accumulation and the consequences of proposed reforms for such
future pension accumulation (Borella 2004). A good understanding of the
life-cycle wage profile is vital in this literature because deviations from
the estimated deterministic component of the life-cycle wage profile are
supposed to be the result of shocks.
Life-cycle models can be used to analyze retirement savings adequacy
(Scholz et al. 2006). The conclusions of such analyses depend on the
correct specification of the life-cycle wage-profile. However, the wage
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profile estimated in life-cycle models in general does not consider selection
effects into work. Wages are likely to be observed non-randomly over the
life-cycle, e.g. wages are only observed for people who are working. These
same individuals may earn a different potential wage than the individuals
who are not working. Neglecting this non-random selection into work
may bias estimated wages (Heckman 1979) and wage-profiles (Casanova
2013).
The main objective of this paper is to estimate life-cycle wage profiles
of persons in wage employment. We do not distinguish other labor market
statuses like self-employment, unemployment, disability, early retirement
and other inactivity.1 We estimate life-cycle wage profiles by using panel
data sample selection models with special attention given to selection
into full-time and part-time employment. The incorporation of part-time
employment is important as part-time employment plays an important role
throughout the life-cycle for both men and women. Women tend to prefer
part-time employment jobs in general because of the possibility to combine
work and care (Booth and Van Ours 2008, Gregory and Connolly 2008).
Such part-time employment is often associated with a lower wage than
full-time wages among women (Manning and Petrongolo 2008). Among
men, part-time employment is often preferred at older ages (Kantarci and
Van Soest 2008) as a way to reduce working hours prior to full retirement
(e.g. Ruhm (2006), Cahill et al. (2006)). Such end-of-career transitions often
imply substantial drops in wages (Aaronson and French 2004, Casanova
2013, Hurd 1996, Johnson and Neumark 1996).
To estimate life-cycle wage profiles using a panel data sample selection
model with part-time employment, we propose a new estimator that ex-
tends the work of Rochina-Barrachina (1999). Rochina-Barrachina (1999)
proposed an estimator for panel data selection models where both the se-
lection and the wage equation contain individual effects allowed to be cor-
related with the observable variables.2 Compared to Rochina-Barrachina
1Introducing self-employment as a separate state would include another endogenous
decision. Also, we do not have information on the number of hours worked by the
self-employed.
2Other studies dealing with the estimation of panel data sample selection models
are Wooldridge (1995) and Kyriazidou (1997). Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007)
provide a comparison of these three aforementioned estimation methods. Endogeneity
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(1999), who uses a binary selection rule in the selection equation, we im-
plement an ordered selection rule. By using an ordered indicator instead
of a binary selection indicator we are able to take into account extra in-
formation regarding unobserved individual characteristics, such as ability
and preferences, from selection into part-time and full-time work that
may influence wages. Instead of only correcting for systematic differences
between those who work and those who do not work, we also take into ac-
count unobserved differences between those who are employed part-time
and full-time in a panel data sample selection model.
Like Rochina-Barrachina (1999) we eliminate individual specific effects
from the equation of interest by taking first- and higher order differences.
Furthermore, a conditional mean independence assumption (Wooldridge
1995) is made to deal with the possible correlations between the unob-
served individual specific effects and the explanatory variables in the
selection equation. In the literature, discrete choice models have been used
to analyze part-time and full-time wages, amongst others, by Ermisch and
Wright (1993), Dustmann and Schmidt (2000). In contrast to these papers
we use a combination of a bivariate ordered probit selection model and
a wage equation in differences in order to eliminate individual specific
unobserved effects nonparametrically in the second stage. The advantage
of using differences in the wage equation is that it allows for an unknown
conditional mean of the individual effects.
To estimate the model we use administrative data from the Dutch tax
office for the years 2001-2011, which are more representative and reliable
than survey data which are often used for the estimation of wage profiles.3
Our proposed estimator allows us to analyze selection effects, selection
into full-time and part-time employment, the part-time wage penalty and
the effect of career breaks on wages over the life-cycle.
Earlier contributions to selection into work over the life-cycle shows a
diverse picture. Ejrnaes and Kunze (2011) show the existence of negative
selection in reentering full-time work after birth among German women.
issues and dynamic panel data sample selection models are dealt with in Semykina and
Wooldridge (2010) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2011) respectively.
3Most studies analyzing life-cycle wage profiles rely on survey data from PSID. A
number of shortcomings of the PSID for analyzing earnings dynamics are mentioned in
Pischke (1995).
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However, whether selection is positive or negative is found to possibly
change over time among women (Mulligan and Rubinstein 2008). Myck
(2010) finds that British men approaching the retirement age and who
maintain their employment status are more likely to be the lower wage
individuals (e.g. negative selection), whereas German men with higher
wages are more likely to remain employed (e.g. positive selection). For the
US, Casanova (2010) finds negative selection for older men. Using different
selection terms Casanova (2013) does not find evidence for selection effects
among older men (50+) at all.
For men, the results of applying our two-step estimator suggest the
existence of positive selection into work over the life-cycle. This is in
contrast with the results we obtain when using the binary selection correc-
tion proposed by Rochina-Barrachina (1999). Applying a binary selection
indicator suggests negative selection into work. However, adding extra
information using an ordered selection indicator changes the sign of se-
lection. We also find positive selection into part-time employment and
full-time employment among both men and women as well among low-
educated and high-educated groups. Actual selection corrected life-cycle
wage profiles however differ between these groups. Estimating education-
specific models, we find no part-time wage penalties for the average low-
and high educated man respectively. For the average woman, we find
part-time wage penalties of 30% and 34% for low- and high-educated
women respectively. This wage differential between part-time and full-
time work may be a compensation for the ability to combine work with
care and a consequence of less experience being accumulated (Boeri and
Van Ours 2008). Career breaks have a significant downward effect on
life-cycle wages for both men and women although the effect is somewhat
more pronounced among men.
The proposed two-step estimator in this paper is likely to be useful
in all applications of life-cycle earnings models as the second-stage wage
equation is likely to give better estimates of the coefficients of wages
over the life-cycle than wage profiles estimated without correction for
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selection4 or with binary selection correction.5 Applications of the model
can vary from estimating life-cycle models (Gourinchas and Parker 2002,
Scholz et al. 2006), analyzing earnings inequality (Baker and Solon 2003,
Cappellari 2004, Haider 2001) to microsimulation exercises (Borella 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the administrative
data, the selection of the sample, and we provide a descriptive analysis
of observed full-time and part-time wages over the life-cycle for men and
women (section 4.2). Second, section 4.3 describes the basic model and
explains the empirical specification. Section 4.4 shows the estimation
results. Education-specific estimates are shown in section 4.4.3. Finally,
section 4.5 concludes to what extent it is important to correct life-cycle
wage profiles for selection into work and hours.
4.2 Data
The data in this study are taken from the 2001-2011 Income Panel Study
from the Netherlands (IPO, CBS 2009a), the 2001-2011 Data on working
hours (Baanprsjaarbedragtab, CBS 2010a) and the 2001-2011 data on the
highest level of education (Hoogsteopltab, CBS 2010b). All three data sets
are gathered by Statistics Netherlands. The IPO, a representative sample
from the Dutch population, consists of an administrative panel dataset
of, on average, 95,000 selected individuals per year who are followed
longitudinally. Sampling is based on individuals’ national security number,
and the selected individuals are followed for as long as they are residing
in the Netherlands on December 31 of the sample year. Individuals born
4To bypass possible selection papers focused on prime-aged males who are generally
assumed to work to estimate wage profiles. MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989),
Baker (1997), Lillard and Reville (1999), Haider (2001), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004),
Heathcote et al. (2010), Storesletten et al. (2004), Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012), Guvenen
(2009), Altonji et al. (2009), Gottschalk and Zhang (2010), Ziliak et al. (2011) and Moffitt
and Gottschalk (2011) (US). Dickens (2000), Ramos (2003) and Kalwij and Alessie (2007)
(UK). Cappellari (2004) and Borella (2004) (Italy). Baker and Solon (2003) (Canada).
Bonke et al. (2011) (Germany). Santos and Souza (2007) (Brazil). Magnac et al. (2011)
(France). Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009) (Europe). As a consequence, the results of
these models can not be generalized to women and persons approaching the retirement
age (Kassi 2013).
5Such as Casanova (2010, 2013), Ejrnaes and Kunze (2011), Hanoch and Honig (1985),
Johnson and Neumark (1996), Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), Myck (2010).
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in the Netherlands enter the panel for the first time in the year of their
birth, and immigrants to the Netherlands in the year of their arrival. The
main advantages of using this administrative dataset compared to using
survey data for our analysis are, the large sample size, the long panel
aspect of the data, the accuracy of tax data compared to survey questions,
and representativeness. Baanprsjaarbedragtab contains information about
working hours (the number of hours worked in proportion to a yearly
full time job) for the whole Dutch population. Hoogsteopltab provides
information on the highest level of education for a subsample of the
Dutch population. We merge this information with the internationally
standardized ISCED3 measures of educational levels. The three data sets
are merged based on the individuals’ personal identifier.
Variable definitions and data selection 4.2.1
The dependent variables in our analysis is the real full-time equivalent
wage expressed in 2010 euros. To construct wages, we divide yearly
earnings by the proportion of hours worked relative to a full time job. This
leaves us with a yearly full-time equivalent wage. Inevitably, we do not
observe wages for people that do not work.
In this study we select individuals between the ages of 24 and 64
(309,025 observations for men and 305,678 observations for women). In
the estimates, we only use information of persons born no later than
1980. Disentangling age, period and cohort effects works better when an
individual is observed over a long time-span. Persons born later than 1980
are only available in the years 2006-2011 at relatively young ages.
Subsequently, we drop some outliers. First, we drop persons who
worked less than one-twelfth of a full-time year. We argue they work to
little to calculate a reliable wage. Second, we drop observations where the
wage rate is higher than the 99th-percentile6. In this way we correct for
possible measurement error in either earnings or the full-time employment
factor leading to a very high wage. Third, we delete observations where
the wage is lower than the minimum wage since the minimum wage is
6149,681 euros for men and 89,930 euros for women on average.
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legally binding (we take into account yearly differences in the minimum
wage level). Fourth, observations are dropped if a year-to-year-change in
the wage rate is lower than -50% or higher than 80%. It is highly unlikely
that these persons face a year-to-year change in their wage that is due to
promotion or demotion. It is more likely that such big changes in year-
to-year wages are a consequence of measurement error in the part-time
employment factor. Finally, since a lot of people retire during the year
observations about the last year of work before retirement are sensitive to
mistakes in the number of hours worked in that year. Therefore, we drop
observations for which the wage rate dropped more than 30% or increased
more than 80% in the last year before retirement.
For the analysis that differentiates between education levels, we end
up with 87,401 men and 84,757 women for whom the education level is
known. We use population weights to make the sample representative
with respect to age, gender, marital status, province, household size and
the age of the head of the household.
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 shows the development of earnings and wages in our period of
observation (2001-2011). The table shows that labor income (including
zeros for non-workers) is over time for men and increased for women.
Also the average and median wages rates (second column) are slightly
increasing over time for men and women. For women, we observe that the
average part-time employment factor (which is equal to one if full-time
employed throughout the year) increased substantially over the years 2001-
2011 from 0.39 to 0.47. For men, the table indicates that average wages are
quite stable over time while median wages seem to have increased over
time.
Table 4.1 solely focuses on trends over time. To gain insight in wage-
differences over the life-cycle and between cohorts we construct age-
cohort figures. Figure 4.1 presents average earnings for men and women
(including those who do not work). For men, average earnings are about
20,000 euros per year at the age of 25 and grow up to about 35,000 euros
per year around the age of 50. After the age of 50, we observe a decline
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Table 4.1: Descriptives of real earnings and wage rates
Year Average Average Median S.D. Part-time Obs.b
earningsa wage wage factor
Men
2001 30,266 43,212 37,948 19,249 0.72 26,142
2002 30,047 43,160 37,974 19,025 0.72 25,764
2003 29,947 43,793 38,511 19,402 0.71 25,891
2004 29,933 44,311 39,076 19,883 0.70 25,717
2005 29,710 44,357 39,005 20,140 0.70 25,686
2006 29,856 44,474 39,196 20,153 0.70 25,823
2007 29,978 44,199 38,906 19,989 0.70 25,954
2008 30,213 44,299 39,062 20,097 0.71 25,820
2009 30,196 44,973 39,752 20,300 0.70 25,913
2010 29,703 44,913 39,692 20,479 0.70 25,831
2011 29,813 44,774 39,376 20,928 0.70 25,552
Women
2001 13,007 33,564 31,149 11,879 0.39 24,118
2002 13,398 33,908 31,574 11,987 0.40 23,926
2003 13,573 34,265 31,911 12,008 0.40 24,177
2004 13,745 34,634 32,198 12,309 0.40 24,127
2005 13,900 34,688 32,003 12,749 0.40 24,290
2006 14,283 33,329 31,070 11,647 0.42 25,927
2007 14,927 33,483 31,213 11,843 0.44 25,085
2008 15,471 33,671 31,296 11,981 0.45 25,172
2009 15,907 34,489 32,008 12,247 0.46 25,460
2010 16,176 34,876 32,428 12,496 0.46 25,260
2011 16,370 34,678 32,073 12,559 0.47 25,139
a Average earnings include observations with earnings equal to zero. Wage rates are only observed for workers.
b Total number of observations, including observations with earnings equal to zero.
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in average yearly earnings with a huge drop in earnings around the age
of 60. The decline in average earnings among men may be explained by
several phenomena: 1) early retirement, 2) drops in hours worked (partial
retirement), 3) older people receive lower wages and 4) cohort effects.
Profound cohort differences are observed among women, because of the
increased female labor force participation in the last decades. We observe
that a 25 year-old female earns about 17,000 euros per year on average.
Around the age of 35 (when most women raise their children) earnings are
relatively low, probably because of a drop in the labor force participation
and/or the number of hours work. Thereafter, earnings increase and as
from the age of 50 earnings decrease again.
Unemployment and part-time employment shape the earnings profile
as shown in figure 4.1.7 Figure 4.2 therefore shows the percentage of men
in full-time and part-time employment over the life-cycle for different
cohorts. About 70% of all men in all cohorts seem to work full-time until
the age 55.8 However, between 2001 and 2011 it seems in all cohorts about
10% of the men moved from a full-time to a part-time job. Most men
seem to end up in unemployment at older ages defined as everyone not
in paid-employment. About 30% is unemployed at the age of 55 and this
increases to about 90% at the age of 64 for the oldest cohort. As expected,
younger cohorts of men retire later.
Figure 4.3 presents the percentage of women in full-time and part-time
employment over the life-cycle for different cohorts. The figure indicates a
substantial drop in full-time employment around the age at which women
raise children. Before the age of 30 about 30-40% of women work full-time
and this drops to less than 15% at the age of 40, after which it stays
constant which is in line with the findings of Bosch et al. (2010). Part-time
jobs, on the other hand, increase between the age of 30 and 40 from about
7In this paper we define people to be unemployed when they do not earn labor income
from paid employment.
8We assume persons to be working full-time if the part-time employment factor is
equal to one. Every person with a part-time employment factor of smaller than one is
considered to be working part-time or unemployed. The effect of considering people
with a part-time employment factor of 0.9 or bigger would be marginal as only 5.3%
of men and 3.7% of women have a part-time employment factor of larger than 0.9 but
smaller than one.
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Figure 4.1: Life-cycle earnings of men (a) and women (b)
(a) Earnings men
(b) Earnings women
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of men in full-time employment (a) and
part-time employment (b)
(a) Full-time employment (%)
(b) Part-time employment (%)
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7 to 15%. Unemployment is much lower for younger cohorts than for older
cohorts of women. Part-time jobs, however, increase for younger cohorts.
Figure 4.4 shows the average full-time equivalent yearly wage for those
in full-time and part-time employment. Average yearly wages of men are
approximately 30,000 euros at the age of 25 and about 50,000 euros at the
age of 58. Female yearly average wages increase from 27,000 euros at the
age of 25 to 35,000 euros at the age of 35 after which it remains relatively
constant.
Decomposing the observed wages for persons in full-time and part-
time employment shows that full-time wages are generally higher than
the part-time wages. This applies to both men (figure 4.5) and women
(figure 4.6). This observation may be explained by self-selection effects
into full-time and part-time employment, e.g. persons with beneficial
(observed and unobserved) characteristics tend to choose for full-time
employment. The difference in full-time and part-time wages may also
be well explained by the existence of a part-time wage penalty. To test
the existence of selection and a part-time wage penalty, we use the model
explained in the following sections.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of women in full-time employment (a)
and part-time employment (b)
(a) Full-time employment (%)
(b) Part-time employment (%)
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Figure 4.4: Life-cycle wages of men (a) and women (b)
(a) Wages men
(b) Wages women
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Figure 4.5: Full-time and part-time wages of men
(a) Full-time wages
(b) Part-time wages
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Figure 4.6: Full-time and part-time wages of women
(a) Full-time wages
(b) Part-time wages
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4.3 Model
4.3.1 Panel data sample selection model
This section outlines our empirical model for analyzing wages. As dis-
cussed in section 4.2 we observe wages and the number of hours worked
per year. We use a panel data sample selection model to model both wages
and labor force participation at the extensive and intensive margin. The
model can be written as follows:
y∗it = xitβ + αi + uit i = 1, ..., N t = 1, ..., T (4.1)










0 (no participation) if h∗it ≤ δ1t
1 (part-time) if δ1t < h∗it ≤ δ2t
2 (part-time) if δ2t < h∗it ≤ δ3t
...
J (full-time) if δJt < h∗it
(4.4)
where yit is the log full-time equivalent wage for individual i in period
t. hit contains J categories of labor (no labor force participation, several
categories of part-time labor force participation, and full-time labor force
participation). Furthermore, xit and zit are vectors of explanatory variables.
For identification zit includes variables that do not appear in xit (exclusion
restrictions) such as information regarding marital status, children and
other household characteristics. β and γ are unknown parameter vectors
to be estimated and αi and ηi are unobserved individual specific effects,
which are possibly correlated with xit and zit. Finally, δjt with j = {1, .., J}
are cut-off points to be estimated and uit and vit are unobserved distur-
bances, presumably not independent of each other,9 which are assumed
9If uit and vit are independent, we do not need to worry about selection effects in the
wage equation.
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to follow a normal distribution with mean zero and variances σu,t and σv,t.
uit and vit are assumed to be uncorrelated with xit and zit.
To estimate the model we built upon the approaches of Rochina-
Barrachina (1999) and Kalwij (2003). Kalwij (2003) proposed a new esti-
mator for a panel data Tobit model in which the unobserved individual
specific effects are allowed to correlate with the explanatory variables. The
paper of Rochina-Barrachina (1999) is concerned with the estimation of
a panel data sample selection model where both the selection and the
regression equation contain individual effects allowed to be correlated
with the observable variables.
Following Mundlak (1978) we parameterize the individual specific
effect in the selection equation (4.2) as a linear function of the average
explanatory variables over time plus a random individual specific effect
that is assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables:10
ηi = ziθ + ci (4.5)
where ci is a random effect that is assumed to be a normally distributed
random variable with mean zero and variance σc. Substituting (4.5) into
(4.2) yields:
h∗it = zitγ + ziθ + µit (4.6)
where µit = ci + vit. Given the distributional assumptions it holds that
µit ∼ N(0, σµ,t), where σ2µ,t = σ2c + σ2v,t. Furthermore, µit is allowed to be
serially dependent (this is important, because of the term ci).
By taking first- and higher order differences we eliminate the indi-
vidual specific unobserved effects αi without having to assume a specific
parameterization of the individual unobserved effect in the wage equation
(4.1). We can only observe wage differences for those observations for
10An application of Mundlak (1978) to panel data selection models was first used in
Wooldridge (1995).
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which an individual has worked at both time t and t−m:
yit − yit−m =
{




y∗it − y∗it−m = (xit − xit−m)β + (uit − uit−m), m ≥ 1 (4.8)
Estimating equation (4.8) by OLS would yield inconsistent estimates
of β as the conditional expectation of the error term is unlikely to be
zero due to correlation between uit and vit (e.g. selection effects into
work). Therefore, Rochina-Barrachina (1999) calculates the expectation




E[yit − yit−m|xi, zi, h∗it−m > δ1t−m, h∗it > δ1t]
= (xit − xit−m)β + E[uit − uit−m|xi, zi, h∗it−m > δ1t−m, h∗it > δ1t]
= (xit − xit−m)β
+ E[uit − uit−m|xi, zi, µit−m > δ1t−m − zit−mγ− ziθ, µit > δ1t − zitγ− ziθ]
(4.9)
The errors [(uit − uit−m), µit−m, µit] are assumed to be trivariate normally
distributed conditional on xi and zi. Denote the correlation coefficient of
µit−m and µit by ρtm. By taking the derivative of the moment generating
function of the truncated multi-normal distribution with respect to t and
evaluating the function in t = 0, Rochina-Barrachina (1999) obtains the
following conditional mean of the error term (uit − uit−m):12
E[uit − uit−m|µit−m > δ1t−m − zit−mγ− ziθ, µit > δ1t − zitγ− ziθ]
= π1tmλ1itm(Mit−m, Mit, ρtm) + π2tmλ2itm(Mit−m, Mit, ρtm) (4.10)
11The method of Rochina-Barrachina (1999) is a specific case of our general model
presented in equations (4.1)-(4.4) in which only information on work versus no work is
used. Equation (4.4) contains two categories: no participation and participation.
12This result is based on calculating the first moment of the truncated multivariate
normal distribution as in Tallis (1961).
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where
Mit−m = (−δ1t−m + zit−mγ + ziθ)/σµ,t−m (4.11)
Mit = (−δ1t + zitγ + ziθ)/σµ,t (4.12)
and


















Applying OLS on the sample of first- and higher order differences will
yield consistent estimates of β if the selection correction terms (4.10) are
added to (4.1). If added to the regression equation, the new error term
ξit ≡ (uit − uit−m)− (π1tmλ1itm + π2tmλ2itm) has a conditional expectation
of zero by construction.
Panel data sample selection model with part-time employment 4.3.2
The proposed method by Rochina-Barrachina (1999) takes into account the
binary selection of work versus no work. We argue that more information
regarding the correlation between uit and vit can be added to the model
by additionally taking into account labor supply at the intensive margin.
By using an ordered selection equation instead of a binary selection
equation, we are able to take into account the extra information available
from observing part-time and full-time work. Thus, instead of only cor-
recting for systematic differences between those who work and those who
do not work, we also take into account unobserved differences between
those who work part-time and full-time.
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We extend equation (4.9) by taking into account the lower- and upper
thresholds of working hours categories, which yields
E[yit − yit−m|xi, zi, δj,t < h∗it ≤ δj+1,t, δj,t−m < h∗it−m ≤ δj+1,t−m]
= (xit − xit−m)β
+ E[uit − uit−m|xi, zi, δj,t < h∗it ≤ δj+1,t, δj,t−m < h∗it−m ≤ δj+1,t−m]
= (xit − xit−m)β
+ E[uit − uit−m|xi, zi, Git−m ≤ µit−m < Hit−m, Git ≤ µit < Hit] (4.15)
where
Hit−m = −δj,t−m + zit−mγ + ziθ (4.16)
Git−m = −δj+1,t−m + zit−mγ + ziθ (4.17)
Hit = −δj,t + zitγ + ziθ (4.18)
Git = −δj+1,t + zitγ + ziθ (4.19)
and where j is the working hours category of individual i at time t. For
persons who do not work at time t, δ0,t = −∞. For these people, Hit = ∞.
Similarly, for persons engaged in full-time work at time t, δJ+1,t = ∞ such
that Git = −∞.
As in the framework of Rochina-Barrachina (1999), the errors [(uit −
uit−m), µit−m, µit] are assumed to be trivariate normally distributed condi-
tional on xi and zi. Denote the correlation coefficient of µit−m and µit by
ρtm. We can write out the conditional mean in (4.15) by:
E(uit − uit−m|xi, zi, Git−m ≤ µit−m < Hit−m, Git ≤ µit < Hit) =
(4.20)
π1tmλ1itm(ρtm, bit, ait−m, bit−m)
+ π2tmλ2itm(ρtm, ait, ait−m, bit−m)
+ π3tmλ3itm(ρtm, ait, bit, bit−m)
+ π4tmλ4itm(ρtm, ait, bit, ait−m)


















with σµ,t and with σµ,t−m being the variances of the error term of the
selection equation for time t and t−m respectively and where















Φ2(bit−m, bit; ρtm)−Φ2(ait−m, ait; ρtm)
(4.25)















Φ2(bit−m, bit; ρtm)−Φ2(ait−m, ait; ρtm)
(4.26)















Φ2(bit−m, bit; ρtm)−Φ2(ait−m, ait; ρtm)
(4.27)















Φ2(bit−m, bit; ρtm)−Φ2(ait−m, ait; ρtm)
(4.28)
For the derivation of this result by calculating the first moment of the
doubly truncated multivariate distribution, we refer to Appendix 4.A. As
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ξitm ≡ (uit − uit−m)− (π1tmλ1itm + π2tmλ2itm + π3tmλ3itm + π4tmλ4itm) has
a conditional expectation of zero by construction, taking into account
both the lower- and upper thresholds of working hours categories results
in four selection correction terms; two more than the binary selection
approach of Rochina-Barrachina (1999).13
4.3.3 Experience and unemployment
Labor market experience has a positive return on the wage rate (see for
example Dustmann and Meghir 2005). On the other hand, unemployment
has a negative effect on post-unemployment wages (see for example
Schmieder et al. 2013). In our proposed model in section 4.3.2, we are able
to take into account information regarding experience by investigating
wage differences between t and t−m (m = {1, 2, 3, ..., 10}). When people
experience years of unemployment between t and t − m we take this
explicitly into account in the model by including a variable indicating the
number of years without labor income between time t and t− m. This
provides information about how wage growth is influenced by years of
unemployment. Our large data set allows us to investigate the effect of
unemployment on wage growth for men and women at different ages and
during different stages of the business cycle. Since the effect of the number
of years unemployed on wage growth may be nonlinear, we include the
number of years unemployed as a linear spline with knots at 0, 1 and
3 years of unemployment. This linear spline takes into account that the
effect of unemployment on wage growth may be different in the first year
compared to the second and third year and four or more years.
4.3.4 Estimation
To estimate the model we use a two-step estimation procedure. In the
first step we deal with the selection equation. We estimate the following
bivariate ordered probit model for each s = {t, t−m}.
13Technically, this is a consequence of the difference in analyzing the first moment of a
singly and doubly truncated multivariate normal distribution.
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h∗it−m = zit−mγt−m + ziθt−m + µit−m (4.29)
h∗it = zitγt + ziθt + µit (4.30)
his =

0 (no participation) if h∗is ≤ δ1s
1 (part-time) if δ1s < h∗is ≤ δ2s
2 (part-time) if δ2s < h∗is ≤ δ3s
...
J (full-time) if δJs < h∗is
(4.31)
The bivariate ordered probit model takes into account the correlation
between µit and µit−m. This is necessary because we assume that this
error-term has a time-constant individual component (ci in µit = ci + vit,
see section 4.3).
In the second step we construct the correction terms λ1itm, λ2itm, λ3itm
and λ4itm by using the estimates âit, âit−m, b̂it, b̂it−m, σ̂µ,t, σ̂µ,t−m and ρ̂tm.
λ̂1itm, λ̂2itm, λ̂3itm and λ̂4itm are used as additional regressors in the wage
equation to obtain consistent estimates of β by OLS on the sample of
wages observed in t and t−m.14,15 (M2 )× 4 selection terms are added to
the wage equation.16 We estimate




πctmλcitm + (uit − uit−m),
m ≥ 1 (4.32)
14We use bootstrapped standard errors for inference in the two-stage approach
(Wooldridge 2002).
15Note that our estimation approach is slightly different from the approach taken in
Rochina-Barrachina (1999). Rochina-Barrachina (1999) estimates separate OLS regressions
for each s and uses a minimum distance estimator on the separate OLS regressions to
obtain the regression results. We, on the other hand, estimate one OLS regression on first-
and higher order differences. Both approaches assume that the effects are the same for
each s.
16M = 10. The bivariate model consists of pairs of 2. We obtained 4 selection correction
terms per combination.
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4.4 Estimation results
4.4.1 Selection equation
We model the first-stage bivariate ordered probit models with four ordered
categories of labor force participation: 1) no participation, 2) participation
lower than or equal to 50% of the full-time working hours, 3) more than
50% but less than 100% of the full-time working hours, and 4) working
full-time.17
We allow for a semi-parametric specification of age effects by using
age-dummies as explanatory variables in vector z. Following Ermisch
and Wright (1993) and Paci et al. (1995), we use information on marital
status (dummies for married, divorced and widowed) and children (the
number of children and age of the youngest child) as exclusion restrictions
in zit. Furthermore, we use a dummy variable that indicates whether
an individual has a partner aged 62 or older. As an additional control
variable we include a dummy for first-generation immigrants. zi includes
the individual’s time-averages of the marital status dummies, the variables
providing information on children and the dummy whether there is a
partner aged 62 or older present in the household.
The bivariate ordered selection model is estimated for each combination
of t and t − m.18 The separate estimations capture period and cohort
differences in labor force participation.
4.4.2 Wage equation
The main equation (4.1) contains a flexible semi-parametric specification
of age- and period effects (following Kalwij and Alessie 2007). However,
age, period, and cohort effects (captured in the individual effect) cannot be
identified empirically because the calendar year is equal to the year of birth
plus age thereby spanning up the vector space. To identify age, period,
and cohort effects we follow the identification restriction proposed by
17We do a sensitivity check with more part-time employment categories.
18In our case with data from 2001-2011, this implies separate estimations for
(2002, 2001), (2003, 2002), (2003, 2001), ..., (2011, 2010), ..., (2011, 2001).
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Deaton and Paxson (1993). This means that we assume that all remaining
period effects add up to zero and are orthogonal to a linear time trend.
The estimated period effects (not reported here) are generally signifi-
cant but their effects on wages are rather small compared to the age effects,
e.g. most of the wage growth is a result of age and cohort effects.
Selection over the life-cycle
Figure 4.7 shows the estimated age coefficients of the wage regressions
for men and women. The figure indicates the differences in the estimated
age coefficients for 1) a model without selection correction (solid line), 2)
a model with binary selection correction as in Rochina-Barrachina (1999)
(dotted line) and 3) a model with ordered selection correction as proposed
in this paper (dashed line).
First focusing on the model without selection (solid line), the results
can be interpreted as follows. A 64 year old male has a 60% higher wage
than a 24 year old male. A 64 year old female has an approximately 50%
higher wage than a 24 year old female. Wages slightly decrease after the
age of 58. The wage at age 64 is significantly lower than the wage at age
58.19 The wage at age 64 is comparable to the wage at age 46.20 Among
women, we observe a lower wage growth from the age of 47 as the slope
of the wage curve decreases.
To test for selection, we follow Rochina-Barrachina (1999) who argues
that a valid test of no selection is a Wald-test of the joint significance of the
selection terms. In the binary selection model this means a Wald-test on
(M2 )× 2 coefficients. In the ordered selection model this means a Wald-test
on (M2 )× 4 coefficients.
For men, the selection correction terms of the binary selection correction
are jointly significant.21 Estimated age coefficients are higher than in the
model without selection correction. This suggests that correcting the
wages for persons whose wages are not observed gives a higher age effect
on wages than the model without selection correction. This result suggest
19H0 : β58 = β64. H0 rejected, p-value= 0.00.
20H0 : β46 = β64. H0 can not be rejected, p-value= 0.20.
21P-value= 0.00.
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Figure 4.7: Binary versus ordered selection correction regres-
sions and regressions without selection correction
of men (a) and women (b)
(a) Estimated coefficients men
(b) Estimated coefficients women
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the existence of negative selection into work over the life-cycle among
men, e.g. men with worse observed and unobserved characteristics tend
to work.
Testing the joint significance of the selection correction terms of the
ordered selection correction are jointly significant.22 Again, we find an
inverse U-shape of wages over age that is even more pronounced than
in the model with binary selection correction and the model without
selection correction. The results show that, wages drop by a substantial
9%-points from the peak at age 55 to the wage at age 64. Correcting
the wages for persons whose wages are not observed by the ordered
selection procedure gives a lower age effect on wages than the model
without selection correction. This result suggests positive selection into
work over the life-cycle among men. Positive selection seems especially
pronounced towards the end of the career. Such positive selection into
work would have remained unnoticed in a model that corrects for selection
by using a binary indicator. In stead, the model with the binary selection
procedure suggests that there is negative selection into work among men.
These different results indicate that correcting for selection into work and
working hours simultaneously may lead to different conclusions than
correcting solely for selection into work.
For women, the selection correction terms of the binary selection cor-
rection are jointly significant.23 The estimation results show that women’s
wages tend to increase over the life-cycle. Furthermore, we find that
correcting for selection with the binary selection indicator suggests the
existence of negative selection into work.
Testing the joint significance of the selection correction terms for the
ordered selection model indicates that selection is present.24 Whereas
the model with the binary selection indicator suggests the existence of
negative selection among women, the model with the ordered selection
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Table 4.2: Effect of career breaks (years) on wage
Men Women
Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D.
Career break = 1 -0.11*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01
1 < Career break ≤ 3 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01
Career break > 3 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Based on a binary selection indicator we would conclude that negative
selection over the life-cycle is present among men and women. However,
adding information from working hours decisions makes us conclude that
positive selection exists over the life-cycle among men while the negative
selection for women is much smaller than suggested by the model with
binary selection terms.
Career breaks
The effects of a career break, defined as a year in which one does not
receive labor income, on the life-cycle wage is estimated by a linear spline
for 1, 2-3 and 4+ years of a career break. A semi-parametric linear spline
is used because of possible non-linear effects, e.g. the effect a the first year
may be different from the effect of 4+ years.
The estimated coefficients of the linear spline function of career breaks
are shown in table 4.2 and can be interpreted as follows. Males who suffer
from a career break of at most one year have a 11% lower wage than men
without a career break. Men who suffer from a career break of at most
2-years (not necessarily subsequently) face an additional 5% lower wage.
An additional third year lowers the wage with another 5%. An additional
year after 3 years does not significantly reduce the wage anymore.
Women with a one-year career break face a 7% lower wage than women
without a career break. An additional second and third year reduce the
wage by 5%. The effects of a career break are not significantly different
from zero thereafter.
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Education-specific selection in full-time and part-time employ-
ment
4.4.3
In this section, we estimate education-specific life-cycle wage profiles. To
analyze selection into full-time and part-time wages, we estimate separate
wage equations for full-time (βFT) and part-time work (βPT).
Taking into account education may be relevant as wage growth may
differ between educational levels (Connolly and Gottschalk 2006). To ana-
lyze whether selection into full-time and part-time wages differs between
educational levels, we estimate separate wage equations for different edu-
cational levels. We use the international ISCED3 standard to define low
education (ISCED3= 1 or ISCED3= 2) and high education (ISCED3= 3).
In the selection equation, we use a simplified version of the specification
of the bivariate ordered probit model due to the loss of observations when
using educational information as explained in section 4.2. Basically, we no
longer use a semi-parametric specification of the age effects but assume
the effects of age on working hours to be quadratic. Furthermore, we
assume that the age effects on hours decisions may differ between low-
and high education. The same exclusion restrictions are used as in the
earlier specification of the bivariate ordered probit model.
The results (figure 4.8) suggest that there is positive selection in part-
time and full-time employment among men. For low-educated men we
find positive selection in both part-time25 and full-time employment.26
However, we do not find any wage growth over the life-cycle in the part-
time wage profile for low-educated men as the estimated age-coefficients
are not significantly different from zero. Among high-educated men, we
only find significant positive selection into full-time employment.27 Selec-
tion into part-time employment is not significant among high-educated
men.28
Analyzing the selection effects into part-time and full-time employment
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both part-time work29 and full-time work30 (figure 4.9). When correcting
for selection, all age effects on wages become insignificant among low-
educated women working part-time, e.g. there is no significant wage
growth over the life-cycle. Corrections for selection into part-time and full-
time employment among high-educated women shows positive selection
in both part-time31 and full-time work32 (figure 4.8).
4.4.4 Education-specific part-time wage penalties
Noticeable observations in figures 4.8 and 4.9 are 1) wage growth is steeper
over the life-cycle for full-time employment and 2) wage growth is steeper
for high-educated persons. This is true for both men and women.
The seminal work of Mincer (1974) focused on the relationship between
education and wage. Since Mincer (1974) many more advanced techniques
to identify the causal link between education and wages have emerged as
summarized by Card (1999) and virtually all studies find positive returns
to education. More recently Connolly and Gottschalk (2006) found that
also wage growth differs among educational levels which explains our
second observation in figures 4.8 and 4.9.
Our first observation suggests the existence of a part-time wage penalty.
Most studies find an existing part-time wage penalty although in some
papers the penalty almost disappears when controlling for differences in
personal- and job characteristics (for example, Manning and Petrongolo
2008). Others studies still find a part-time wage penalty after controlling
for such observables with substantial cross-country variation (for exam-
ple, Gornick and Jacobs 2002). A part-time wage premium is also found
empirically (for example, Pissarides et al. 2005). However, aforementioned
studies do not control for differences in unobserved characteristics such
as ability, tastes and preferences for full-time work. If there are unob-
served differences between persons choosing for part-time and full-time
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Figure 4.8: Part-time and full-time wage regressions for (a) low-
educated and (b) high-educated men
(a) Estimated coefficients low-educated
(b) Estimated coefficients high-educated
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Figure 4.9: Part-time and full-time wage regressions for (a) low-
educated and (b) high-educated women
(a) Estimated coefficients low-educated
(b) Estimated coefficients high-educated
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tioned studies are likely to be biased as most studies on the part-time
wage penalty are based on cross-sectional data and do not control for
selection.33
Compared to these earlier studies, we take into account selection
effects into part-time and full-time work. This is important as Aaronson
and French (2004) and Casanova (2013) also find substantial part-time
wage penalties for men (25% and 34% of a full-time wage respectively)
approaching the state-pension eligible age for who part-time employment
often functions as a partial retirement route. Dustmann and Schmidt (2000)
do take into account selection into full-time and part-time employment
when calculating wage differentials. However, their main interest lies in
the wage differential between native- and migrant women and estimate
these wage differentials for women in full-time and part-time employment.
Using the results in figures 4.8 and 4.9 we can test the existence of a part-
time wage penalty by testing whether all differences in the age coefficients
of part-time and full-time age dummies are jointly equal to zero.34 Among
high-educated men, the difference between estimated age coefficients of
the part-time and full-time model is not jointly significantly different from
zero meaning that we do not find a significant part-time wage penalty over
the life-cycle among high-educated men.35 We do find joint significance of
the difference between estimated age coefficients for low-educated men
which suggests the existence of a part-time wage penalty.36 The part-time
wage penalty is present among both low-educated37 and high-educated38
women.
To get an idea about the magnitude of the part-time wage penalty, we
use simulation to calculate the part-time wage penalty for the mean using
the following procedure: 1) we derive the unobserved heterogeneity αi for
each person, 2) we calculate the average of αi and every variable in vector
xit assuming uit = 0, 3) we set λ1itm = 0, λ2itm = 0, λ3itm = 0 and λ4itm = 0
since λ1itm, λ2itm, λ3itm and λ4itm are included in the regression to obtain
33Ermisch and Wright (1993) do correct for selection with cross-sectional data.
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correct estimates of β. The selection correction terms are, however, of
no relevance in this simulation excercise. 4) We predict the full-time and
part-time wage for the average person and 5) we calculate the differences
of full-time and part-time wages for the mean and the associated variance
using bootstrap.39 The interpretation of this method is that we calculate the
differences for the average person (in terms of observed and unobserved
characteristics) who worked either full-time or part-time. Results are
shown in table 4.3.
Table 4.3 shows the simulated part-time and full-time wages for the
mean as well as the absolute difference and the relative difference (the part-
time wage penalty).40 We find that the part-time wage penalties of -16%
and 14% are not statistically different from zero41 for low-educated and
high-educated men respectively (see table 4.3). Correcting for selection,
career breaks and education, the size of the part-time wage penalty is
negligible over the life-cycle among men. For low-educated and high-
educated women we find a significant part-time wage penalty of 30% and
34% respectively (see table 4.3).
These results, ofcourse, depend on the age that is used in the simulation
exercise. We use the average age that is observed in our data. Using a
lower (higher) age is likely to give a smaller (larger) part-time wage penalty
as the differences between full-time and part-time wages increases over
the life-cycle because of cumulative effects in experience.42 Manning and
Robinson (2004), Hirsch (2005) and Russo and Hassink (2008) find that
the part-time wage penalty is small or absent at the start of a career but
develops over the life-cycle. This can be explained by the lower experience
among part-time workers as well as by the observed lower incidence
of promotions among part-time workers compared to full-time workers
(Russo and Hassink 2008). These two effects tend to accumulate over
39Using 1500 replications.
40Please note that observed- and unobserved characteristics are averaged within gender
and not over gender. This implies that part-time and full-time wages can be compared
within gender but not between gender. Only the relative wage penalty can be compared
between gender.
41The variance of this penalty is relatively large and therefore the difference in wage is
insignificantly different from zero.
42In this simulation, we assume people to work either part-time of full-time during
their whole working life.
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Table 4.3: Part-time wage penalty for the mean for educational levels
Men Women
Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
ŷPT 47,225 12,110 48,970 7,310 29,215 4,027 36,717 3,286
ŷFT 40,696 1,420 56,690 1,489 41,626 1,621 57,774 1,487
Absolute difference -6,529 12,286 7,719 7,467 12,411 4,430 21,056 3,564
Relative difference -16% 14% 30% 34%
the life-cycle which explains the increasing gap between full-time and
part-time wages (Russo and Hassink 2008). The fact that we only find a
part-time wage penalty among women may be explained by compensation
for the ability to combine work with care (Boeri and Van Ours 2008).
Sensitivity analyses 4.4.5
To determine the robustness of our results we perform two sensitivity
analyses. Firstly, we analyze the consequences of increasing the number
of part-time employment categories in the selection equation. Secondly,
we discuss the possible endogeneity of the careeer breaks and the effect
on the conclusions.
Increasing part-time employment categories
The paper argues that adding additional information regarding the in-
tensive margin of participation is important in estimating wage profiles
as it gives more information regarding unobserved characteristics that
remain unnoted in selection correction models that only take into account
the extensive margin. To prove this, we also compare our baseline re-
sults (J = 4) with an extended model with more part-time employment
categories (J = 7).
We increase the number of ordered categories in the selection equation
to J = 7: 1) no participation, 2) full-time factor between 0% and 20%, 3)
full-time factor between 20% and 40%, 4) full-time factor between 40%
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and 60%, 5) full-time factor between 60% and 80%, 6) full-time factor
between 80% and 100%, and 7) working full-time (100%). The percentage
of men observed in these categories is 26%, 0.4%, 1%, 2%, 2%, 10% and
59% respectively. The percentage of women observed in these categories
is 42%, 1%, 5%, 12%, 12%, 12% and 16% respectively.
Figure 4.10 shows the estimation results when we take into account
7 working hours categories in stead of 4 in part-time and full-time wage
equations.
The estimation results are highly comparable for the full-time wage
profile. We observe that using J = 7 in stead of J = 4 in the first-stage
causes the part-time wage profile to increase for men and decrease for
women. So, the number of hours categories taken into account does matter
for the second-stage wage profiles. For future research, we would like to
increase J as long as there are a sufficient amount of observations in each
j.
Career breaks
Since perons with a low-wage potential may also be subject to a career
break more often (because of unemplyment, for example), the coefficients
of the effects of career breaks on wages should be interpreted with caution.
To check that the possible endogeity of the career breaks does not affect
the main conclusions of the paper, we estimated a model excluding career
break variables. Comparing the estimated wage profiles without career
breaks to the model including career break variables indicates that the
estimated age coefficients are highly similar. Therefore, we conclude that
the inclusion of career break variables does not affect the main conclusions
of the paper despite the possible endogenity of the variables.
4.5 Conclusion
To gain insight in consumption and savings behavior over the life-cycle
and to assess the adequacy of retirement savings, it is important to model
life-cycle earnings as labor income usually is the primary source of income
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Figure 4.10: Ordered selection correction regressions with J=7
for men (a) and women (b)
(a) Estimated coefficients men
(b) Estimated coefficients women
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(Scholz et al. 2006). Also, earnings are often directly related to the accu-
mulation of (occupational) pension rights over the life-cycle. Conclusions
regarding the adequacy of retirement savings depend on a correct specifi-
cation of the wage equation. However, most life-cycle models neglect the
selection into wages while selection into work is likely to be nonrandom
(Casanova 2013).
This paper proposes a new estimator to estimate life-cycle wage pro-
files using a panel data sample selection model that takes into account
information about part-time and full-time work. Our proposed new es-
timator is an extension of the method proposed by Rochina-Barrachina
(1999). Rochina-Barrachina (1999) proposes a binary selection equation
to correct for selection into work. We propose an ordered selection equa-
tion to correct for selection into work and the number of hours of work
simultaneously. By taking into account the number of hours that people
work, extra information is available about unobserved characteristics in the
wage equation. This is especially relevant for the analysis of wages over
the life-cycle as women who work full-time or have a large part-time job
during the upbringing of young children may have different unobserved
characteristics compared to women in small part-time jobs. Also, men
who retire partially may be a selective group with different observed and
unobserved characteristics than men who do not retire gradually. The
estimator proposed in this paper is applied to estimate life-cycle wage
profiles and to analyze selection into part-time and full-time employment
as well as the part-time wage penalty over the life-cycle conditional on
possible career breaks.
Using the binary selection correction proposed by Rochina-Barrachina
(1999) we find negative selection into work over the life-cycle among men
and women. However, adding information regarding hours decisions
by using the ordered selection correction proposed in this paper we find
positive selection into work over the life-cycle among men and less sub-
stantial negative selection among women. This difference indicates that it
is important to take into account both participation and hours decisions to
account for unobserved heterogeneity in wages. This is strengthened by
our analysis that increases the number of hours categories. The positive se-
lection suggests that persons with more affluent observed and unobserved
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characteristics tend to work over the life-cycle whereas persons with less
beneficial observed and unobserved characteristics are less likely to be
employed. Career breaks have a substantial negative effect on life-cycle
wages with an effect of 11% (men) and 7% (women) of the first year which
increases up to 21% (men) and 17% (women) from the third year.
Education-specific life-cycle wage profiles for low- and high-educated
persons show that both selection effects and part-time wage penalties
may differ between these groups. Among men, we generally find positive
selection. The part-time wage penalty over the life-cycle is not significantly
different from zero for low- and high-educated men. Positive selection into
part-time and full-time employment is found among both low-educated
and high-educated women. Estimating the life-cycle wage profiles sepa-
rately for low- and high-educated women substantially gives an average
part-time wage penalty of 30% and 34% for low- and high-educated
women respectively.
The paper shows the existence of selection into work over the life-cycle
for both men and women. This has consequences for applications in which
estimating life-cycle earnings processes are crucial. The extra information
regarding unobserved individual heterogeneity that the proposed estima-
tor incorporates in estimating life-cycle wages makes it well-applicable
to models that depend on life-cycle earnings processes such as life-cycle
models of consumption and savings (Scholz et al. 2006), earnings in-
equality (Cappellari 2004) and microsimulation models of future pension
accumulation (Borella 2004).
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4.A Derivation of the selection terms
To derive the selection correction terms based on the ordered selection
equation, we need to calculate the first moment of the doubly truncated
trivariate normal distribution. To calculate this first moment, we follow the
approach of Manjunath and Wilhelm (2012) using the moment generating
function (m.g.f.) of a doubly truncated multivariate normal distribution.
The m.g.f. of a doubly truncated trivariate normal distribution43 that is
truncated in a and b yields (see equation 5 in Manjunath and Wilhelm
2012)












location parameter µ = 0 and covariance matrix Σ. φαΣ(x ) is the trivariate





























a∗1 = a1 − Σt (4.35)
a∗2 = a2 − Σt (4.36)
a∗3 = a3 − Σt (4.37)
b∗1 = b1 − Σt (4.38)
b∗2 = b2 − Σt (4.39)
43[(uit− uit−m), µit−m, µit] are assumed to be trivariate normally distributed conditional
on xi and zi.
44See Muthen (1990) for a derivation of the doubly truncated bivariate normal dis-
tribution and Tallis (1961) for a derivation of the singly truncated multivariate normal
distribution.
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We are interested in E(x1|a2 ≤ x2 ≤ b2, a3 ≤ x3 ≤ b3) with a1 = −∞ and
b1 = ∞. Therefore, we need to take the partial derivative of the m.g.f.
















Inserting the trivariate normal distribution and applying Leibniz’s rule for






























































Evaluating the derivative ∂m(t )∂t1 at t = 0 in order to compute the first
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Here, ρ12, ρ13 and ρ23 are the correlation coefficients between. We can






























 a2 − ρ23a3√
1− ρ223
 (4.47)







Φ2(b2, b3, ρ23)−Φ2(a2, a3, ρ23)
(4.48)
with Φ2(.) being the bivariate normal distribution. Φ2(b2, b3, ρ23)−Φ2(a2, a3, ρ23)
is the fraction of the trivariate normal distribution after truncation, e.g. a
normalization of the terms in equation (4.47). The four terms in equation
(4.47) are the four selection correction terms where −σ12, σ12, −σ13 and
σ13 are the coefficients to be estimated in the wage equation (π1tm, π2tm,
π3tm and π4tm in equation (4.20)). a2, a3, b2, b3 and ρ23 are to be estimated
in the first-stage selection equation (subscript 2 denoted as t and 3 denoted
as t−m in equation (4.15)). a2 = Hit/σt, b2 = Git/σt, a3 = Hit−m/σt−m,
b3 = Git−m/σt−m, ρ23 = ρtm and Hit, Hit−m, Git and Git−m defined as
in equations (4.16) to (4.19). With x1 being the error term of the wage
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equation and x2 and x3 being the error terms of the selection equations
we get
E(x1|a2 ≤ x2 ≤ b2, a3 ≤ x3 ≤ b3) =
E(uit − uit−m|Git−m ≤ µit−m ≤ Hit−m, Git ≤ µit ≤ Hit) (4.49)
4.B First-stage regression results
Since we estimate the first-stage bivariate ordered probit model for every
combination of t and t−m for t = {2002, ..., 2011} and m = {1, .., 10}, we
end up having 55 different models to construct the selection correction
terms λ1itm, λ2itm, λ3itm, λ4itm. We report the estimation results for the
combination 2002 and 2001 and the combination 2011 and 2010 in tables 4.4-
4.5 for men and women respectively. Apart from the sign and significance,
the reported coefficients have no direct interpretation.
Age-effects are with respect to the baseline of age 25. We estimate the
selection equations for persons born no later than 1980. As a consequence,
the baseline of age-effects shifts from t = 2006. Coefficients should be
interpreted with respect to the estimated parameters δ1t, δ2t, δ3t, δ1t−m,
δ2t−m and δ3t−m that indicate the thresholds between the J = 4 labor
supply categories for time t and t respectively. ρtm indicates the correlation
between the error terms at time t and t−m in the selection equation.
The estimation results (see tables 4.4-4.5) show that the likelihood of
participation, and especially full-time work, decreases with age. This is
true for both men and women, although the decline over age is relatively
smaller for men than for women. Especially in the earlier years. Also,
the first-stage regressions suggest that life-cycle participation decisions
changed over time. The decrease in the probability to participate over the
life-cycle is much larger in 2002 than in 2011. This suggests that labor
force participation over the life-cycle increased over time. For women, this
can also be concluded from the part-time factor in table 4.1. For men, the
differences in labor force participation seem to be concentrated at the end
of the career.
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We find that immigrant men are significantly and substantially less
likely to work (full-time). Being married is positively related to the labor
force attachment among men, but only in the later years. The number of
children decreases the labor force participation while the effect of having
a partner of age 62 or older is usually not significant. Being married
or divorced increases labor force participation among men. For women,
we find a significant and substantial negative association between the
labor force participation, children and having a partner of age 62 or
older. Furthermore, a woman is less likely to work (full-time) if she is an
immigrant, married or widowed.
A final interesting result from the first-stage equations are the estimates
of ρtm. We find that ρ̂tm decreases for higher m (e.g. the correlation between
the error terms of the selection equation decreases if the period between
the choices is longer). ρ̂tm is rather constant over time in both the bivariate
ordered probit model and the bivariate probit model, but ρ̂tm is generally
higher in the bivariate probit models than in the bivariate ordered probit
models. However, estimating the wage model with bivariate ordered
probit selection correction while using ρ̂tm from the bivariate probit model
gives highly similar results as the estimates using ρ̂tm from the bivariate
ordered probit model as presented in figure 4.7 (dashed line). Hence, the
difference in the estimates of the wage profiles of the model with binary
selection correction (dotted line in figure 4.7) and the ordered selection
correction (dashed line figure 4.7) is not a consequence of the difference in
the correlation of the error terms estimated by the two approaches.
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Table 4.4: Estimation results first-stage selection equation, men
t = 2002 t−m = 2001 t = 2011 t−m = 2010
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Age 25 ref. ref.
Age 26 0.00 0.03 -0.09 0.07
Age 27 -0.12* 0.07 -0.06 0.06
Age 28 -0.11 0.07 -0.07 0.06
Age 29 -0.10 0.07 0.13* 0.07
Age 30 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.06 ref.
Age 31 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.06 ref. 0.11 0.08
Age 32 -0.08 0.06 -0.10* 0.06 0.11 0.07 -0.16** 0.07
Age 33 -0.17*** 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.15*** 0.07 -0.05 0.07
Age 34 -0.09 0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.07
Age 35 -0.16** 0.07 -0.12* 0.06 0.00 0.07 -0.22*** 0.07
Age 36 -0.16** 0.07 -0.15** 0.06 -0.21*** 0.07 -0.12* 0.07
Age 37 -0.24*** 0.07 -0.10* 0.06 -0.12* 0.07 -0.16** 0.07
Age 38 -0.19*** 0.06 -0.09 0.06 -0.17** 0.07 -0.11 0.07
Age 39 -0.16** 0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.19*** 0.07
Age 40 -0.16** 0.07 -0.17*** 0.06 -0.20*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.07
Age 41 -0.22*** 0.07 -0.20*** 0.06 -0.22*** 0.07 -0.26*** 0.07
Age 42 -0.28*** 0.07 -0.16** 0.06 -0.22*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.07
Age 43 -0.23*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.07 -0.22*** 0.07
Age 44 -0.27*** 0.07 -0.24*** 0.07 -0.24*** 0.07 -0.31*** 0.07
Age 45 -0.28*** 0.07 -0.19*** 0.07 -0.31*** 0.07 -0.31*** 0.07
Age 46 -0.24*** 0.07 -0.24*** 0.07 -0.31*** 0.07 -0.23*** 0.07
Age 47 -0.31*** 0.07 -0.23*** 0.07 -0.20*** 0.07 -0.15*** 0.07
Age 48 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.28*** 0.07 -0.16** 0.07 -0.29*** 0.07
Age 49 -0.39*** 0.07 -0.32*** 0.07 -0.32*** 0.07 -0.31*** 0.07
Age 50 -0.38*** 0.07 -0.33*** 0.07 -0.32*** 0.07 -0.28*** 0.07
Age 51 -0.39*** 0.07 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.29*** 0.07
Age 52 -0.34*** 0.07 -0.22*** 0.07 -0.32*** 0.07 -0.38*** 0.07
Age 53 -0.36*** 0.07 -0.38*** 0.07 -0.33*** 0.07 -0.25*** 0.08
Age 54 -0.47*** 0.07 -0.48*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.08 -0.35*** 0.07
Age 55 -0.55*** 0.07 -0.46*** 0.06 -0.40*** 0.07 -0.38*** 0.07
Age 56 -0.59*** 0.07 -0.67*** 0.07 -0.39*** 0.08 -0.51*** 0.07
Age 57 -0.76*** 0.08 -0.77*** 0.07 -0.52*** 0.07 -0.45*** 0.07
Age 58 -0.89*** 0.07 -0.93*** 0.07 -0.51*** 0.07 -0.51*** 0.07
Age 59 -1.05*** 0.07 -1.21*** 0.08 -0.59*** 0.07 -0.62*** 0.08
Age 60 -1.37*** 0.08 -1.48*** 0.08 -0.67*** 0.08 -0.72*** 0.08
Age 61 -1.78*** 0.08 -1.83*** 0.08 -0.82*** 0.08 -0.96*** 0.08
Age 62 -2.11*** 0.09 -2.13*** 0.09 -1.09*** 0.08 -1.43*** 0.08
Age 63 -2.35*** 0.10 -2.45*** 0.10 -1.59*** 0.08 -1.69*** 0.08
Age 64 -2.53*** 0.10 -1.83*** 0.08
Number of children -0.02* 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01
Single ref. ref. ref. ref.
Married -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.19*** 0.04 0.19*** 0.04
Divorced -0.09* 0.05 -0.08* 0.05 0.17*** 0.05 0.18*** 0.06
Widowed 0.12 0.17 -0.04 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.14
Immigrant -0.49*** 0.03 -0.49*** 0.03 -0.46*** 0.03 -0.47*** 0.03
Partner 62+ 0.11* 0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05
F-test zi 220.86*** 64.67***
δ1t -0.90*** 0.04 -0.84*** 0.05
δ2t -0.86*** 0.04 -0.79*** 0.05
δ3t -0.60*** 0.04 -0.37*** 0.05
δ1t−m -0.84*** 0.04 -0.84*** 0.05
δ2t−m -0.79*** 0.04 -0.78*** 0.05
δ3t−m -0.54*** 0.04 -0.41*** 0.05
ρtm 0.97*** 0.02 0.97*** 0.02
Obs. 24,129 20,886
Chi2 3,247 2,088
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Table 4.5: Estimation results first-stage selection equation, women
t = 2002 t−m = 2001 t = 2011 t−m = 2010
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Age 25 ref. ref.
Age 26 -0.02 0.05 0.12* 0.06
Age 27 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06
Age 28 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.06
Age 29 -0.13* 0.07 -0.07 0.06
Age 30 -0.13* 0.06 -0.12** 0.06 1.19*** 0.08
Age 31 -0.18*** 0.06 -0.19*** 0.06 0.10 0.06 1.14*** 0.08
Age 32 -0.31*** 0.06 -0.18*** 0.06 0.08 0.06 1.04*** 0.08
Age 33 -0.30*** 0.06 -0.30*** 0.06 -0.03 0.06 1.04*** 0.08
Age 34 -0.38*** 0.06 -0.31*** 0.06 ref. 1.05*** 0.08
Age 35 -0.37*** 0.06 -0.35*** 0.06 0.02 0.06 1.00*** 0.08
Age 36 -0.44*** 0.06 -0.39*** 0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.99*** 0.08
Age 37 -0.46*** 0.06 -0.39*** 0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.94*** 0.08
Age 38 -0.44*** 0.06 -0.33*** 0.06 -0.11* 0.06 0.84*** 0.08
Age 39 -0.45*** 0.06 -0.37*** 0.06 -0.17*** 0.06 0.97*** 0.08
Age 40 -0.44*** 0.07 -0.45*** 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.86*** 0.08
Age 41 -0.50*** 0.07 -0.37*** 0.06 -0.18*** 0.06 0.88*** 0.07
Age 42 -0.42*** 0.07 -0.33*** 0.06 -0.14*** 0.06 0.87*** 0.08
Age 43 -0.39*** 0.07 -0.38*** 0.06 -0.16*** 0.06 0.93*** 0.08
Age 44 -0.42*** 0.07 -0.52*** 0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.84*** 0.08
Age 45 -0.58*** 0.07 -0.51*** 0.06 -0.16*** 0.06 0.86*** 0.08
Age 46 -0.56*** 0.07 -0.54*** 0.07 -0.20*** 0.06 0.91*** 0.08
Age 47 -0.61*** 0.07 -0.65*** 0.06 -0.13** 0.06 0.86*** 0.07
Age 48 -0.66*** 0.07 -0.68*** 0.07 -0.13** 0.06 0.88*** 0.08
Age 49 -0.73*** 0.07 -0.74*** 0.07 -0.17*** 0.07 0.77*** 0.08
Age 50 -0.80*** 0.07 -0.75*** 0.07 -0.26*** 0.06 0.75*** 0.08
Age 51 -0.81*** 0.07 -0.92*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.06 0.82*** 0.08
Age 52 -0.94*** 0.07 -0.99*** 0.07 -0.22*** 0.07 0.75*** 0.08
Age 53 -1.01*** 0.07 -1.04*** 0.07 -0.28*** 0.07 0.67*** 0.08
Age 54 -1.12*** 0.07 -1.24*** 0.07 -0.40*** 0.07 0.60*** 0.08
Age 55 -1.26*** 0.07 -1.24*** 0.07 -0.42*** 0.07 0.58*** 0.08
Age 56 -1.30*** 0.08 -1.29*** 0.08 -0.49*** 0.07 0.49*** 0.08
Age 57 -1.34*** 0.08 -1.45*** 0.08 -0.55*** 0.07 0.39*** 0.08
Age 58 -1.55*** 0.09 -1.57*** 0.09 -0.63*** 0.07 0.24*** 0.08
Age 59 -1.65*** 0.09 -1.78*** 0.09 -0.80*** 0.07 0.31*** 0.08
Age 60 -1.87*** 0.10 -1.84*** 0.10 -0.71*** 0.08 ref.
Age 61 -2.07*** 0.12 -2.10*** 0.10 -1.03*** 0.08 -0.16*** 0.09
Age 62 -2.34*** 0.11 -2.65*** 0.14 -1.16*** 0.08 -0.38*** 0.09
Age 63 -2.69*** 0.14 -2.87*** 0.18 -1.47*** 0.08 -0.67*** 0.09
Age 64 -3.14*** 0.22 -1.84*** 0.09
Number of children -0.08*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.01 -0.08*** 0.01 -0.09*** 0.01
Single ref. ref. ref. ref.
Married -0.23*** 0.04 -0.21*** 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05
Divorced -0.09 0.06 -0.12** 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.14** 0.06
Widowed -0.22** 0.10 -0.18** 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.10
Immigrant -0.28*** 0.03 -0.26*** 0.03 -0.34*** 0.03 -0.34*** 0.05
Partner 62+ 0.09** 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03
F-test zi 358.02*** 215.18***
δ1t -1.40*** 0.05 -1.09*** 0.05
δ2t -1.05*** 0.05 -0.72*** 0.05
δ3t -0.20*** 0.05 0.38*** 0.05
δ1t−m -1.32*** 0.04 -0.09 0.07
δ2t−m -0.97*** 0.04 0.28*** 0.07
δ3t−m -0.15*** 0.04 1.35*** 0.07




5 Early retirement across Europe.
Does non-standard employment
increase participation of older
workers?
Abstract
In many European countries, the labor market participation of older
workers is considerably lower than the labor market participation of prime-
age workers. This study analyzes the variation in labor market withdrawal
of older workers across 13 European countries over the period 1995-2008.
We seek to contribute to existing macro-econometric studies by taking non-
standard employment into account, by relating the empirical model more
explicitly to microeconomic theory on retirement decisions and by using a
two-step IV-GMM estimator to deal with endogeneity issues. The analysis
leads to the conclusion that part-time employment is negatively related
to labor market withdrawal of older men. This relationship is less strong
among women. Additionally, we find that part-time employment at older
ages does not decrease the average actual hours worked. Furthermore, the
results show a positive relationship between unemployment among older
workers and early retirement similar to previous studies.
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5.1 Introduction
The aging of the population is an important challenge for most of the
Western welfare systems in the near future. While an increasing life
expectancy will lead to higher expenditures on pensions and healthcare,
there will be fewer younger people who pay taxes and contributions
to finance the welfare systems. In this respect, Barr (2006) argues that
"The problem is not that people are living longer, but that they retire too early."
Pestieau (2003) argues that the financial sustainability of pension systems
is substantially affected by the low participation rates of older workers.
Although the participation rates of older workers have been rising for
both men and women in many European countries, the participation rates
are still low compared to those of prime-age workers. Furthermore, the
developments in the participation rates of older workers vary considerably
across countries. In Italy, the participation rate of persons aged 55-64 years
increased from 29.5 to 35.5 percent between 1995 and 2008, in Austria
from 30.8 to 41.9 percent and in the Netherlands from 30 to 54.7 percent.
This study aims to analyze the variation in early labor market withdrawal
across countries and over time.
One prominent explanation for the low participation rates of older peo-
ple is that once older people are unemployed or receive disability benefits,1
relatively few of them start working again before they reach the statutory
retirement age. As a result, such social insurance programs function in
practice quite often as an arrangement to smoothen the transition from
work to retirement, next to formal retirement programs. Gruber and Wise
(2004) and Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) indicate this importance of social
insurance programs as early retirement mechanisms based on coherent
country-specific micro-econometric analyses. In the last decades of the
twentieth century, almost all European countries had strong disincentives
to work at older ages because of such social insurance programs (Gruber
and Wise 1998). Since the 1990s, many governments have started to reform
welfare state institutions to reduce the disincentives to work as well as en-
couraging employers to maintain older workers (Casey et al. 2003, Sonnet
1Which may be agreed upon by employer and employee.
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et al. 2014). Hence, these reforms may have contributed to the increase of
participation rates of older workers across Europe.
Another class of factors that may explain the developments in participa-
tion rates of older people is the rise of non-standard forms of employment.
Chen et al. (2013) observe rapid increases of non-standard employment
in many OECD countries over the past decades, especially among people
aged 50-64 years. The largest increase has been observed for part-time
employment. As older workers generally tend to have a relatively strong
preference for leisure (Kantarci and Van Soest 2008), they often take up
part-time work before full retirement (Morris and Mallier 2003). Hence,
part-time work provides the opportunity to retire gradually by provid-
ing a bridge between full-time employment and retirement (Cahill et al.
2006, Gustman and Steinmeier 1984, Kim and DeVaney 2005, Quinn and
Kozy 1996, Ruhm 1990, 2006). Reday-Mulvey and Delsen (1996) indicate
the importance of such ‘bridge jobs’ across OECD countries. Similarly,
older people may opt for self-employment because it provides flexibility
in working hours such that self-employment may be used as gradual
retirement mechanism similar to part-time employment (Bruce et al. 2000,
Gu 2009). Self-employment rates are found to be relatively high among
the 50+ population (Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2009) and should therefore
be taken into account in analyzing retirement behavior. Morris and Mallier
(2003) show that the high and increasing importance of such non-standard
employment opportunities in European countries can be related to the
countries’ patterns of labor force participation at older ages. They ar-
gue that the increases in non-standard employment are both related to
voluntary decisions to decrease working hours prior to retirement and
in anticipation to declining opportunities in both full-time employment
(Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2010) and early retirement possibilities (Casey et al.
2003). However, whether non-standard forms of employment can explain
the cross-national variation in labor market participation of older workers
has not been analyzed thus far.
The amount of comparative macro-econometric work on labor partic-
ipation among older workers is rather limited. Existing studies (Blake
and Sangnier 2011, Blondal and Scarpetta 1998, Duval 2003, Faggio and
Nickell 2007, Johnson 2000) found that generous social insurance- and
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early retirement programs enhance early labor market withdrawal. Fur-
thermore, they found that also high unemployment rates lead to lower
participation rates among older workers. With respect to these empirical
analyses at the macro level, we seek to make three contributions. First, we
extend the analysis by taking part-time employment and self-employment
into account. Second, we strengthen the theoretical underpinning of the
macroeconomic empirical analysis of mutually exclusive labor market
states and retirement by relating it more explicitly to microeconomic the-
ory on retirement decisions. Third, for the analysis of panel data for
13 European countries, we use a two-step GMM estimator to deal with
endogeneity issues.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 5.2.2,
we describe the theoretical framework to explain retirement decisions and
we discuss the model to be estimated in section 5.2.3. Section 5.3 describes
our data and variables and presents the developments in early retirement
and non-standard employment across countries and over time. Section 5.4
presents our estimation results of the pooled time-series cross-country
regression analyses. In section 5.5, we discuss the robustness of our results
based on a variety of sensitivity analyses. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Model
5.2.1 Literature review
A natural starting point for explaining individual retirement decisions
is by analyzing the difference in the expected present value of retiring
immediately and postponing retirement.2 The expected present value
is the utility stream, which is an arbitrary function of consumption and
leisure possibilities, coming from one of the decisions, corrected for time-
2Such models are often solved by way of an Option Value Model (Stock and Wise 1990)
or Dynamic Programming (Rust 1989). The main difference between the two approaches
is the way of modeling uncertainty (Belloni 2008). However, since the actual theoretical
modeling of uncertainty is not important in our empirical application, the option value-
and the dynamic programming model reduce to one theoretical framework that can be
used to study retirement decisions.
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preferences that attach different weights to consumption in current and
future periods. If the difference in the expected present value of post-
poning retirement is higher than the expected present value of retiring,
the person delays retirement up to the point where the expected present
value of retirement is higher than the value one would receive from post-
poning retirement. In this way, retirement decisions can be attributed
to, for example, labor income, income from social insurances, or social
security wealth which affect the opportunity costs of retirement (leisure).
Evaluating the opportunity costs of several labor market decisions allows
the model not only to include the decision when to retire, but how to
withdraw from the labor market as well. A person will choose a period of
using social insurance before retirement if the expected present value of
doing so exceeds the expected present value of the other possibilities.
Applying this microecnomic theory on retirement behavior has been
primarily focused on country-specific analyses, e.g. modeling microe-
conomic responses to country-specific retirement incentives in national
institutions.3 This approach, however, makes it hard to explain the dif-
ferences in retirement patterns observed across countries. Piekkola and
Deschryvere (2010) are the first to analyze retirement decisions with three
countries based on the option value model using micro data from ECHP.
The cross-country dimension, focusing on Belgium, Germany and Finland,
remains limited however.
Cross-country macroeconomic reduced form approaches by Blondal
and Scarpetta (1998), Johnson (2000), Duval (2003) and Blake and Sangnier
(2011) are consistent with microeconomic theory although the empirical
model is not directly derived from it. Nevertheless, these studies are the
first to put the effects of early retirement incentives on early retirement
in an international perspective using macro data. Blondal and Scarpetta
(1998), Johnson (2000), Duval (2003) and Blake and Sangnier (2011) include
3Structural estimation applications can be found in, among others, Berkovec and
Stern (1991), Rust and Phelan (1997), Heyma (2004), Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)
and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). Examples of reduced form approaches can be
found in Brugiavini and Peracchi (2003) and Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004) (using binary
nonlinear models), Kerkhofs et al. (1999), Euwals et al. (2010) (using duration models). A
multinomial logit approach is taken by, for example, De Vos et al. (2012), Zucchelli et al.
(2012), Emmanoulidi and Kyriazidou (2012) and Been and Knoef (2013). The latter three
also take non-standard employment into account in the retirement decisions.
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approximations of disincentives to work at older ages stemming from
early retirement programs including unemployment- and disability-related
schemes. Although such a macroeconomic approach is unable to cope with
individual and household characteristics and their influence on retirement
decisions, it is able to analyze the effects of retirement incentives embedded
in national institutions and to explain the observed differences in early
retirement across countries.
To underpin our cross-country analysis of early retirement patterns,
we extend the microeconomic framework with non-standard employ-
ment as labor market states. Two important types of cross-country het-
erogeneity in non-standard employment are part-time employment and
self-employment (Chen et al. 2013), especially for persons approaching
retirement (Morris and Mallier 2003).
5.2.2 Theoretical framework to model retirement decisions
Following microeconomic theory, we assume that persons maximize their
current and future utility given their time-preferences (ρ)4 and preferences
for consumption (c) and leisure (l) and constraints that coincide with
labor market choices. Since we are interested in retirement decisions in
a context with regular employment, social insurance and non-standard
employment possibilities, we assume six possible labor market states (j)
for older persons: full-time employment (FT), part-time employment (PT),
self-employment (SE), disability insurance (DI), unemployment insurance
(UI) and early retirement (R). Disability insurance is often assumed to
be a substitute to unemployment (Autor and Duggan 2003, Hassink et al.
1997, Koning and Van Vuuren 2010) and, more specifically, as a way to
induce early retirement (Euwals et al. 2012, Riphahn 1997). Therefore,
disability insurance is an important early retirement possibility in many
countries (Gruber and Wise 1998).
4A higher value of ρ indicates a higher weight for current utility streams than for
future utility streams such that the individual is relatively time-impatient.
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Persons compare and reevaluate utility (u) streams coming from these
six labor market states (j) in each period (t)5 and so maximize their inter-
temporal utility given their characteristics that determine utility directly





(1 + ρ)t−τuτ(ciτ, liτ, jiτ; siτ, ϑiτ) (5.1)
Not only is the labor market state j associated with its own combination
of consumption and leisure possibilities, it also enters the utility function
directly such that some states can provide more satisfaction than other
states.7 Furthermore, the institutional setting determines to what extent
states can be chosen (e.g. eligibility criteria) and how attractive these states
are in terms of consumption possibilities (e.g. replacement rates, duration,
tax differences) and leisure possibilities (e.g. extra requirements, hours
flexibility).
Instead of solving and estimating a structural model for the retirement
decision (Heyma 2004), we approximate equation (5.1) with a linear value
function V (Mastrogiacomo et al. 2004). Here, V can be viewed as direct
utility received from consumption, leisure, personal characteristics and
the institutional setting captured by the different retirement possibilities8
Vij(t) = ϑitβ j + Zitθj + εit (5.2)
5Until the period of full retirement (T) which is assumed to be an absorbing state. Em-
pirically, it is observed that full retirement is not always an absorbing state: older people
may re-enter the labor market after full withdrawal (Maestas 2010). This assumption has,
however, no consequences for our empirical reduced form model that is estimated using
macro data.
6The institutional setting (s) implicitly includes the generosity of social insurance
schemes as early retirement routes.
7In this way, active states may explicitly provide more utility than inactive states
because it may make older workers feel ‘useful’. A meta-analysis by Pinquart (2002)
suggests positive associations between being employed and having a higher purpose in
life at older ages.
8It is common in the literature to include an individual specific parameter as well in
equation (5.2). We omitted this individual specific parameter from the equation since
we do not intend to estimate equation (5.2) at the micro level using individual specific
information.
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such that (early) retirement is preferred if
ViR(t) > Vik(t) (5.3)
for
k = {FT, PT, SE, DI, UI} (5.4)
Here, ϑ is the vector of all observed characteristics that describe prefer-
ences for consumption and leisure and can therefore be seen as ‘taste
shifters’. Z includes labor market state-specific variables that indicate the
incentives associated with each labor market state given by the institu-
tional framework (s). The error component, ε, is assumed to follow a Type
I extreme value distribution meaning that equation (5.2) is estimated by a
multinomial logit model.
The mutually exclusive labor market states j and the baseline are
modeled explicitly by normalizing the coefficients of the baseline to zero
for identification.
P(jt|ϑit, Zit) =
exp(ϑitβ j + Zitθj + εit)
∑Jq=1 exp(ϑitβq + Ziθq + εit)
(5.5)
An increase in the probability to use a particular retirement route is always
relative to the baseline j = R. Instead of estimating equation (5.5), we aim
to estimate a macroeconomic analogy to the microeconomic reduced form
approximation of microeconomic retirement behavior.
5.2.3 Empirical model
At the macro level, we do not have information on individual choices
regarding labor market states j. Only the aggregate of individual choices
is observed at the macro level. Therefore, we use information on early re-
tirement, full-time employment, part-time employment, self-employment,
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disability and unemployment rates in the macroeconomic analogy to
equation (5.5). Since these rates are no binary indicators of j, as in the
multinomial logit case at the micro level, we are unable to use an explicit
multinomial logit procedure. Instead, we estimate equation (5.6) that
explicitly allows for analyzing the mutual exclusiveness between early
retirement and the aforementioned labor market states.
Rit = β0 + ϑctβ1 + DIctβ2 +UIctβ3 + SEctβ4 + PTctβ5 +γt + δc + εct (5.6)
Here, R, DI, UI, PT and SE are the early retirement, disability, unemploy-
ment, part-time employment and self-employment rates respectively.9 c
now represents a country instead of an individual i as in equation (5.5).
Country-fixed effects and time-effects are captured by γ and δ respectively.
These fixed effects capture the unobserved heterogeneity in, for example,
the cross-country differences in social acceptance of early retirement. The
error term, ε, follows an i.i.d. normal distribution. Early retirement is the
dependent variable since we are particularly interested in the substitution
effects of labor market states with regard to early retirement and not so
much in the substitution effects among labor market states in general.
Clearly, R, DI, UI, PT and SE are jointly, and so endogenously, de-
termined in the model. Applying a simple OLS to equation (5.6) would
yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the coefficients due to the en-
dogeneity in equation (5.6). Therefore, we estimate equation (5.6) by a
two-step procedure as in equation (5.7) where ω indicates the error term
of the first-stage regression and ε indicates the error-term of the second
step regression:
Rct = β0 + ϑctβ1 + DIctβ2 + UIctβ3 + SEctβ4 + PTctβ5 + γt + δc + εct
DIct = π0,DI + ϑctπ1,DI + Zctπ2,DI + ωct,DI
UIct = π0,UI + ϑctπ1,UI + Zctπ2,UI + ωct,UI
SEct = π0,SE + ϑctπ1,SE + Zctπ2,SE + ωct,SE
9Note that the full-time employment rate is captured by β0.
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PTct = π0,PT + ϑctπ1,PT + Zctπ2,PT + ωct,PT (5.7)
Here, different characteristics, included in ϑ, and the institutional setting
related to the labor market state, included in Z, determine the relative
attractiveness of the labor market states. ϑ contains country-specific effects
in the empirical model. Z includes labor market institutions affecting
DI, UI, SE and PT but not directly affecting R (see section 5.2.5 for an
extended discussion of the instruments). Compared to the microeconomic
framework in equation (5.2), the relative attractiveness of the labor market
states is now expressed as the aggregate of individual choices at the macro
level by taking rates.
As suggested by the theoretical framework and captured by Z in
equation (5.2), a different institutional setting may give a different relative
attractiveness of labor market states and therefore influence retirement
decisions.
For example, higher UI benefits, captured in Z, increase the attractive-
ness of UI resulting in a higher aggregate rate of UI. At the same time, the
higher UI benefits decrease resulting in a lower aggregate rate of FT. Since
the institutional setting is generally considered to be exogenous, the theo-
retical framework provides us with a set of instruments that can be used
in the system of equations (equation 5.7) as long as the instruments used
in equation (5.7) are not influenced by the aggregate retirement decisions.
5.2.4 Finding the appropriate estimator
Equation (5.7) suggests a two-step procedure with instruments for DI, UI,
SE and PT. However, the second-stage error terms and labor market state
specific first-stage error terms are possibly cross-correlated which would
be ignored by a simple two-stage procedure. Ignoring the covariance
structure of the error terms results in an inefficient 2SLS estimator. To
increase efficiency, a 3SLS procedure could be applied (Zellner and Theil
1962). 3SLS accounts for both endogeneity (like in 2SLS estimation) and
the covariance structure of the error terms across equations in the system
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(like in SUR estimation). 3SLS estimations are widely applied in economics
and they can be found in various contexts.10
Nevertheless, IV-GMM estimation as a 2SLS-estimator may be pre-
ferred to 3SLS in cases of heteroskedasticity since heteroskedasticity leads
to an inconsistent 3SLS estimator resulting in inconsistent standard errors
(Wooldridge 2002). In the case of IV-GMM, the error terms are i.i.d., but a
possible correlation structure among the error terms is not taken into ac-
count. Wooldridge (2002) argues that there is generally not much reason to
choose 3SLS over a GMM estimator if the assumption of homoskedasticity
does not hold. Using a two-step IV-GMM estimator is also preferred to the
regular 2SLS estimator as it relaxes the i.i.d. assumptions of the error terms
resulting in efficiency gains in a situation of arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
As usual in IV regressions, we need validity and relevance of the
instruments to justify our instruments. In a situation with possibly weak
instruments, a Fuller-k estimator can be applied which is suggested to be
more robust to possibly weak instruments than the IV-GMM estimator
as the Fuller-k estimator is median unbiased (Stock et al. 2002). Even in
a situation with weak instruments, LIML estimators such as the Fuller-k
are almost unbiased (Blomqvist and Dahlberg 1999). As a consequence,
LIML estimators have a relatively large variance and can be regarded as a
conservative estimator when dealing with many weak instruments and
small sample sizes (Blomqvist and Dahlberg 1999).
Instruments 5.2.5
Blondal and Scarpetta (1998), Johnson (2000) and Duval (2003) use several
labor market institutions such as unemployment benefit replacement rates,
employment protection legislation (EPL) and labor taxes as regressors
in explaining early retirement and argue that these labor market states
are exogenous in an OLS framework. However, as these studies note,
the effect of labor market institutions such as unemployment benefits
and EPL on early retirement run through their effect on unemployment
10A small selection of 3SLS applications in economics: Buck and Hakim (1982), Au-
dretsch and Feldman (1996), Burnside (1996), Barro (2000), Glewwe et al. (2001), Burton
et al. (2002), Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) and Brown and Alexander (2005).
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rates.11 Therefore, we apply a two-step procedure using labor market
institutions as instruments for the aggregated levels of DI, UI, PT and SE.
For identification, the instruments should 1) be correlated with DI, UI, PT
and SE (instrument relevance) and 2) be uncorrelated with the error term,
ε, in equation (5.7) (instrument validity). If these conditions are fulfilled,
the instruments are associated with changes in DI, UI, PT and SE but do
not lead to changes in R aside from their indirect effect through DI, UI,
PT and SE. As we will explain in detail below, labor market institutions
associated with DI, UI, PT and SE are theoretically proven to be relevant
as well as valid instruments.12
For the selection of instruments we follow the literature on the effects
of labor market institutions - such as unemployment benefits, employment
protection legislation (EPL) and active labor market policies (ALMP) - on
unemployment rates (Bassanini and Duval 2009, Belot and Van Ours 2004,
Blanchard and Wolfers 2000, Elmeskov et al. 1998, Nickell 1998, Nickell
et al. 2005, Scarpetta 1996). This literature shows that more generous
benefits make unemployment more attractive and so increase unemploy-
ment rates. The effects of EPL are somewhat more ambiguous. Nickell
(1998) argues that the effects of EPL on the unemployment rate are likely
to be small because EPL mainly tends to decrease flows into- and out
of unemployment. Nevertheless, decreasing inflows and outflows from
unemployment may decrease short-term unemployment and increase long-
term unemployment (Nickell 1998). An excellent overview of the theory
and empirics of EPL by Addison and Teixeira (2003) shows that estima-
tions of the effect of EPL on unemployment rates can be both positive
and negative. However, Addison and Teixeira (2003) also indicate that
most of the effects that are estimated to be significant show that EPL and
unemployment rates are positively related. As an additional determinant
of unemployment rates, the effects of ALMP spending are generally found
to be small in economic terms (Card et al. 2010, Kluve 2010). Nevertheless,
ALMP spending is important to take into account as some countries may
have high initial UI benefit levels but also many reintegration measures.
11This, of course, does not apply to the included variables that indicate the disincentives
of postponing retirement such as the implicit tax rate on continued work.
12Empirical tests also prove that instruments are both relevant and valid as we will
show in section 5.5.
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Replacement rates of UI benefits, EPL and ALMP spending are proven to
be relevant instruments according to the aforementioned literature. There
is no ex ante reason to belief that there is a direct relationship between
replacement rates of UI benefits and ALMP spending and early retirement
(validity). However, this does not hold for EPL. Dorn and Sousa-Poza
(2010) find that strict EPL leads to higher shares of involuntary early
retirement.
A similar approach as Scarpetta (1996), Nickell (1998), Nickell et al.
(2005), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Belot and
Van Ours (2004) and Bassanini and Duval (2009) - focusing on cross-
country self-employment instead of unemployment - has been employed
by Torrini (2005), Robson (2003) and Parker and Robson (2004). Torrini
(2005) focuses on explaining variation in self-employment rates by cross-
country and time differences in tax incentives. Robson (2003) focuses on
cross-country and time differences in EPL on self-employment (rates) and
Parker and Robson (2004) focus on cross-country and time differences in
self-employment due to (dis)incentives of income taxes and unemploy-
ment benefit replacement rates. All three papers suggest that labor market
institutions, as used in the literature focusing on unemployment, are rele-
vant in explaining self-employment as well. The results suggest that high
taxes on labor induce self-employment (Parker and Robson 2004, Robson
2003, Torrini 2005) while high unemployment benefit replacement rates
(Parker and Robson 2004, Robson 2003) and EPL (Robson 2003) reduce
self-employment. Therefore, the labor market variables (replacement rates
of UI benefits particularly) used to instrument the unemployment rate
are also expected to be relevant instruments for the self-employment rate.
As a tax incentive, we include the implicit tax on self-employment as an
additional instrument for self-employment. We do not use the implicit tax
on labor as this variable may also be relevant for the marginal decision to
work in regular employment at older ages.
It is harder to find valid instruments for the part-time employment
rates as most determinants (e.g. possible relevant instruments) of part-
time employment (Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2010), such as the fertility rate,
child benefits and female labor supply, possibly also have a direct effect
on labor market withdrawal at older ages (e.g. non-valid). However,
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Buddelmeyer et al. (2008) suggest that EPL is an important determinant
of part-time employment from a macro perspective. Based on their find-
ings and earlier work, Buddelmeyer et al. (2008) suggest that strict EPL
increases the advantages of hiring part-time employment in firms. This
effect can either be direct (e.g. EPL strictly limits the use of part-time
employment) or indirect (e.g. to ease the firms’ burden of highly rigid
employment legislation associated with full-time employment). Either
way, EPL seems to be relevant for unemployment, self-employment and
part-time employment, but the validity of this instrument is questionable
(Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2010). Therefore, we do not use the level of EPL as
an instrument but the difference between EPL for regular and temporary
work instead.13 The difference between EPL for regular and temporary
jobs may be relevant for the decision to work part-time as this difference
may lead to spill-overs between full-time and part-time work given that
part-time jobs are generally more often of a temporary nature (OECD
2002) and because part-time employment is complementary to temporary
employment (Buddelmeyer et al. 2008). Additionally, EPLdi f f may be valid
as it is likely that only the level of EPL is important for involuntary early
retirement.
Fairly little research has been devoted to the cross-country variation
in disability rates. OECD (2009a) shows that there is large heterogeneity
in disability rates among countries and that such heterogeneity can be ex-
plained by cross-country differences in compensation, such as accessibility
and generosity of disability benefits (both positively related to disability
rates), and (re)integration policies such as vocational rehabilitation pro-
grams, subsidized employment and other activation policies that provide
incentives to work (all negatively related to disability rates). Furthermore,
OECD (2009a) argues that UI benefit replacement rates may also be of
importance in modeling disability rates since it is a crude measure of
alternative benefit options. OECD (2009a) finds that higher UI benefit
replacement rates are negatively related to disability rates. Following
aforementioned study, we instrument disability rates with UI replacement
rates and ALMP spending. Furthermore, we use the information regarding
13EPLdi f f = EPLregular − EPLtemporary
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the spending on disability which is publicly available at the macro level.14
Additionally, we include the replacement rates of social assistance benefits
as an additional instrumental variable in the sensitivity analyses as these
benefits may be a true alternative benefit option. Social assistance benefits
may also be important to include in the analysis as exhausted UI benefits
are usually followed-up by social assistance benefits. This is especially
relevant for older persons bridging the gap between employment and
retirement with UI. Additionally, we are able to use the compensation and
integration indices as used in OECD (2009a).
A final note on the instruments is that we use the same full set of
instruments for each endogenous variable to account for the alternative
options.
Data and definitions 5.3
Data 5.3.1
To identify early retirement, we use a variable that describes labor market
withdrawal of persons aged 55-64 compared to below 55 following Duval





where AR indicates the activity rate. By relating the activity rate of
persons aged 55-64 to the activity rate of persons aged 25-54 we take into
account cross-country differences in participation of prime-age persons
who are not confronted with retirement decisions yet. By using this
relative measure, we also correct for within-country cohort differences in
participation which are especially relevant among women (Ebbinghaus
2006). Blondal and Scarpetta (1998), Johnson (2000), Duval (2003) and
14We use the transformed natural logarithm of per capita disability spending.
15We also use different age spans to disaggregate early retirement approximations
(Ebbinghaus 2006). Results are largely robust to this baseline specification of the depen-
dent variable.
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Blake and Sangnier (2011) explicitly focus on males only. We, however,
analyze both men and women in separate analyses. R can be interpreted
as the percentage decrease in activity rates of the population aged 55-64
compared to 25-54, e.g. a macroeconomic measure of labor supply at the
extensive margin.
For the dependent variable, the study relies on activity rates, defined
as the sum of the employed and unemployed workers as a percentage
of the population.16 We use activity rates for both men and women and
for different age groups, which are taken from the Labour Force Survey,
provided by Eurostat (2014).
For the independent variables, we use a number of labor market indi-
cators for persons aged 55-64. The unemployment rate is measured as the
number of unemployed employees as a percentage of the labor force aged
55-64 and is publicly available as a macro indicator at Eurostat. Disability
rates, self-employment rates and part-time employment rates are calcu-
lated ourselves using the Labour Force Survey micro data (Eurostat 2014)
as the publicly available macro data are insufficient for our purposes.17
In general, constructing internationally comparable disability rates
from survey data is hard as Banks et al. (2004) show. There is no interna-
tionally comparable data on disability rates among older persons. The
OECD provides cross-country rates of disability for people aged 20-64, but
the cross-country comparability is questionable (OECD 2010a). To identify
disability, we use persons aged 55-64 with no job during the reference
week who do not search for a job because they indicate to suffer from
sickness or disability.18 The disability rate is then constructed by relating
16According to Eurostat, the activity rate represents the number of persons in the
labor force (employed and unemployed persons) as a percentage of the total population
of the same age. Using this statistic, it is assumed that persons in unemployment
have not retired yet. If one assumes the older unemployed to have retired instead, the
employment rate would be a more appropriate indicator to construct the dependent
variable (Ebbinghaus 2006). We follow Blondal and Scarpetta (1998), Johnson (2000),
Duval (2003) and Blake and Sangnier (2011) by using activity rates. A sensitivity analysis
(table 5.5) where employment rates are used instead of activity rates shows that the
results are robust.
17Do-files to construct these measures are available upon request.
18In LFS: WSTATOR = 5, SEEKWORK = 3 and SEEKREAS = 2.
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the total of identified disabled persons to the total of persons aged 55-64
for whom these variables are non-missing.19
We identify part-time employment as persons aged 55-64 working as
an employee with a part-time job.20 This excludes self-employed working
part-time as we only want to include part-time paid-employment in part-
time employment. Part-time employment is standardized across countries
with a measure that identifies a person to be in part-time employment if a
person’s usual working hours are less than the working hours considered
to be ‘normal’. Normal working hours is considered to be a full-time
working week at the national, regional, industrial or unit level. Hence, the
part-time employment indicator is a relative indicator that accounts for
local standards with respect to working hours. The part-time employment
rate is measured as part-time employment as a percentage of the total of
paid-employment. This implies a percentage of total paid-employment for
whom the identifying variables are non-missing.
Self-employment is identified as persons aged 55-64 working as a
self-employed in industries other than agriculture.21 Issues may arise
regarding the cross-country measurement of self-employment. The self-
employment definition of Eurostat is standardized to a broad definition
of all workers who are not in (paid) employment. This includes sole or
joint owners of unincorporated enterprises (unless their main activity
is in paid-employment), unpaid family workers, outworkers and peo-
ple in self-sufficiency (Eurostat 2014).22 However, issues regarding the
cross-country comparability of self-employment arise with regard to the
question whether to treat incorporated enterprises as self-employment
or not (OECD 2005). Given our set of countries, this comparability issue
19However, Eurostat acknowledges that breaks in the data are present for
SEEKREAS = 2 for some countries due to survey improvement. If this is observed
for several years in a country and the variable MAINSTAT is available for that country,
we base the disability rates on the MAINSTAT variable instead of basing the rate on
the variables WSTATOR, SEEKWORK and SEEKREAS. In the cases that MAINSTAT
is not available, we delete the disability rates that are subject to the break from the data
set (this occurs in Ireland (2005), France (2003-2008), Portugal (1995-1997) and UK (2005)).
Hence, the disability rate variable should be interpreted with caution, although Eurostat
confirms that there is no other option to construct disability rates.
20In LFS: WSTATOR = 1, 2, STAPRO = 3 and FTPT = 2.
21In LFS: WSTATOR = 1, 2, STAPRO = 1, 2 and NA11s = 1, 2.
22This standardized definition of self-employment is also used by the OECD for cross-
country comparisons (OECD 2005).
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is small and unlikely to affect the results since only Norway considers
the incorporated self-employed to be in paid-employment. We exclude
self-employment in agriculture because self-employment is traditionally
high in the agricultural sector (Parker 2004, Torrini 2005) while agricultural
self-employment is unlikely to function as a bridge between full-time work
and full labor market withdrawal.
The self-employment rate is measured as a percentage of total em-
ployment between the age of 55 and 64, which is the convention in the
literature (Chen et al. 2013, Robson 2003). This implies a percentage of the
total of paid- and self-employment for whom the identifying variables are
non-missing.
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.1 shows the activity rates of men and women for 15 European
countries between 1995 and 2008. For persons aged 25-54, activity rates
are generally higher than the activity rates of persons aged 55-64. Fur-
thermore, the table also indicates that the activity rates of persons aged
55-64 have increased over time. Table 5.2 presents the developments in
early retirement among men and women (based on the information from
table 5.1). Among men, labor market withdrawal is the highest in France
and Belgium. In 2008 for example, the activity rate among French men
between 55 and 64 years old was 54.9 percent lower than the activity rate
among the men between 25 and 54. For women, labor market withdrawal
was the highest in Belgium. Across the board, labor market withdrawal
between 55 and 64 is more prevalent among women then among men, ex-
cept for Finland in 2008. Between 1995 and 2008, early retirement declined
across all countries. Only among Danish men and Greek women, early
retirement increased substantially. The decline was the sharpest in the
Netherlands, both among men and women.
The disability, unemployment, self-employment and part-time em-
ployment rates for the population between 55 and 64 are presented in
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figure 5.1.23 The disability rate is especially high in Nordic countries and
the Netherlands (about 15-20 percent on average), while disability rates are
only decreasing in Finland and the Netherlands. The other Nordic coun-
tries seem to have high and persistent disability rates among 55 to 64 year
olds. On the other hand, the unemployment rates are, on average, rather
low in these countries (except for Finland) compared to the relatively
high unemployment rates in Germany (about 12 percent), Spain (about 9
percent). Moreover, unemployment rates also vary within countries over
time.
Self-employment rates are rather stable over time in most countries
although Greece, Norway, Sweden and the UK show a slightly increasing
trend in self-employment among the 55-64 population over time. Only
Belgium and Italy show marked decreases in self-employment. Interest-
ingly, self-employment rates are relatively high in the Southern European
countries and in Ireland while, simultaneously, these countries show rela-
tively low rates of disability and unemployment. This may suggest that
self-employment is a reaction to a lack of alternatives at old-age.24
23Disability-, self-employment- and part-time employment rates for Germany are
only available from 2002 as the LFS micro data is unavailable before 2002 due to an
improvement in the survey method.
24This is also more or less suggested by Been and Knoef (2013).



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Section 5.4 Results from reduced form retirement model 163
Part-time employment has been traditionally relatively low in most
Southern European countries, although the part-time employment rates
have been rising in virtually all countries as shown in the figures. Also
in countries with relatively high initial rates of part-time employment,
such as Germany and the Netherlands, part-time employment increased
between 1995 and 2008. These developments suggest that the decline in
early retirement as observed in table 5.2 might be related to the increase
in part-time employment.
Below, we employ regression analyses to examine such relationships in
more detail. Unfortunately, not all instruments are available for all coun-
tries. Implicit tax rates on self-employment and social assistance benefits
replacement rates are unavailable for Germany and Greece respectively.
Results from reduced form retirement model 5.4
As mentioned in section 5.2.4, 3SLS regression may be preferred to IV-
GMM regression if homoskedasticity of the error terms and a covariance
structure among the error terms is present. A Breusch-Pagan LM Test, an
LR Test and a Wald Test indicate that heteroskedasticity is present in the
model.25 Therefore, using a two-step IV-GMM estimator is preferred.
Validity of the instruments is tested using the Hansen’s J-statistic.26 We
perform robustness checks of the results with instruments that are certain
to be exogenous, such as the lags of the endogenous regressors.
Relevance of the instruments is tested using an F-test in the first-stage
regressions27 as well as by the Anderson-Rubin statistic that is robust to
25P-value = 0.000 for all three tests implemented with the Stata program written by
Shehata (2011). This applies to separate analyses of both men and women.
26P-values of the Hansen’s J-statistic are reported in the regression tables and show
that the instruments are valid in all baseline regressions.
27The F-tests of our first-stage regressions in the baseline model (Model 2 in table 5.3
and table 5.4) reject the null-hypothesis of non-relevance of the instruments at 1%, 5% and
1% level for part-time employment, self-employment and unemployment respectively.
The F-tests indicate that the set of instruments is relevant for these endogenous variables
in the baseline specification. Regarding disability, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis.
However, if we add interactions between two institutional variables, as in Model 4 and
5, the null-hypothesis can be rejected. T-tests indicate that the relevance of a single
instrument may differ between the instrumented variables DI, UI, SE and PT, but they are
included as we tend to keep the set of instruments the same in all first-stage regressions.
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Table 5.2: Labor market withdrawal of workers aged 55-64 rela-
tive to workers aged 25-54
Men Women
1995 2008 Change 1995 2008 Change
Austria 53.0 43.2 -9.8 74.4 61.2 -13.2
Belgium 62.2 51.9 -10.3 80.1 64.7 -15.4
Denmark 23.7 29.3 5.6 51.6 38.7 -12.9
Finland 50.9 33.6 -17.3 51.0 31.6 -19.4
France 61.7 54.9 -6.8 64.5 54.8 -9.8
Germany 41.6 28.1 -13.4 57.0 37.3 -19.8
Greece 34.7 35.5 0.8 55.3 58.8 3.5
Ireland 29.0 24.9 -4.2 63.0 41.2 -21.8
Italy 48.7 48.4 -0.3 73.6 62.1 -11.5
Netherlands 55.5 30.3 -25.3 71.2 47.3 -23.9
Norway 20.7 18.6 -2.1 28.8 23.7 -4.1
Portugal 32.5 32.4 -0.1 53.8 43.8 -10.0
Spain 41.1 29.7 -11.4 64.8 54.2 -10.6
Sweden 24.1 17.8 -6.3 28.7 21.2 -7.5
UK 32.7 23.7 -9.0 45.1 35.8 -9.3
Mean 40.8 34.2 -6.6 57.5 45.1 -12.4
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2014). The first
available year for Norway is 2000.
Section 5.4 Results from reduced form retirement model 165
Figure 5.1: Disability-, unemployment-, self-employment- and
part-time employment rates of persons aged 55-64
over time.
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2014).
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weak instruments.28 To test the robustness of the results to possibly weak
instruments, we apply a Fuller-k estimator. The results (not reported here)
show that the main conclusions are robust to the Fuller-k estimator.29
In all estimations, we use HAC-corrected standard errors, correcting for
both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation which are generally present
in macroeconomic retirement indicators (Ebbinghaus 2006).30 Based on
the results of the Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in panel data,
we reject the null-hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation (p-value =
0.000).
Table 5.3 and table 5.4 show the estimation results for men and women
respectively. A regular fixed-effects regression is used in Model 1. This
model indicates that the disability-, unemployment- and self-employment
rate increase early retirement while part-time employment decreases early
retirement. However, as these variables are endogenous, estimation results
are biased and we should use instrumental variables to infer correct
relationships.
Model 2 uses the IV-GMM approach proposed in this paper and indi-
cates that a higher unemployment rate among persons aged 55-64 increases
the percentage change in activity rates from 25-54 to 55-64, e.g. more peo-
ple enter early retirement.31 This applies to both men and women. More
specifically, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate increases early retirement by about 1.6 and 2.5 percentage points
among men and women respectively.32 We do not find significant effects of
28The AR statistic shows that the instruments are relevant in the baseline model (Model
2 in table 5.3 and table 5.4). The null-hypothesis of relevance of the instruments can not
be rejected. However, this does not mean that there is no weak instruments problem.
29The unknown parameter of the Fuller-k estimator is set equal to 4 following Hahn
et al. (2004).
30Estimations are corrected for autocorrelation by using a Bartlett kernel function with
a bandwidth of 2. A common choice for the bandwidth is T1/3 with T the time-dimension
(Baum et al. 2007). In our case, T has a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 14.
31Estimated coefficients of the first-stage regressions that are significantly different
from zero are in line with the expected signs.
32This is slightly higher than the 0.6-0.9 percentage points found in the preferred model
by Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) and lower than the 1.2-9 percentage points found in
the preferred model by Duval (2003). Please note that their dependent variable also
differs. Duval (2003) uses a similar approach as we do, but employs smaller age-groups
in activity rates. Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) only take into account the participation
rate of 55-64 year olds.
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the disability rate, which may be related to the difficulties of constructing
the variable as mentioned in section 5.3. Model 3 therefore uses a different
series of disability rates.33 Results are nevertheless robust.
Self-employment is not found to have a significant effect on activity
at older ages. Regarding the part-time employment rate, we find that a
1 percentage point increase in the part-time employment rate decreases
early retirement by 1.7 percentage points among men. Among women,
we do not find such a relationship between part-time employment and
early retirement in Model 2. Models 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 and 11 do find this
relationship between part-time employment and early retirement among
women. The effect is generally smaller among women than among men
which may be explained by the different purposes part-time employment
has for men and women over the life-cycle. Part-time employment as
gradual retirement mechanism is likely to be more important among men
than among women (Peracchi and Welch 1994).
Please note that estimated coefficients larger than 1.0 do not necessarily
reflect an extra effect upon direct labor supply effects as not all variables
use the same denominator. Activity rates, unemployment rates and dis-
ability rates use the total labor force as denominator, self-employment
rates the total of employment and part-time employment rates the total
of people in paid-employment. Next to that, the dependent variable is a
relative indicator indicating the percentage change in activity of 55-64 year
olds compared to 25-54 year olds.
Subsequently, we examine the robustness of the results with respect to
different specifications. In Model 4 and 5, we add interactions between
the instruments as additional instruments since institutions can interact
in their impact on macroeconomic outcomes (Belot and Van Ours 2004).
Results are largely robust except that part-time employment now seems
to decrease early retirement among women similar to men. Model 6
indicates that this effect can be primarily attributed to voluntary part-time
employment measured as the share of total part-time employment that is
part-time employed because of other reasons than that the person could
33These disability rates are solely based on the variable WSTATOR, SEEKWORK
and SEEKREAS in the LFS micro data without imputing results from the variable
MAINSTAT and deleting possibly false rates due to breaks in the data.
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not find a full-time job.34 So, we define involuntary part-time employment
as a consequence of labor demand. A 1 percentage point higher share
of voluntary part-time employment decreases early retirement by about
2 and 1.3 percentage points among men and women respectively. These
results suggest that people participate longer in the labor force when they
can voluntarily choose for a reduction of their working hours. Without the
option of part-time employment, more persons would exit the labor market
rather than working full-time. Involuntary part-time employment does
not lead to less early retirement, because these persons prefer a full-time
job per definition. Hence, it is likely that these persons in involuntary part-
time employment do not use part-time employment as partial retirement
mechanism and prefer continue working (full-time) instead of retiring
early.
Model 7 includes the state pension eligible age as an additional exoge-
nous variable. This additional explanatory variable may correct for the
precariousness of sustained labor force participation at older ages due to
the graying population and the reforms undertaken to improve the sus-
tainability of the pension system. The pension eligible age does not seem
to affect early retirement and earlier results regarding unemployment and
part-time employment are robust. The insignificance of the state pension
eligible age may be explained by the fact that this variable does not vary
much within countries over time (see also Blake and Sangnier 2011). Most
of the variation in the variable comes from cross-country variation. If
Model 2 is performed on a subsample of countries that have a state pen-
sion eligible age that is 65 or above,35 results of Model 2 are robust for
men (not reported here). Significant effects are lost when this is done for
women as a consequence of a large drop in observations (not reported
here), e.g. many countries have a state pension eligible age for women
that is below 65.36 Blake and Sangnier (2011) did find significant effects
of the state pension eligible age on activity rates among older persons.
34Whether a person works part-time because the persons could not find a full-time job
is based on the variable FTPTREAS in the LFS micro data.
35Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece (from 1999), Ireland, Italy
(from 2002), Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK have a state
pension eligible age of 65 or above.
36Only Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal (from
1999), Spain and Sweden have a female state pension eligible age of 65 or more.
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However, they found the effect to be negative among persons aged 55-59
and to be positive among persons aged 60-64. In our case of looking at
the aggregate of persons aged 55-64, these effects may cancel out.
Model 8 and 9 include an indicator for the implicit tax rate on continued
work at older ages as explanatory variables of early retirement. Model
8 includes the implicit tax rate for the 55+ population and model 9 for
the 60+ population. Both indicators are included as approximations of
incentives to work at older ages. The implicit tax rate on continued
work is an approximation of the importance of official early retirement
schemes (Blake and Sangnier 2011). The implicit tax rate on continued
work gives an indication of the marginal benefits of continued working,
e.g. the marginal costs of retiring early. Although this concept is different
from replacement rates for early retirement, Duval (2003) argues that
cross-country differences in implicit tax rates on continued work are good
indicators of cross-country differences in the level of generosity of early
retirement. Unfortunately, data on implicit tax rates on continued work are
highly unbalanced. Therefore, we use an alternative indicator as suggested
by Duval (2003).37
We construct an indicator of the implicit tax on continued work that is
equal to 0 if the implicit tax rate is in the first quartile38 of the cross-country
and -time distribution of implicit tax rates. Similarly, the indicator equals 1
if the tax rate is in the second or third quartile and 2 if the tax rate is in the
fourth quartile. Unlike Johnson (2000) (0.6-1.7 percentage points), Duval
(2003) (0.6-1.7 percentage points) and Blake and Sangnier (2011) (no effect
among 55-59 year old persons and 0-0.7 percentage points among persons
aged 60-64) we do not find significant effects of the implicit tax rate on
continued work. A possible explanation for not finding significant effects
of the implicit tax rate on continued work is that the marginal costs of
retiring may already be implicitly defined by the alternative labor market
options relative to full-time employment. Nevertheless, we still observe
37Duval (2003) makes a difference between countries with a low, medium and high
level of implicit tax rates on continued work and constructs an indicator that is equal to
0, 1 or 2 respectively.
38The first quartile of the 55+ (60+) indicator stops at an implicit tax rate of 21.40 (20.3).
The fourth quartile begins at an implicit tax rate of 58.2 (74.2). The distribution has a
mean and median of 40.9 (47.4) and 44.1 (35.58) respectively. The lowest value in the
distribution is 2.80 (-0.15). The highest value is 101.4 (105.1).
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that a higher part-time employment rate decreases early retirement among
men. For women, the results of Model 8 and 9 are similar to Model 2. A
more practical explanation for not finding an effect of the implicit tax on
continued work is the loss of heterogeneity because of constructing the
aforementioned indicator. If we would use the original data from Duval,
our regressions would end up having only 39 observations. However,
specifying a simple fixed-effects model with HAC-corrected standard
errors and the implicit tax rate on continued work as the only explanatory
variable does show that a higher implicit tax rate on continued work
increases early retirement significantly (based on 89 observations).
Model 10 shows the results of the IV-GMM estimation with a different
set of instruments. Whereas the previous estimations are based on a
set of instruments that include labor market institutions only, Model
10 presents estimation results with a set of instruments that consists of
both the labor market institutions and the first lag of the endogenous
variables. Also this model indicates that unemployment increases early
retirement, part-time employment decreases early retirement and self-
employment does not decrease early retirement (no effect among men and
a positive effect among women). To test the robustness of our results to
a set with highly exogenous instruments, we perform a regression with
only the first and second lags of the endogenous regressors of instruments.
The estimated effects (not reported here) are slightly smaller than in the
baseline regression, but the estimated effects are highly robust.
Finally, Model 11 presents the estimation results for a specification in
which the compensation and reintegration policies of disability insurance
are taken into account in the first-stage as these indicators seem to partially
explain cross-country differences in disability rates (OECD 2009a). Based
on the underlying data of figures 4.7 and 4.8 presented in OECD (2009a),
we constructed time-varying indices of compensation and integration
policies regarding disability insurance.39 The main conclusions do not
alter by including these instruments that are highly likely to be valid.40
39For an explanation of these indices we refer to Annex 4.A2 in OECD (2009a).
40The C-statistic confirms that we can assume these indices as well as the DI spending
to be exogenous with p-value=0.224 and p-value=0.274 respectively (orthogonality is
tested subsequently).
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So far, we have assumed that the endogenous independent variables
can be explained by structural labor market institutions. However, un-
employment can also be explained by cyclical effects (Nickell et al. 2005).
To account for such cyclical effects, we use labor demand shocks41 as an
additional instrumental variable as well. The results (not reported here)
are highly robust to the inclusion of this cyclical instrument.
Sensitivity of the dependent variable 5.5
Section 5.4 shows that early retirement is increased by higher rates of
unemployment and decreased by higher rates of part-time employment.
We do not find effects for the disability rate. Self-employment rates are
largely insignificant implying that the self-employment rate does not
decrease early retirement. The current section provides evidence on the
robustness of the results to the use of variations on the measure of labor
market withdrawal.
Employment rates 5.5.1
Firstly, we compare the results of Model 2 using activity rates (similar to
Blake and Sangnier 2011, Blondal and Scarpetta 1998, Duval 2003, Johnson
2000) to a model that identifies retirement from employment rates (as
suggested by Ebbinghaus 2006). Mentioned earlier in the paper, using
activity rates (including employment and unemployment) assumes that
unemployment is not considered to be early retirement while using em-
ployment rates assumes that unemployment is similar to non-participation
41Following Nickell et al. (2005) labor demand shocks are modeled by including the
estimated residual (ε̂τ) of the following equation as a variable in the first-stage regressions:
ERτ = θ0 + LCGτθ1 + RGDPGτθ2 + ετ (5.9)
Where ER is the employment rate for people aged 15-64, LCG is the growth of labor
costs and RGDPG is the growth of real GDP. The equation is estimated separately for
each of our 13 countries using OLS with Newey-West standard errors to correct for
autocorrelation. The results of our baseline specification are robust for different assumed
lags of autocorrelation in the labor demand shock equation.
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Table 5.5: Retirement indicator based on employment
ratesa
Men Women
Disability rate 55-64 -0.94 1.69
(1.88) (2.54)
Unemployment rate 55-64 2.24*** 2.90***
(0.77) (0.87)
Self-employment rate 55-64 -1.18 -0.99
(1.83) (2.39)
Part-time employment rate 55-64 -1.51** -1.45**
(0.59) (0.70)
Fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations (N x T) 149 149
Hansen’s J statistic (p-value reported)b 0.56 0.41
a HAC standard errors using Bartlett kernel bandwith=2 to cor-
rect for autocorrelation in parentheses. * Significant at the .10
level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level using t-statistics.
Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Germany, Greece
and Luxembourg have one or more empty variables. All
first-stage regressions includes the instruments: UI benefits re-
placement rate, EPLdi f f , Implicit tax rate on self-employment,
ALMP spending, DI spending, and SA benefits replacement
rate.
b Hansen’s J statistic H0: valid instruments.
at older ages. Table 5.5 shows that the results are robust for the use of
either employment- or inactivity rates in the proposed retirement indicator,
although the effect of part-time employment is more pronounced among
women now.
5.5.2 Age-windows
Secondly, we analyze the robustness of the estimation results by using
retirement indicators that are disaggregated to smaller age-spans. Table 5.6
and table 5.7 show the results of the disaggregated retirement indicators
for men and women respectively. For both men and women, the estimation
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results of Model 2 in table 5.3 and table 5.4, which is Model 1 in table 5.6
and table 5.7, show similar patterns: disability rates are insignificant,
unemployment is positive and significant, self-employment is insignificant
and part-time employment is negative and significant in most cases.
For men, the magnitude of the coefficients indicates that the effect of
unemployment on early retirement is the largest for the 60-64 year olds
(Model 3 and Model 6). Regarding part-time employment, we observe that
the effects on early retirement are the largest for the total group of men
aged 55-64. Nevertheless, patterns vary only marginally between Model
1-6.
Among women, we find similar results: unemployment rate effects
seem to be larger for the group of women aged 60-64. Comparing par-
ticipation of women aged 55-64 and 55-59 to the group of 25-54 did not
result in finding significant effects of part-time employment. However,
comparing women aged 55-64, 55-59 and 60-64 to a smaller basis (e.g.
50-54, 50-54 and 55-59 respectively) indicates that part-time employment
does decrease early retirement significantly.
Hours decisions 5.5.3
The estimation results so far suggest that part-time employment reduces
early retirement and this seems to be mainly driven by voluntary part-time
employment. This would suggest that inducing part-time employment
by partial retirement programs increases labor force participation at older
ages. However, such partial retirement programs are only efficient if they
induce people to work part-time who would otherwise have fully retired.
Such programs are inefficient if it induces people to work part-time who
would have worked full-time in absence of partial retirement possibilities.
Results in micro studies are ambiguous with respect to the efficiency
of part-time retirement options. Support for a positive effect of part-
time retirement on hours worked is found by Wadensjo (2006) (using
Swedish data), Kapteyn et al. (2007) (using Dutch data) and Kantarci and
Van Soest (2008) (using Dutch data). Allen et al. (2001) (using US data)
and Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2006) (using Finnish data) find negative
effects on hours.
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To address this issue, we construct a macro variable indicating the
average actual hours worked by persons aged 55-64 (including people that
do not work). This macro variable measures the number of hours actually
worked during the reference week in the main job.42 Table 5.8 presents
the cross-country trends in hours worked among persons aged 55-64 and
shows that the average number of hours worked among the total of men
is substantially higher than among women in most countries. On the
other hand, the growth in the actual hours worked has increased more
substantially among women. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Norway even
have a decreasing trend in working hours among men and an increasing
trend among women.
The largest increases in average hours worked for both men and women
can be found in Finland and the Netherlands with increases of more than
five hours on average. As depicted in figure 5.1, these countries also
showed relatively strong increases in part-time employment in the period
1995-2008. To test the effect of part-time employment on labor supply
decisions at the intensive margin, we use the same analytical framework
as in the case of labor supply effects at the extensive margin. Instead of
using the retirement indicator based on activity rates, we now use the
average actual hours worked as a dependent variable in the regression
analysis.
The estimation results indicate that an increase in the unemployment
rate of one percentage point decreases the average hours worked by about
0.5 hours among men and 0.6 hours among women. More interestingly,
the estimation results show that a higher part-time employment rate not
only increases the labor supply of older workers at the extensive margin
but that part-time employment does not decrease the average number of
hours worked either. A one percentage point higher part-time employment
rate increases the average actual number of hours worked by about 0.4
hours among men. The effect is smaller, or even absent, among women,
but the results indicate that part-time employment possibilities do not
have a negative effect on the total labor supply at older ages.
42This variable is based on the HWACTUAL variable included in the LFS micro data.
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Table 5.8: Average number of hours worked, 55-64
Men Women
1995 2008 Change 1995 2008 Change
Austria 16.0 19.0 3.0 6.0 8.2 2.2
Belgium 12.7 14.6 1.9 3.9 6.6 2.7
Denmark 21.6 22.0 0.4 9.4 14.2 4.8
Finland 9.9 16.8 6.9 9.6 15.2 5.6
France 13.1 13.9 0.8 7.6 9.7 2.1
Germany 18.9 22.6 3.6 8.5 11.7 3.2
Greece 25.7 24.5 -1.2 8.9 9.7 0.8
Ireland 26.0 25.5 -0.5 5.7 10.6 4.9
Italy 17.0 16.7 -0.3 4.6 7.0 2.4
Netherlands 14.1 19.7 5.6 3.4 9.0 5.6
Norway 26.0 23.2 -2.8 14.6 15.8 1.2
Portugal 24.4 21.5 -2.9 12.0 13.4 1.4
Spain 18.4 21.6 3.2 6.0 8.7 2.7
Sweden 20.2 23.7 3.5 15.1 18.1 3.0
UK 20.7 23.5 2.8 9.0 11.9 2.9
Mean 19.0 20.6 1.6 8.3 11.3 3.0
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2014). The first
available year for Germany is 2002.
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Summary and discussion 5.6
In many European countries, the labor market participation of older work-
ers is considerably lower than the labor market participation of prime-age
workers. However, this gap between older and prime-age workers de-
clined considerably between 1995 and 2008. One of the factors that may
have contributed to the decline in early labor market withdrawal is the
rise of non-standard forms of employment among older workers. Since
non-standard employment provides downwards flexibility in working
hours, older workers with a relatively strong preference for leisure could
use these forms of employment as a bridge between full-time employment
and retirement. Moreover, non-standard employment may be chosen be-
cause of less generous social insurance programs that were often used as
early retirement routes in the past. The existing empirical literature on the
relationship between non-standard employment and labor market with-
drawal consists of micro-level studies. To analyze the variation in early
labor market withdrawal across 13 European countries, this study extends
the models employed in macro-level retirement studies with non-standard
employment in addition to social insurance schemes. We regress early
labor market withdrawal on part-time employment, self-employment, un-
employment and disability rates, instrumented by institutional variables.
Our analysis finds that for men, part-time employment is a substitute
for full early labor market withdrawal. The results suggest that this is
mainly because of the possibility to reduce working hours as we find that
specifically voluntary part-time employment induces labor force participa-
tion at older ages. Among women, this effect of part-time employment on
early retirement is smaller and somewhat more ambiguous. This might
be due to the fact that part-time work plays a different role in the careers
of men than in the careers of women. During their prime age, men work
relatively more full-time than women, as women tend to combine the
flexibility of part-time employment with raising children. Hence, men
use part-time employment as a step in a gradual transition from full-time
employment to retirement, whilst women do not work more in part-time
at the end of their career than before (Peracchi and Welch 1994).
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With regard to self-employment, our results provide no evidence for
substitution effects between self-employment among older workers and
early retirement. Our finding that part-time employment may function as
a substitute to early retirement, whilst self-employment does not, is in line
with the findings of other studies on non-standard employment. Results
from recent studies at the micro-level (Been and Knoef 2013, Emmanoulidi
and Kyriazidou 2012) indicate that older workers primarily choose for
self-employment as a way to end unemployment and much less as a
way to reduce working hours in paid employment. In contrast, part-
time employment among older workers usually follows after full-time
employment. In terms of microeconomic theory, our findings suggest that
the combination of leisure and consumption while working in part-time
gives on average more utility to older workers than retiring early, whereas
the combination of leisure and consumption while being self-employed
does not. This difference may be owing to several factors. For instance,
starting a new business requires a certain investment in terms of working
hours, whilst the income is often uncertain.
Furthermore, we find complementary effects between unemployment
rates and early retirement of both men and women. Unemployment
among older workers contributes to early labor market withdrawal. In
contrast, our results provide no evidence for complementary effects be-
tween disability rates and early retirement. However, this result should
be taken with caution, because the data on the beneficiaries of disability
benefits might be troublesome due to cross-country incomparability as
well as breaks in the LFS data in some countries.
As a wider implication, our results suggest that facilitating part-time
work might contribute to higher labor market participation among older
workers at the extensive margin. However, facilitating part-time work
could also induce a reduction in working hours among persons who would
otherwise have remained working in full-time employment. Our analysis
suggests that increases in part-time employment did not have negative
effects on the labor supply at the intensive margin across countries. For
men, the results even suggest clear positive effects. This indicates that
part-time work schemes may actually increase the labor supply at both
the extensive and the intensive margin at older ages.
Section 5.A Descriptive statistics 183
Descriptive statistics 5.A
Table 5.10: Dependent and independent variables (raw data)
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Source
Dependent variables
Activity rate 55-64 (males) 205 56.89 11.62 Eurostat (2014)
Activity rate 25-54 (males) 205 92.34 1.42 Eurostat (2014)
Activity rate 55-64 (females) 205 36.47 15.17 Eurostat (2014)
Activity rate 25-54 (females) 205 75.01 8.91 Eurostat (2014)
Average hours worked 55-64 (males) 203 19.76 4.31 Eurostat (2014)
Average hours worked 55-64 (females) 203 9.70 3.84 Eurostat (2014)
Endogenous independent variables
Disability rate 55-65 183 9.53 6.17 Eurostat (2014)a
Unemployment rate 55-64 210 5.39 3.12 Eurostat (2014)
Self-employment rate 55-64 202 18.90 7.65 Eurostat (2014)a
Part-time employment rate 55-64 202 21.15 11.39 Eurostat (2014)a
Voluntary part-time employment 55-64 201 20.47 11.16 Eurostat (2014)a
Instrumental variables
EPLdi f f 210 0.12 1.24 OECD (2013a)
ALMP expenditure (% GDP) 210 0.90 0.48 OECD (2012b)
DI expenditure (p.c.) 210 880.02 485.32 OECD (2012b)
UI replacement rate 208 60.48 13.00 Van Vliet et al. (2012)
SA replacement rate 195 46.30 8.59 Wang and Van Vliet (2014)
Implicit tax rate on self-employment 174 15.76 6.20 Eurostat (2013)
DI compensation index 180 26.36 4.08 OECD (2009a)
DI integration index 180 18.69 5.49 OECD (2009a)
Additional control variables
Statutory retirement age (males) 210 64.82 1.58 OECD (2012a)
Statutory retirement age (females) 210 63.23 2.89 OECD (2012a)
Implicit tax continued work (55+) 76 43.14 20.75 OECD (2013b)
Implicit tax continued work (60+) 76 52.49 30.44 OECD (2013b)
a Own caluclation.
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Table 5.11: Pairwise correlation coefficients of endogenous variables
and instrumentsa
DI rate 55-64 UI rate 55-64 SE rate 55-64 PT rate 55-64
EPLdi f f 0.19 0.10 -0.41 0.44
(0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)
ALMP expenditure 0.33 0.23 -0.50 0.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DI expenditure 0.70 -0.13 -0.77 0.63
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
UI replacement rate 0.28 0.15 -0.43 0.25
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
SA replacement rate 0.06 -0.36 0.03 0.00
(0.42) (0.00) (0.69) (0.95)
Implicit tax rate on self-employment 0.37 0.00 -0.35 0.08
(0.00) (0.98) (0.00) (0.28)
DI compensation index 0.52 0.04 -0.49 -0.08
(0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.30)
DI integration index 0.43 0.00 -0.78 0.46
(0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00)
a P-value in parentheses.
6 The necessity of self-employment
towards retirement: Evidence




This paper investigates whether individuals at the end of working life
choose self-employment out of necessity and to what degree job search
requirements for unemployment benefits induce people to become self-
employed. For this purpose we model labor market transitions at older
ages using a dynamic multinomial logit model with unobserved hetero-
geneity. The results indicate that at the end of the career individuals with
a weak labor market position have a relatively high probability to become
self-employed, e.g. to end or avoid a period of unemployment or inactivity
(necessity driven self-employment). Contrasting some earlier work, the
results do not suggest that self-employment is used as a gradual retirement
route for employees. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that job
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search requirements for unemployed older workers increased the outflow
from unemployment and decreased the inflow into unemployment, but
did not increase self-employment out of necessity or opportunity.
6.1 Introduction
In virtually all OECD countries, labor force participation rates of the 50+
population decreased in the period from the 1960s to the mid-1990s (OECD
2011c). This was partially due to generous unemployment insurance,
disability insurance and early retirement schemes (Gruber and Wise 1998).1
Since the mid-1990s aging has raised concerns about the sustainability
of the welfare state and social insurance reforms have been undertaken
to increase the labor force participation of the 50+ population. As a
result, the share of people being active in both paid-employment2 and
self-employment increased.
This paper focuses on self-employment at older ages and the intro-
duction of job search requirements for unemployed older workers. Inter-
estingly, self-employment is found to be relatively high among the 50+
working population, compared to other age groups (Hurd 1996, Karoly
and Zissimopoulos 2004, Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2007). Taking into ac-
count self-employment is therefore important for understanding pathways
to retirement (Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2009).
This paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, this study
contributes to the literature on the importance of necessity and opportunity
driven self-employment. In the literature, two main hypotheses have risen
to explain self-employment at older ages. First, self-employment may be
chosen out of necessity, to end or to avoid unemployment.3 The 50+ popu-
lation particularly faces difficulties finding a new job once unemployed
1Country-specific analyses of the effects of such schemes on early retirement can be
found in Bould (1980), Hogarth (1988), Ruhm (1995), Riphahn (1997), Kerkhofs et al.
(1999), Hernoes et al. (2000), Roed and Haugen (2003), Friedberg and Webb (2005),
Van Vuren and Van Vuuren (2007), Euwals et al. (2010), Euwals et al. (2012), De Vos et al.
(2012).
2Defined as being an employee.
3E.g. Taylor (1999), Reize (2000), Earle and Sakova (2000), Kuhn and Schuetze (2001),
Kellard et al. (2002), Rissman (2003) and Glocker and Steiner (2007).
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(Chan and Stevens 2001, Maestas and Li 2006). Second, self-employment
may be chosen as an opportunity to reduce working hours and enhance
gradual retirement.4 To investigate the nature of self-employment at
older ages we test 1) whether transitions from unemployment to self-
employment are important and increase with age,5 2) whether high unem-
ployment rates push workers from paid-employment to self-employment,6
and 3) whether the introduction of job search requirements for unem-
ployed older workers increases self-employment. For the last test we
use a Dutch UI reform which introduced job search requirements for
unemployed persons between the age of 57.5 and 63 as from January 2004.
Before this reform unemployed older workers did not have to search for
a job in order to receive unemployment benefits. The reform implied an
exogenous and unanticipated shock in the attractiveness of unemployment
as a pathway to retirement. Whereas Lammers et al. (2013) and Hullegie
and Van Ours (2013) investigate the effect of this reform on the outflow
from welfare and substitution effect with regard to disability and early
retirement,7 we focus on the effect of mandatory search requirements
on the entry of self-employment. Self-employment may increase when
unemployment becomes less attractive as an exit route to retirement. As
far as we know, there are no other studies that investigated the effect
of job search requirements on substitution between unemployment and
self-employment as an exit route to retirement.8
4This is suggested by Fuchs (1982), Hurd (1996), Bruce et al. (2000), Morris and Mallier
(2003), Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007), Giandrea et al. (2008), and Gu (2009).
5Parker and Rougier (2007) find that transitions from unemployment to self-
employment are relatively important and argue that this indicates necessity-driven
self-employment at older ages.
6Several studies find that high unemployment rates increase self-employment propen-
sities, e.g. Benedict and Hakobyan (2008), Kim and Cho (2009), and Congregado et al.
(2012). This latter effect is known as the recession push hypothesis. This hypothesis is,
however, not confirmed in all papers (Moore and Mueller 2002 and Tapia 2008). Among
others, Carrasco (1999) finds that self-employment becomes more attractive when the
economic situation improves (the prosperity pull hypothesis).
7Lammers et al. (2013) and Hullegie and Van Ours (2013) both find that the 2004 UI
reform significantly increased exits from unemployment to paid-employment. Lammers
et al. (2013) also find substitution effects between unemployment insurance and disability
insurance.
8For an overview of the literature regarding the effects of job search requirements in
unemployment, see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006).
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Our second contribution concerns the effect of job search requirements
on the inflow to unemployment. We expect that the introduction of search
requirements for unemployed older workers lowers the inflow into un-
employment, since job search requirements make unemployment a less
attractive exit route to retirement. Other studies that investigate the inflow
into unemployment are focused on entrance requirements to unemploy-
ment insurance (e.g. Christofides and McKenna 1996, Green and Riddell
1997) and on the level and/or duration of benefits (e.g. Andersen and
Meyer 1997, Lalive et al. 2006, Tuit and Van Ours 2010, Winter-Ebmer
2003). Lalive et al. and Tuit et al., for example, focus on unemployed
older workers and show that benefit duration affects the inflow to unem-
ployment insurance. The bulk of the literature on search requirements is
focused on the effects of exiting unemployment instead of the inflow to
unemployment (Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006).
This paper analyzes labor market transitions using a dynamic multino-
mial logit model.9 This model allows us to study the pathways through
which people enter self-employment, to study the effect of the unemploy-
ment rate on transitions to self-employment, and to study the effect of
the introduction of job search requirements on labor market transitions
using a difference-in-differences approach. We correct for unobserved
heterogeneity by allowing for correlated random effects (Wooldridge 2010)
and we take into account the initial conditions problem by using the
method of Wooldridge (2005). Estimating a dynamic multinomial logit
model avoids a possible sample selection bias, which may occur when
considering binomial estimates for a transition. To estimate the model, the
paper takes advantage of the long panel dimension of the Dutch Income
Panel data (1989-2009). The Dutch Income Panel is a large administrative
dataset and since we are not able to estimate the model for all observations
at once, we use two subsamples of the data (such that all observations are
used) and apply minimum distance.
Our main finding is that at the end of the career unemployed in-
dividuals have a relatively high probability to enter self-employment
(necessity driven) and this effect is found to be significantly increasing
9This model has also been used by Cappellari et al. (2010), Constant and Zimmerman
(2004), Caliendo and Uhlendorff (2008) and Martinez-Granado (2002).
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with age. For men in paid-employment the results show significant evi-
dence for the recession push hypothesis. For inactive men and women
in paid-employment, on the other hand, we find that a low unemploy-
ment rate increases the probability to enter self-employment. At lower
ages, self-employment entry is most likely from inactivity. In the highest
age-category, self-employment entry from unemployment and inactivity
are not significantly different. Introducing job search requirements for the
unemployed at the end of their working life increased exits from unem-
ployment. This reform, however, did not increase self-employment out of
necessity (we find no significant increase in flows from unemployment to
self-employment due to the reform). Finally, job search requirements have
decreased the inflow to unemployment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the
Dutch unemployment insurance system. Section 6.3 presents the model,
and section 6.4 describes the data. Section 6.5 reports the estimation
results, after which section 6.6 provides some discussion and section 6.7
concludes the paper.
Unemployment insurance towards retirement 6.2
As this paper focuses on self-employment and unemployment as exit
routes to retirement, this section provides an overview of the Dutch UI
benefit system. In the 1990s unemployment was an attractive exit route
for older workers because of generous arrangements and easy eligibility
rules. As from the age of 57.5 people had the possibility to use UI
benefits up to the mandatory retirement age without having to search for
a job. Unemployment was, therefore, used frequently as an exit route to
retirement. The number of UI beneficiaries expanded and, in light of the
aging population, reforms have been undertaken.10
This paper investigates the effect of a UI reform introduced on January
1st 2004, which implied that unemployed persons older than 57.5 years
10For an international comparison of unemployment as an early retirement route, see
Gruber and Wise (1998).
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were no longer exempted from the requirement to search actively for a
job. Search requirements involve that persons in unemployment 1) have a
mandatory intake meeting at the unemployment office, where individual
criteria are made regarding the expected activities undertaken during
unemployment that are ex post testable,11 2) have the obligation to accept
suitable job-offers, where suitable job offers are defined by the educational
level and the time spent in unemployment, 3) have to make a sufficient
number of applications,12 where sufficiency is individually determined
and related to the labor market, the number of available vacancies and
personal health, 4) have to participate in educational programs and job
search assistance when they are assumed to not to be able to find work
within six months, and 5) have regular report meetings every 4-6 weeks in
addition to the mandatory intake meeting and the follow-up to explain
the further procedures.
The baseline from which individual arrangements are made is the
requirement of applying for a job once a week on average. An automatic
exception is made for individuals starting their own business. Furthermore,
exceptions are made for persons participating in care or volunteering for
at least 20 hours per week for a period of at most six months, individuals
taking part in an educational program, people of age 64, or persons older
than 62 years and 2 months who already received UI benefits for at least a
year in 2004. The first two exceptions are made because they may increase
the probability to find a job. The latter two exceptions are made because
of a transitory regime. The strictness of job monitoring in the Netherlands
is high13 and due to the risk of substantial financial sanctions we can
reasonably assume people to be complying with the search requirements
(Verveen et al. 2005). The reform also implied that, after some time, people
have to accept all job offers irrespective of their educational level.
11The employability of an individual is determined by objective characteristics such
as profession, education, age and experience as well as the subjective impression of the
caseworker during the interview.
12The following options are considered to be an application: letter, e-mail, phone call
or nuncupative contact with a company, registering at an agency, having a job interview
and doing an assessment.
13From an international perspective, Venn (2012) ranks the Netherlands among coun-
tries with a high strictness of job search monitoring. The OECD indicator suggests that
monitoring job search is stricter in the Netherlands than in countries such as the US,
Canada and Scandinavian countries.
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Fulfilling above mentioned requirements, together with eligibility re-
quirements that people have worked at least 26-out-of-36 weeks, gives
persons the right to receive UI benefits. Until October 2006 the maxi-
mum UI benefits duration for receiving 70% of previous earnings was
age-dependent and amounted to a maximum of 42, 48 and 60 months
for persons aged 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 respectively. Until August 2003
persons aged 57.5+ could, in principal, even extend the benefit period
up to the age of 65 by using extended UI benefits. These extended UI
benefits amounted 70% of minimum wage. From August 2003, extended
UI benefits were abolished simultaneously with the introduction of the
so called IOAW-benefits14 targeted at unemployed 50+ individuals. The
only difference between the extended UI benefits and the IOAW for older
unemployed is that receiving the latter depends on the income of the
spouse while extended benefits were unconditional on the income of the
spouse. Single households are therefore indifferent between receiving
extended UI benefits or IOAW benefits.
In October 2006, both benefits and the duration of benefits were mod-
erated for all UI recipients and the maximum UI benefit duration was
made conditional on the employment history, with a maximum of 38
months. However, after 38 months of UI benefits, unemployed elderly
can obtain social benefits from IOAW and the IOW15 (implemented in
August 2003 and December 2009, respectively) to complement household
income up to subsistence level without asset-based means testing (and
for the IOW also unconditional on the income of a partner). Furthermore,
self-employed elderly individuals with a low income who have to stop
their business can receive benefits to complement their income up to
subsistence level, without the strict asset-based means testing from social
assistance benefits.16
14Wet inkomensvoorziening oudere en gedeeltelijk arbeidsongeschikte werkloze werknemers.
15Inkomensvoorziening oudere werklozen.
16This program is called the IOAZ (Wet Inkomensvoorziening oudere en gedeeltelijk arbeid-
songeschikte gewezen zelfstandigen.)
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6.3 Model
6.3.1 Exit routes to retirement
This section describes the model we use to investigate labor market transi-
tions among the 50+ population. The exit route to retirement can be seen
as the outcome of a maximization process, in which individuals reevaluate
their optimal labor market status each period, given their preferences and
the constraints that coincide with each labor market state. Individuals
compare utility streams associated with different exit routes and choose
the alternative with the highest utility stream. More specifically, we define





(1 + ρ)t−τuτ(ciτ, liτ, jiτ; siτ, viτ) (6.1)
where ciτ and liτ denote consumption and leisure of individual i in time
period τ implicitly defined by labor market state j. ρ is the discount factor
and T the time horizon of the individual. In our model we distinguish
between four mutually exclusive labor market states: paid-employment
(j = 1), self-employment (j = 2), unemployment insurance (j = 3), and
inactivity (j = 4).17 Each labor market status is associated with it’s own
consumption and leisure possibilities, but labor market status itself may
also influence the utility function directly. E.g., conditional on leisure and
consumption, some people receive a higher utility from self-employment
than from paid-employment, due to characteristics of self-employment
such as the independence and flexibility that self-employment provides.
Social insurance rules siτ that hold for individual i in period τ influence
the exit route to retirement. An increase of job search requirements, for ex-
ample, decreases the amount of leisure and so the value of unemployment
as a retirement route. Furthermore, transitions from self-employment
or inactivity to unemployment are not possible because only persons in
paid-employment are eligible for UI benefits. Finally, observed and unob-
served characteristics viτ influence the utility function indirectly through
17Inactivity includes individuals in disability, welfare, early retirement, and individuals
without personal income.
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preferences. For example, age, the number of children in the household,
and education may influence the utility perceived from consumption and
leisure.
Equation (6.1) provides a guideline for the empirical specification of the
model. It shows that individuals choose the exit route that maximizes their
utility over consumption, leisure, and labor market status. Furthermore,
individual characteristics and social insurance rules affect current and
future labor market statuses. For the empirical implementation of the
problem, like Blau (1998) and Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004), we approximate
the value function Uit for individual i who chooses labor market status j
at time t with a linear function:
Vij(t) = Xitβ j + Zit−1⊗ [1 AGE′it YEAR′it]γj + Zit−1URtθj + Dijt + µij + εijt, (6.2)
where Xit is a vector of observed personal and household characteristics
that influence preferences as shown in (6.1). Zit−1 is a vector of dummy
variables indicating lagged labor market status. AGEit and YEARit are
vectors of dummy variables indicating age and year categories. These
are interacted with Zit−1 to allow for mobility differences across age and
periods. URt is the unemployment rate in period t, which we interact
with Zit−1 to take into account that the unemployment rate may affect
individuals with various previous employment states differently. The
treatment variables function D contains variables and interactions that we
use to identify the effect of the job search requirements introduced in 2004
and will be explained in section 6.3.2.
Finally, the terms µij describe individual specific unobserved hetero-
geneity and εijt are i.i.d. error terms, which we assume to be independent
of the explanatory variables and to follow a Type I extreme value distribu-
tion. Hence, the probability for individual i to have labor market status j
at time t > 0 can be written as
P(jt|Xit, Zit−1, AGEit, YEARi,t, URt, Dijt, µi1, ..., µi J) =
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exp(Xitβ j + Zit−1 ⊗ [1 AGE′it YEAR′it]γj + Zit−1URtθj + Dijt + µij)




it]γk + Zit−1URtθk + Dikt + µik)
,
(6.3)
where J denotes the number of mutually exclusive labor market states
distinguished in the model. To identify the model, β1, γ1, θ1 and µi1 are
normalized to zero (paid-employment is the reference category). The un-
observed heterogeneity or random effects µi = (µi2, µi3, µi4)′ are assumed
to follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance
Σµ.
Introducing unobserved heterogeneity has the advantage that the ir-
relevance of independent alternatives (IIA) property of the multinomial
logit model is avoided. Furthermore, allowing for unobserved hetero-
geneity within choice possibilities will give true, instead of spurious, state
dependence in the model. The initial labor market status Zi0 is not fixed
or exogenous and, as in most papers, we do not have the entire history
of the process generating individual’s employment dynamics available.
Therefore, the initial conditions problem arises, which is discussed in
Heckman (1981). To deal with this problem Heckman (1981) proposed to
estimate a static multinomial logit model for the initial state with different
slope parameters and without lagged labor market status, simultaneously
with the dynamic model. Several studies investigating transitions between
multiple states have used this method, e.g. Gong et al. (2000), Uhlendorff
(2006) and Cappellari et al. (2010). In this paper we will use an alternative
approach, proposed by Wooldridge (2005), to take into account the initial
conditions problem. In the method of Wooldridge (2005), individual spe-
cific heterogeneity terms are modeled conditional on the initial condition,
the initial value of the lagged dependent variable, and the individual mean
of time-varying covariates
µij = α0j + Zi0α1j + Xiα2j + aij j = 2, 3, 4 (6.4)
where Zi0 is the vector of initial conditions and Xi the vector of the
individual mean of time-varying covariates. The remaining stochastic
element, aij, is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with
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where L is the Cholesky matrix of Σa which has to be estimated (the
unique lower triangular matrix such that LL′ = Σa). In this way, we allow
for unobserved heterogeneity within and between choice possibilities.
Applying the Wooldridge correction for initial conditions in the way
explained above, automatically results in a Correlated Random Effects
model (Mundlak 1978). Applying this Correlated Random Effects regres-
sion has the advantage of allowing for correlation between observed- and
unobserved heterogeneity similar to a fixed effects model, even in an
unbalanced panel (Wooldridge 2010).
Akay (2011) studied the performance of the Wooldridge method, com-
pared to the Heckman method. He found that the method proposed by
Wooldridge works well for moderately long panels (5-8 periods) and that
all methods perform equally well for panels of long duration (longer than
15-20 periods)18. For short panels, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) find
that the bias practically disappears when the initial-period explanatory
variables are included as additional regressors. Examples of other stud-
ies that used the Wooldridge approach are Devicienti and Poggi (2011),
Michaud and Tatsiramos (2011), Haan and Wrohlich (2011), Buddelmeyer
et al. (2010) and Christelis and Sanz-de Galdeano (2011).
Identifying the effects of job search requirements 6.3.2
The 2004 UI reform, described in section 6.2, provides an exogenous source
of variability in the data. These search requirements decrease leisure in
the unemployment state. This implies that the UI reform makes the value
of unemployment relatively lower compared to paid-employment, self-
employment and inactivity. As from 2004 individuals of age 57.5 and older
are no longer exempted from job search requirements. To infer causal
18In this paper we have a long panel of 21 periods available.
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effects of job search requirements, we apply a difference-in-differences
framework. In this framework, we compare the inflow to and the outflow
from unemployment before and after the reform for the 57.5+ population
(for whom job search requirements were no longer exempted), relative to
those younger than 57.5 (for whom nothing changed). We assume that
in absence of the reform there would not be a discontinuous change in
labor market transitions for 57.5+ individuals relative to those younger
than 57.5 after the reform.19
Formally, the difference-in-differences framework is implemented in
equation (6.2) using the treatment variable function D which is given by
Dijt = [PEit−1 UIit−1]⊗ [Git Pit Git · Pit]δj (6.6)
where Git is a dummy variable indicating the treatment group, which is
equal to one if a person is between the ages of 58 and 63 (at December
31th) and zero otherwise.20 Only, due to a transitional regime, persons
older than 62 years and 2 months who were already unemployed for
a minimum of one year at the time the reform was implemented were
not affected by the reform and are classified as belonging to the control
group. Pit indicates the treatment period (2004-2009), and Git · Pit is one
for those persons that are treated. Finally, by interacting the treatment
variables with indicators for paid-employment (PE) and unemployment
(UI) in the previous period, we investigate the effects of the reform on the
outflow from unemployment and on the inflow from paid-employment to
unemployment.
Lammers et al. (2013), who exploit the same policy reform, notice
that anticipation of the policy change can result in selective inflow into
unemployment around the time the policy was initiated, but found no
evidence of this. Probably, since none of the individuals flowing into UI in
2003 were exempted from the new rules, speeding up the firing procedure
19Placebo tests will follow to verify this common trends assumption.
20Since we have yearly data we cannot identify effects that start during a year. The
smallest bias is introduced when we define individuals to belong to the treatment group
as from the year in which they become 58. Taking the year in which people become
57 increases the bias, since all individuals born after June do not reach the age of 57.5
during that year. Furthermore, also those born from January to June have a smaller bias
when the treatment group starts as from the year in which individuals become 58.
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could not prevent them from the new search requirements after the age
of 57.5. Therefore, we can reasonably assume that the introduction of
the reform was unanticipated. Another type of anticipation effect may
well arose before the reform. If before 2004 unemployed individuals
who were close to 57.5 were already reducing their search capacity in
anticipation of the removal of the search requirement after the age of 57.5,
the labor market transitions of those younger than 57.5 are also affected
by the reform. Hullegie and Van Ours (2013) find that individuals already
reduced their search intensity about two months prior to the age of 57.5 in
the period before 2004, meaning that persons anticipated the abolishment
of search requirements at older ages. If indeed the treated group would be
all individuals as from the age of 57 and 4 months (57.5 minus 2 months),
we would change our definition of the treatment group. We would indicate
persons born in January or February to be treated as from the year in
which they become 57 (instead of 58), so to reduce the bias resulting from
the yearly observations. A robustness check (not reported here) in which
the treatment group also consists of persons of age 57 who were born in
January or February shows that the results hardly change.
The 2004 UI reform did not change the UI benefit level and -duration,
but only introduced mandatory job search requirements that increased the
number oblifations to receive unemployment benefits. To make sure that
we only measure the effects of the introduction of job search requirements
on the first of January 2004 and not the abolition of extended benefits in
August 2003, we exploit the fact that the reform of August 2003 did not
affect singles (as mentioned in section 6.2) in the robustness checks.
Estimation 6.3.3
We estimate the model’s parameters using maximum likelihood. The
likelihood contribution of an individual i with observed labor market
states j1, ..., jM is
Li(j1, ..., jM |X, Z, AGE, YEAR, UR, D, ai ; α, β, γ, θ, δ) =








exp(Xitβ j + Zit−1 ⊗ [1 AGE′it YEAR′it]γj + Zit−1URtθj + Dijt + Zi0α1j + Xiα2j + aij)
∑Jk=1 exp(Xitβk + Zit−1 ⊗ [1 AGE′it YEAR′it]γk + Zit−1URtθk + Dikt + Zi0α1k + Xiα2k + aik)
)I(j=jt)
(6.7)
where Mi is the last observation for individual i. We do not observe
the individual specific effects ai (= (ai2, ai3, ai4)). This term has to be
integrated out, such that the likelihood contribution becomes
Li(j1, ..., jM|X, Z, AGE, YEAR, UR, D, ai; α, β, γ, θ, δ) =∫ ∞
−∞
Li(j1, ..., jM|X, Z, AGE, YEAR, UR, D, ai; α, β, γ, θ, δ)dai
(6.8)
We evaluate the integral using Maximum Simulated Likelihood (for details,
see Gourieroux and Monfort 1993, Hajivassiliou and Ruud 1994). We apply
Halton draws instead of random draws, as they are found to give more
precise estimation results (Bhat 2001, Train 2000).
Due to our large dataset (164,620 men and 161,487 women) we are
unable to estimate our dynamic multinomial logit model with unobserved
heterogeneity for all observations at once. Hence, we draw a random
sample of individuals. To increase the efficiency of the estimated coeffi-
cients we estimate the model on two subsamples of the data, such that all
observations are used, and apply minimum distance (Chamberlain 1984),
where we restrict the estimates of the two subsamples to be the same.
This method is applicable to all kind of situations in which (complicated)
models have to be estimated with large data sets.
6.4 Data
6.4.1 Data and definitions
Data are from the Dutch Income Panel Study 1989-2009 (IPO, Inkomens
Panel Onderzoek, CBS 2009b), gathered by Statistics Netherlands. IPO
is an administrative dataset that contains a representative sample of the
Dutch population. About 95,000 individuals are selected, based on their
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national security number, and followed over time. Detailed information is
available, most particularly from the tax office, on income, wealth, gender,
age, marital status, children, ethnicity, homeownership and labor market
status.
A major advantage of having administrative data is the number of
observations and the high level of representativeness. It is a well-known
fact that the rich and the poor are often underrepresented in surveys, but
also that self-employed individuals are often underrepresented. Another
advantage of IPO is that we have a long time span available (21 years)
and that we have no endogenous panel attrition, since panel attrition only
occurs as a result of emigration or death.
In this paper we select men and women between the ages of 50 and
63.21 To define labor market status we use an individuals’s main source
of income during a year of observation. We make one exception for self-
employment, namely, we also indicate someone to be self-employed when
the person has a negative profit (a loss) while income from wealth (rents
and dividends) is larger than any other component that year. This, for
example, allows us to take into account start-ups.22
The analysis also uses additional published data of Statistics Nether-
lands about the macroeconomic unemployment rate and the consumer
price index (CPI). The unemployment rate decreased from 6.9% in 1989 to
2.6% in 2009, with peaks in 1994 (7.5%) and 2004 (4.5%).
Descriptive analysis 6.4.2
Table 6.1 describes individual- and household characteristics. We distin-
guish individuals in the treatment and the control group, in the treatment
and control period. Men and women are analyzed separately, because
their retirement routes may be quite different. Within control and treat-
ment groups we do not find large differences over time in personal and
household characteristics. Only, the share of men and women with a
21Individuals of age 64 are excluded from the UI reform that we investigate. Becoming
unemployed at the age of 64 implies being exempted from search requirements.
22Income from self-employment denotes income from profit, freelancing or from being
a director/major shareholder.
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partner decreased about 10%-points between the control and the treatment
period for the control group.
Labor market statuses, on the other hand, changed substantially be-
tween the pre- and post-reform period. Paid-employment increased at the
expense of inactivity, especially among women in the treatment group.
This can be explained by cohort effects, as found by Euwals et al. (2011).
About 10% of the people are self-employed and only about 2-5% of these
people receive a substantial amount of labor income in addition to the
profit from their business (at least half of their profit). Furthermore, only
10 to 15% of the unemployed received a substantial amount of labor in-
come (at least half of their unemployment benefits). This reassures us that
that we do not have to worry about only using the main income source to
define labor market status.
Income from wealth offers some information about relative wealth
differences between individuals. Since labor market status influences
wealth (e.g. wealth may decline in a period of unemployment), we use
initial wealth in our analysis. We find that young cohorts receive a higher
income from financial wealth than old cohorts and that homeownership
has increased among younger cohorts. On the other hand, also mortgages
have increased (probably largely due to tax incentives and eased loan
restrictions). Also, younger cohorts tend to receive a slightly higher share
of their income from wealth from risky assets such as stocks and bonds.
Especially in the treatment period.
Transition matrices in tables 6.2 and 6.3 present labor market transi-
tions. The diagonals of table 6.2 show that year to year transitions out of
paid-employment, self-employment and inactivity diminished between the
control and treatment period. In contrast, yearly transitions out of unem-
ployment increased between the control and treatment period (10% in the
treatment group and 17% in the control group). People who leave unem-
ployment move into paid-employment, self-employment and inactivity. In
the treatment group transitions from unemployment to self-employment
increased from 0.49% to 1.25%. This may be due to the introduction
of job search requirements, however, also in the control group we find
an increase (from 1.88% to 3.97%). Transitions from unemployment to
paid-employment increased from 1.80% to 4.69% in the treatment group
Section 6.4 Data 201
Table 6.1: Descriptive statisticsa
1989-2003 (control period) 2004-2009 (treatment period)
Age 50-57 Age 58-63 Age 50-57 Age 58-63
(Control group) (Treatment group) (Control group) (Treatment group)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Men
Personal and household characteristics
Age 53.34 2.28 60.41 1.71 53.48 2.30 60.38 1.69
Birth year 1943 4.83 1936 4.70 1953 2.88 1946 2.28
Immigrant 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27
Partner 0.87 0.34 0.96 0.19 0.77 0.42 0.93 0.25
Children 0.17 0.38 0.05 0.22 0.23 0.42 0.05 0.22
Number of childrenb 1.53 0.87 1.57 0.89 1.55 0.76 1.51 0.79
Age youngest childb 12.48 4.51 10.73 5.58 12.45 4.28 11.44 5.32
Labor market status
Paid-employment (PE) 0.65 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.42 0.49
Self-employment (SE) 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.30
Unemployment (UI) 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19
Inactive (IA) 0.21 0.41 0.57 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.44 0.50
Partial paid-employment
SE and PEc 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14
UI and PEd 0.11 0.32 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.25
Financial variables (expressed in 2010 euro’s using the CPI)
Income financial wealth (t=0)e 636.83 12341.01 562.77 4711.88 1034.79 14542.46 720.33 14974.99
Homeowner (t=0) 0.57 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.67 0.47 0.63 0.48
Income housing wealth (t=0)f -457.32 4678.91 341.83 3711.48 -2037.59 5190.78 -770.87 5237.12
Mortgage (t=0)g 66.14 133.67 36.01 82.34 134.01 244.75 73.02 120.75
Risky assets (t=0)h 1.45 61.82 1.45 64.16 3.50 111.22 1.59 42.30
Observations 69,916 39,928 31,951 22,825
Women
Personal and household characteristics
Age 53.35 2.28 60.43 1.71 53.46 2.31 60.38 1.69
Birth year 1943 4.82 1936 4.72 1953 2.93 1946 2.28
Immigrant 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.26
Partner 0.93 0.25 0.99 0.11 0.82 0.38 0.97 0.16
Children 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.34 0.02 0.13
Number of childrenb 1.39 0.79 1.61 0.94 1.35 0.64 1.57 0.81
Age youngest childb 13.35 4.26 8.74 6.28 13.63 3.77 9.03 6.49
Labor market status
Paid-employment (PE) 0.33 0.47 0.12 0.32 0.53 0.50 0.23 0.42
Self-employment (SE) 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26
Unemployment (UI) 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14
Inactive (IA) 0.58 0.49 0.83 0.37 0.36 0.48 0.67 0.47
Partial paid-employment
SE and PEc 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17
UI and PEd 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.36 0.05 0.23
Financial variables (expressed in 2010 euro’s using the CPI)
Income financial wealth (t=0)e 971.19 20363.13 833.57 4525.06 1477.91 25362.00 1270.65 28053.39
Homeowner (t=0) 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.59 0.49
Income housing wealth (t=0)f -165.83 4536.95 489.45 3415.68 -1536.87 5348.39 -394.90 5086.26
Mortgage (t=0)g 55.09 119.75 29.30 64.23 118.09 392.71 61.26 135.57
Risky assets (t=0)h 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20 102.92 0.00 0.00
Observations 67,716 40,551 31,095 22,116
a Only 5% of the men and 3% of the women aged between 58 and 63 years between 2004-2009 are in a transitory arrangement (e.g.
persons aged 62+ who received UI benefits for at least a year in 2004).
b Conditional on having at least one child.
c Partial SE shows the percentage of individuals whose main source of income is profit from business, but who also receive a
substantial amount of labor income (at least half of profit from business).
d Partial UI shows the percentage of individuals whose main source of income are unemployment benefits, but who also receive
a substantial amount of labor income (at least half of the unemployment benefits).
e Income from financial wealth is the sum of interest and dividends, minus interest payments for debts other than mortgage debt
at the household level.
f Income from housing wealth is the imputed rent minus the interest payments from mortgages at the household level.
g Mortgage shows the mortgage interest payments divided by the rental value of the house at the household level (this information
gives some idea about the loan to value).
h Risky assets shows the percentage of income from total wealth that is generated by stocks and bonds at the household level.
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and from 15.99% to 26.84% in the control group. Among the individuals
active in the labor market, self-employment is higher in the treatment than
the control group. This may be due to necessity reasons (it is generally
more difficult for older men to find a job), but also preferences may play
a role (gradual retirement through self-employment). Transitions from
paid-employment to self-employment do not change very much but we
do observe a decline in the share of employed people moving to unem-
ployment, especially in the treatment group, who were confronted with
the search requirements of the 2004 UI reform. For treated men we find
that transitions from paid-employment to unemployment declined from
2.49% to 1.41%, compared to a decline only from 1.29% to 1.18% in the
control group.
Similar patterns emerge for women. The major difference compared to
men is that relatively more women are inactive. Transitions in tables 6.2
and 6.3 are not conditional on observed and unobserved characteristics.
Therefore, information on state dependence may be spurious. In the
following section we take into account background characteristics and
unobserved heterogeneity.
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Results 6.5
Estimation results 6.5.1
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the estimation results of our baseline model for
men and women, respectively.23 The results provide evidence of self-
employment out of necessity among older workers. First, after controlling
for individual- and household characteristics as well as unobserved hetero-
geneity, the results show that between the ages of 54 and 63 unemployed
individuals are significantly more likely to enter self-employment than
paid-employed individuals and this increases with age (necessity hypoth-
esis I at the end of the table). This is in line with Zissimopoulos and
Karoly (2009) who show that propensity of self-employment entry from
unemployment and disability relative to paid-employment increases with
age among older workers. Second, γ4 and γ8 in the self-employment
equation do not indicate that transitions from paid-employment to self-
employment increase with age, such as the opportunity hypothesis of
self-employment as a bridge to retirement would suggest. In fact, the
probability of flowing from paid-employment to self-employment even
decreases with age among men.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that inactive men of age 50-57 between 1999
and 2009 and inactive women of age 50-53 between 1999-2009 are more
likely to become self-employed than their unemployed counterparts (ne-
cessity hypothesis II). For women this only holds for the age group 50-53
between 1999 and 2003 (table 6.5). Table 6.6 shows that inactive men who
enter self-employment were often depending on income from disability,
wealth or the income of a spouse in the previous period while women were
often relying on the income of a partner. Furthermore, individuals flowing
from disability, early retirement, or social assistance to self-employment
had a relatively low income, compared to all people in the same labor
market status. This may indicate the necessity of self-employment. Only
men for whom income from wealth is the main income source are becom-
ing self-employed more often when they have a relatively large income,
23In our estimation procedure we use 50 Halton draws. The baseline results are robust
for 100 and 200 Halton draws.
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suggesting that not all flows from inactivity to self-employment are driven
by necessity.
With regard to the macroeconomic unemployment rate, the results for
men show that a higher unemployment rate not only leads to more transi-
tions from paid-employment to unemployment, but also to relatively more
transitions from paid-employment to self-employment. This suggests that
self-employment is not only chosen to end a spell of unemployment but
also as a way of avoiding unemployment, consistent with the recession
push hypothesis found in Benedict and Hakobyan (2008), Kim and Cho
(2009), and Congregado et al. (2012). For women, on the other hand, we
find that a higher unemployment rate reduces the probability of flowing
from paid-employment to self-employment which is consistent with the
prosperity pull hypothesis found by Carrasco (1999). The difference between
men and women can be explained by the fact that men are more often
the main income earner of a household. A higher unemployment rate
does not lead to significantly more or less transitions from unemployment
or inactivity to self-employment.24 As expected, people in unemploy-
ment are significantly more likely to stay in unemployment when the
unemployment rate is high.
In line with Lammers et al. (2013) and Hullegie and Van Ours (2013)
the results show that job search requirements for unemployed individuals
between the ages of 58 and 63 have increased transitions out of unem-
ployment (δ2 in the unemployment equation of tables 6.4 and 6.5). Our
results show that the introduction of search requirements did not increase
transitions from paid employment or unemployment to self-employment,
relative to paid employment. Apparently, individuals that are confronted
with search requirements are (at least partly) able to find a job. For women
we find a significantly negative treatment effect for transitions between
unemployment and inactivity. This means that as a result of the treatment,
the growth in transitions between unemployment and paid employment
is significantly higher than for transitions between unemployment and
inactivity. Finally, necessity-hypothesis III in tables 6.4 and 6.5 shows that
after the treatment individuals entering self-employment between the ages
24The sum of θ1 and θ3 and the sum of θ1 and θ4 are not significantly different from
zero in the self-employment equation.
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of 58 and 63 are still significantly more often coming from unemployment
than from paid-employment.
In addition to previous research, our approach does not only allow
us to investigate the effect of job search requirements on the outflow
from unemployment, but also to investigate the effect on the inflow to
unemployment. δ1 in the unemployment equation of tables 6.4 and 6.5
show that the introduction of job search requirements significantly reduced
transitions from paid-employment to unemployment. For women we find
a significantly weak positive effect of the treatment on transitions from
paid employment to inactivity, suggesting substitution effect between
unemployment and inactivity as retirement routes.
The lower parts of tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the variances and covariances
of the random effects. We allow for flexible correlated random effects
that take into account, for example, unobserved differences in education
and ambition. When we would not take into account these effect, we
would find a higher state dependence (spurious versus true state depen-
dence). The estimates show that the random effect for self-employment
plays a significant role and is more important than the idiosyncratic error
term (which has a variance of π2/6, by normalization). This means that,
compared to paid-employment, time invariant unobserved characteristics
play a substantial role in the choice for self-employment. The random
effect for unemployment is only significant for women and the random
effect for inactivity is significant for both men and women. These random
effects are less important than the idiosyncratic error term. The covari-
ances of the random effects for self-employment and unemployment are
significantly positive, meaning that unobserved characteristics that are
related with a high probability of self-employment are also related with a
high probability of unemployment. The covariance of the random effect
for self-employment and inactivity is positive for men and negative for
women. This difference between genders may be explained by the fact
that for women inactivity often means having no personal income (relying
on the income of a spouse), whereas for men inactivity often means early
retirement or disability. Finally, for women we find a significantly positive
covariance between unemployment and inactivity. This is reasonable as
both states imply non-participation. The significance of the covariances
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show us that it is important to model self-employment, unemployment
and inactivity simultaneously.
In table 6.7 we extend the baseline model with financial variables
and health status in the initial state. We use the initial state since, for
example, wealth may decline when people become unemployed or inactive
or when people start their own business (endogeneity). Also, liquidity
constraints may be important for transitions to self-employment. Panel
A shows that homeownership and financial wealth are associated with
a higher probability of entering self-employment for men. For women,
only homeownership is associated with a higher probability to enter
self-employment. It is interesting to see that mortgages are negatively
associated with inactivity. The financial variables are endogenous, e.g. risk
loving individuals may hold more risky assets and may be more likely to
be self-employed. The treatment effects, however, hardly change with the
inclusion of financial variables.
Health, measured by receiving disability benefits in the first period
of observation, is negatively associated with self-employment and posi-
tively associated with unemployment and inactivity, compared to paid-
employment (panel B in table 6.7). This is in line with Parker and Rougier
(2007), who show that a poor health status decreases the probability of
self-employment entry relative to retirement entry among older persons.
Results of Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007), however, indicate that limit-
ing health conditions increase the probability of self-employment entry
from paid-employment among older persons.
6.5.2 Robustness checks
This section presents three types of robustness checks, 1) two placebo tests
to verify the common trends assumption, 2) robustness checks with regard
to the time span of the sample around the treatment, and 3) a robustness
check that ensures us to measure the effects of the introduction of job
search requirements and not the abolition of extended benefits.
In the first placebo test we estimate the treatment effects for people of
age 56-57, just prior to the group that actually received the treatment. In
the second placebo test we estimate the treatment effects for the period
Section 6.5 Results 209
Table 6.4: Estimation results baseline modela (men)
Self-employment Unemployment Inactivity
Effects relative to paid-employment Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Mobility
γ1 SEt−1 3.40*** 0.40 2.68*** 0.36
γ2 UIt−1 2.66** 1.06 2.51*** 0.43 2.60*** 0.47
γ3 IAt−1 2.77*** 0.45 4.93*** 0.24
Age groups
γ4 PEt−1 ·Age 54-57 -0.18* 0.10 0.07 0.08 -0.38*** 0.06
γ5 SEt−1 ·Age 54-57 -0.07 0.11 -0.19 0.12
γ6 UIt−1 ·Age 54-57 0.58 0.37 1.70*** 0.15 0.21 0.17
γ7 IAt−1 ·Age 54-57 0.49*** 0.14 0.01 0.08
γ8 PEt−1 ·Age 58-63 -0.40** 0.16 0.81*** 0.11 0.55*** 0.07
γ9 SEt−1 ·Age 58-63 -0.19 0.14 -0.24* 0.13
γ10 UIt−1 ·Age 58-63 1.44*** 0.45 3.94*** 0.21 0.92*** 0.22
γ11 IAt−1 ·Age 58-63 0.17 0.16 0.17* 0.09
Time periods
γ12 PEt−1 ·Year 94-98 -0.28** 0.13 -0.63*** 0.09 0.49*** 0.06
γ13 SEt−1 ·Year 94-98 0.85*** 0.14 1.66*** 0.15
γ14 UIt−1 ·Year 94-98 0.31 0.59 -0.07 0.22 0.91*** 0.25
γ15 IAt−1 ·Year 94-98 0.52*** 0.16 1.40*** 0.09
γ16 PEt−1 ·Year 99-03 -0.22 0.19 -1.05*** 0.12 1.20*** 0.09
γ17 SEt−1 ·Year 99-03 0.72*** 0.20 2.05*** 0.21
γ18 UIt−1 ·Year 99-03 -1.07 0.80 0.10 0.29 1.56*** 0.32
γ19 IAt−1 ·Year 99-03 0.51** 0.24 1.73*** 0.14
γ20 PEt−1 ·Year 04-09 -0.22 0.22 -0.90*** 0.15 2.26*** 0.12
γ21 SEt−1 ·Year 04-09 1.36*** 0.22 3.42*** 0.22
γ22 UIt−1 ·Year 04-09 0.06 0.71 -0.24 0.29 2.36*** 0.31
γ23 IAt−1 ·Year 04-09 0.91*** 0.25 3.27*** 0.15
Unemployment rate (UR)
θ1 UR 0.09** 0.04 0.10*** 0.03 -0.10*** 0.02
θ2 SEt−1 ·UR -0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.06
θ3 UIt−1 ·UR -0.25* 0.15 0.18*** 0.06 0.01 0.07
θ4 IAt−1 ·UR -0.17** 0.07 -0.11*** 0.04
Treatment
δ1 PEt−1 · treatment 0.09 0.20 -0.50*** 0.14 0.08 0.08
δ2 UIt−1 · treatment -0.62 0.57 -0.81*** 0.25 -0.17 0.28
Personal and household characteristics
β1 Birth year 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.14*** 0.01
β2 Immigrant -0.45*** 0.12 0.28*** 0.07 -0.08 0.05
β3 Partner -0.06 0.09 0.30*** 0.09 0.20*** 0.05
β4 Number of children 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.14*** 0.03
β5 Age youngest child 0.00 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.00







Age 50-53 Age 54-57 Age 58-63
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 89-93 1.90b *** 0.72 2.67c *** 0.73 3.74*** 0.73
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 94-98 2.49d*** 0.56 3.25*** 0.57 4.33*** 0.58
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 99-03 1.05** 0.48 1.81*** 0.50 2.89*** 0.50
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 04-09 2.18*** 0.33 2.95*** 0.34 4.02*** 0.46
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 89-93 -0.37e 0.73 -0.27f 0.74 0.90 0.74
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 94-98 -0.59g 0.58 -0.49 0.59 0.69 0.59
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 99-03 -1.95*** 0.49 -1.86*** 0.50 -0.68 0.50
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 04-09 -1.22*** 0.34 -1.12*** 0.35 0.06 0.45
Necessity-hypothesis III: year 04-09 - - - - 3.32*** 0.41
a * Significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. The log-likelihood of the estimations on
the subsample and the complement are -27,215.74 and -22,063.05 respectively providing an LR χ2 of 1,094.63
and 892.83. Initial conditions corrections are included in the estimation. Necessity hypothesis I tests
whether unemployed individuals have a higher probability to enter SE than paid-employed individuals.
Necessity hypothesis II tests whether unemployed individuals have a higher probability to enter SE than
inactive individuals. Hypothesis III is the same as hypothesis I, but with the treatment. In the hypotheses
we assume an unemployment rate of 3%.
b H0 : γ2 + 3× θ3 = 0
c H0 : γ2 + (γ6 − γ4) + 3× θ3 = 0
d H0 : γ2 + (γ14 − γ12) + 3× θ3 = 0
e H0 : (γ2 − γ3) + 3× (θ3 − θ4) = 0
f H0 : (γ2 − γ3) + (γ6 − γ7) + 3× (θ3 − θ4) = 0
g H0 : (γ2 − γ3) + (γ14 − γ15) + 3× (θ3 − θ4) = 0
h H0 : γ2 + (γ10 − γ8) + (γ22 − γ20) + 3× θ3 + (δ2 − δ1) = 0
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Table 6.5: Estimation results baseline modela (women)
Self-employment Unemployment Inactivity
Effects relative to paid-employment Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Mobility
γ1 SEt−1 3.47*** 0.44 2.69*** 0.42
γ2 UIt−1 1.20 1.23 1.44*** 0.50 0.63 0.57
γ3 IAt−1 1.01** 0.40 3.81*** 0.22
Age groups
γ4 PEt−1 ·Age 54-57 -0.35*** 0.11 0.06 0.10 -0.32*** 0.06
γ5 SEt−1 ·Age 54-57 -0.21* 0.12 -0.22 0.14
γ6 UIt−1 ·Age 54-57 1.08*** 0.40 1.13*** 0.17 0.45** 0.19
γ7 IAt−1 ·Age 54-57 0.23** 0.11 -0.07 0.07
γ8 PEt−1 ·Age 58-63 -0.18 0.17 0.89*** 0.16 0.42*** 0.08
γ9 SEt−1 ·Age 58-63 -0.09 0.16 0.13 0.16
γ10 UIt−1 ·Age 58-63 1.53*** 0.55 3.30*** 0.26 1.37*** 0.27
γ11 IAt−1 ·Age 58-63 0.46*** 0.15 0.35*** 0.09
Time periods
γ12 PEt−1 ·Year 94-98 0.65*** 0.15 -0.74*** 0.11 0.53*** 0.08
γ13 SEt−1 ·Year 94-98 1.25*** 0.19 0.99*** 0.20
γ14 UIt−1 ·Year 94-98 0.86 0.68 -0.09 0.25 1.87*** 0.30
γ15 IAt−1 ·Year 94-98 0.87*** 0.14 1.05*** 0.09
γ16 PEt−1 ·Year 99-03 -0.06 0.21 -1.41*** 0.14 0.88*** 0.11
γ17 SEt−1 ·Year 99-03 0.62** 0.24 0.94*** 0.27
γ18 UIt−1 ·Year 99-03 0.23 0.87 0.14 0.33 2.06*** 0.40
γ19 IAt−1 ·Year 99-03 0.70*** 0.21 1.42*** 0.12
γ20 PEt−1 ·Year 04-09 0.34 0.23 -1.17*** 0.17 1.43*** 0.13
γ21 SEt−1 ·Year 04-09 1.63*** 0.26 1.88*** 0.27
γ22 UIt−1 ·Year 04-09 1.58* 0.83 0.54 0.35 3.53*** 0.39
γ23 IAt−1 ·Year 04-09 1.49*** 0.23 2.52*** 0.14
Unemployment rate (UR)
θ1 UR -0.09* 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.12*** 0.02
θ2 SEt−1 ·UR -0.07 0.07 -0.17** 0.07
θ3 UIt−1 ·UR -0.14 0.18 0.35*** 0.08 0.08 0.09
θ4 IAt−1 ·UR 0.06 0.06 0.07** 0.03
Treatment
δ1 PEt−1 · Treatment -0.02 0.20 -0.80*** 0.19 0.18* 0.09
δ2 UIt−1 · Treatment -1.02 0.69 -1.19*** 0.32 -0.91*** 0.35
Personal and household characteristics
β1 Birth year 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.14*** 0.01
β2 Immigrant -0.32*** 0.12 0.32*** 0.10 0.04 0.06
β3 Partner 0.00 0.10 0.40*** 0.14 0.34*** 0.07
β4 Number of children 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.06
β5 Age youngest child 0.00 0.01 -0.04** 0.02 -0.01* 0.01







Age 50-53 Age 54-57 Age 58-63
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 89-93 0.77b 0.82 2.20c *** 0.81 2.49*** 0.89
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 94-98 0.99d 0.64 2.41*** 0.64 2.70*** 0.73
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 99-03 1.07** 0.45 2.49*** 0.43 2.78*** 0.50
Necessity-hypothesis I: year 04-09 2.02*** 0.40 3.45*** 0.35 3.73*** 0.55
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 89-93 -0.41e 0.82 0.44f 0.81 0.66 0.89
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 94-98 -0.42g 0.65 0.43 0.64 0.65 0.73
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 99-03 -0.88* 0.45 -0.03 0.43 0.19 0.50
Necessity-hypothesis II: year 04-09 -0.32 0.40 0.53 0.35 0.76 0.54
Necessity-hypothesis III: year 04-09 - - - - 2.74*** 0.47
a * Significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. The log-likelihood of the estimations
on the subsample and the complement are -23,215.31 and -20,049.67 respectively providing an LR χ2 of
1,008.45 and 756.42. Initial conditions corrections are included in the estimation. Necessity hypothesis
I tests whether unemployed individuals have a higher probability to enter SE than paid-employed indi-
viduals. Necessity hypothesis II tests whether unemployed individuals have a higher probability to enter
SE than inactive individuals. Hypothesis III is the same as hypothesis I, but with the treatment. In the
hypotheses we assume an unemployment rate of 3%.
b H0 : γ2 + 3× θ3 = 0
c H0 : γ2 + (γ6 − γ4) + 3× θ3 = 0
d H0 : γ2 + (γ14 − γ12) + 3× θ3 = 0
e H0 : (γ2 − γ3) + 3× (θ3 − θ4) = 0
f H0 : (γ2 − γ3) + (γ6 − γ7) + 3× (θ3 − θ4) = 0
g H0 : (γ2 − γ3) + (γ14 − γ15) + 3× (θ3 − θ4) = 0
h H0 : γ2 + (γ10 − γ8) + (γ22 − γ20) + 3× θ3 + (δ2 − δ1) = 0
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Table 6.6: Main income source and income level for those moving
from inactivity to self-employment
Age 50-53 Age 54-57 Age 58-63
%a Median incomeb % Median income % Median income
Men SEt Allt SEt Allt SEt Allt
Disabilityt−1 18 18,645 22,006 27 19,616 22,452 26 17,863 23,082
Early retirementt−1 7 17,788 30,424 8 26,620 35,015 16 29,240 35,453
Social assistancet−1 17 6,423 13,670 5 3,199 13,462 5 8,1401 13,016
Wealtht−1 32 47,982 38,164 39 54,470 40,581 43 44,307 27,687
Income spouset−1 26 0 0 21 0 0 11 0 0
Women
Disabilityt−1 3 14,108 13,776 6 13,029 13,723 6 8,743 13,735
Early retirementt−1 5 14,085 21,426 3 11,846 21,340 16 10,144 19,672
Social assistancet−1 5 16,279 15,076 5 18,587 15,002 2 11,735 14,897
Wealtht−1 8 37,246 17,020 10 7,476 17,363 10 11,516 20,197
Income spouset−1 79 0 0 76 0 0 66 0 0
a % refers to the percentage of inactive persons in t− 1 who enter self-employment from a certain category.
b The table shows median personal total income in period t− 1 for those individuals moving from a certain inactivity category
to self-employment and for all individuals in that inactivity category in t− 1.
2002-2003, which is the period just before the period in which the reform
was actually introduced. The results in panel A of table 6.8 are reassuring
in that we do not find significant effects from the fake treatments on the
inflow and outflow from unemployment.
The robustness check in panel B of table 6.8 shows that also after re-
ducing the time window to the period 1999-2009, search requirements still
increase the outflow from unemployment for men and women. However,
the inflow to unemployment is no longer significantly affected by the
reform. Table 6.8 only shows the coefficients of the treatment effects. Con-
clusions with regard to mobility and the macroeconomic unemployment
rate do not change.
Using yearly data makes it hard to disentangle the effects of the job
search requirements introduced in January 2004 and the abolition of
extended benefits in August 2003. To ensure that our treatment effect
measures the effect of the introduction of search requirements we exploit
the fact that the abolition of the extended UI benefits did not change the
generosity of the UI system for single persons as mentioned in section 6.2.
This robustness check is also exploited by Lammers et al. (2013). We
ensure measuring treatment effects of job search requirements by adding
interaction terms with singles.
In this way we can test whether the treatment effects for single persons are
significantly different from the treatment effects estimated in the baseline
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Table 6.7: Estimation results extended modelsa
Self-employment Unemployment Inactivity
Effects relative to paid-employment Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Panel A. Financial variables
Menb
β6 Homeownert=0 0.23*** 0.07 -0.30*** 0.06 -0.08** 0.03
β7 Mortgaget=0/106 0.21 0.21 -0.03 0.27 -0.35** 0.18
β8 Financial wealtht=0/105 0.70*** 0.25 -0.40 0.66 -0.02 0.16
β9 Net housing wealtht=0/105 -0.14 0.48 0.09 0.84 0.38 0.36
β10 Risky assetst=0/103 0.43 0.47 0.06 0.37 -0.39* 0.20
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment 0.13 0.21 -0.53*** 0.14 0.08 0.08
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -0.52 0.59 -0.76*** 0.26 -0.12 0.28
Womenc
β6 Homeownert=0 0.42*** 0.07 -0.29** 0.07 0.00 0.05
β7 Mortgaget=0/106 0.18 0.30 -0.07 0.29 -0.56** 0.23
β8 Financial wealtht=0/105 0.26 0.25 -0.30 0.72 -0.01 0.20
β9 Net housing wealtht=0/104 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.06
β10 Risky assetst=0/102 0.18 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.15 0.19
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment 0.05 0.21 -0.86*** 0.20 0.16* 0.10
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -1.08 0.70 -1.27*** 0.33 -1.03*** 0.37
Panel B. Health
Mend
β6 Healtht=0 -0.42*** 0.09 0.71*** 0.07 0.75*** 0.04
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment 0.12 0.20 -0.50*** 0.14 0.10 0.08
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -0.62 0.57 -0.65*** 0.25 -0.02 0.28
Womene
β6 Healtht=0 -0.54*** 0.12 1.22*** 0.09 0.70*** 0.06
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment -0.02 0.20 -0.88*** 0.19 0.17* 0.09
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -1.05 0.69 -1.01*** 0.32 -0.78** 0.35
a * Significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level All regressions include the variables from the baseline regression.
b Financial variables are jointly significant with χ2(15) = 95.87 and p− value = 0.000. The log-likelihood of the estimations on the subsample and the
complement are -24,793.58 and -22,030.97 respectively providing an LR χ2 of 980.40 and 901.99.
c Financial variables are jointly significant with χ2(15) = 99.08 and p− value = 0.000. The log-likelihood of the estimations on the subsample and the
complement are -19,339.93 and -20,029.29 respectively providing an LR χ2 of 889.92 and 767.43.
d Healtht=0 equals 1 if a person received disability benefits in the initial period observed and 0 otherwise. The log-likelihood of the estimations on the
subsample and the complement are -27,076.24 and -21,939.01 respectively providing an LR χ2 of 1,056.45 and 866.57.
e Healtht=0 equals 1 if a person received disability benefits in the initial period observed and 0 otherwise. The log-likelihood of the estimations on the
subsample and the complement are -23,100.08 and -19,991.02 respectively providing an LR χ2 of 993.69 and 743.59.
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regression. If the treatment effects are significantly different this is likely
to be a consequence of partially measuring the effects of the abolition of
the extended UI benefits among non-singles.
Panel C in table 6.8 indicates that δ1 and δ2 are highly comparable to
δ1 and δ2 from the baseline regression of males in table 6.4. ϑ1 and ϑ2 in
panel C are not significantly different from δ1 and δ2 which implies that
the treatment effects of singles are not different from the treatment effects
of non-singles. Stated differently, it is likely that δ1 and δ2 only capture
the effects of the introduced search requirements in 2004 among men.
Among women, the estimation results indicate that δ1 and δ2 are highly
comparable to δ1 and δ2 from the baseline regression of in table 6.5, ex-
cept that δ2 in the self-employment equation is now significantly negative
at the 0.10 level whereas this coefficient was only close to the 0.10 sig-
nificance level in the baseline regression, e.g. the search requirements
decreases the flow from unemployment to self-employment relative to
flows from unemployment to paid-employment. ϑ1 and ϑ2 in panel C
are not significantly different from zero among women, except the coeffi-
cient ϑ1 in the self-employment equation at the 0.05 level. This coefficient
shows that the treatment decreases the probability of flowing from paid-
employment to self-employment relative to staying in paid-employment
among single women.25 However, this does not affect our necessity-
hypotheses. Instead, the ‘pure’ effect of search requirements suggests that
more women remained in paid-employment relative to flowing from paid-
to self-employment. So, inducing extra obligtions in unemployment did
not make self-employment more attractive as a way to reduce active hours
spent. This interpretation is consistent with the results of the baseline
regression in table 6.5.
Finally, conclusions do not change when we test the robustness of
the results with regard to different model specifications, e.g. sensitivity
analyses of the age and time categories as well as the categories in the
multinomial dependent variable (not reported here).
Since the data set only contains yearly information, we do not observe
within-year transitions. For example, if someone’s main source of income
in year t− 1 was unemployment, but he also received a substantial amount
25H0 : δ1 + ϑ1 = 0 is rejected at the 0.10 level for the self-employment category.
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Table 6.8: Robustness checksa
Self-employment Unemployment Inactivity
Effects relative to paid-employment Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Panel A. Placebo tests
Men: placebo age 56-57
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.19 -0.08 0.13
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -0.39 0.96 0.28 0.33 0.17 0.38
Women: placebo age 56-57
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment -0.06 0.16 0.01 0.14 0.07 0.07
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -0.12 0.52 -0.04 0.25 0.13 0.29
Men: placebo year 2000-2003
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment -0.23 0.31 0.18 0.21 0.21** 0.09
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment 0.36 1.40 0.32 0.44 0.20 0.47
Women: placebo year 2000-2003
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment -0.11 0.24 0.34 0.21 0.18** 0.09
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -12.91 556.15 0.34 0.34 -0.04 0.40
Panel B. Smaller time window
Men
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment -0.02 0.32 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.11
δ2 UIt−1· Treatment -0.44 1.12 -0.70* 0.41 -0.43 0.43
Women
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.21 0.36*** 0.10
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -0.92 0.75 -0.79** 0.35 -0.47 0.39
Panel C. Single
Men
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment 0.07 0.21 -0.51*** 0.14 0.09 0.08
ϑ1 PEt−1· Treatment · Single 0.16 0.35 0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.11
δ2 UIt−1· Treatment -0.42 0.61 -0.67*** 0.27 -0.03 0.30
ϑ2 UIt−1· Treatment · Single -0.80 0.93 -0.52 0.35 -0.52 0.40
Women
δ1 PEt−1· Treatment 0.11 0.21 -0.87*** 0.21 0.21** 0.09
ϑ1 PEt−1· Treatment · Single -0.81** 0.37 0.27 0.26 -0.13 0.11
δ2 UIt−1·Treatment -1.37* 0.71 -1.43*** 0.34 -1.05*** 0.39
ϑ2 UIt−1·Treatment · Single -11.47 310.90 0.63 0.49 0.69 0.56
a * Significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. Results of the different robustness checks are estimated separately. All regressions
include the variables from the baseline regression including the initial conditions correction and correlated random effects parameters. Single is a binary
variable with a value of one for single individuals and zero otherwise.
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of labor income, than we indicate this person as unemployed in year t− 1.
Table 6.1 already showed that partial unemployment and partial self
employment are not very important. As a last robustness check we added
variables to the model indicating partial unemployment and partial self-
employment. Including these variables in the baseline specification does
not affect the conclusions (not reported here).
Simulation 6.5.3
To facilitate the interpretation of the estimation results in the baseline
model outlined above, we use the baseline estimates to simulate transition
probabilities for a reference individual with specific values assigned to the
covariates. Here, we take as a reference a native male and female with
a partner, without children in the same household, and of age 60 in the
year 2006.26 For the initial labor market status we take the average of
the sample and the random effects are set to zero. First we present the
simulation results without the treatment effect, after that we show how the
transition rates would change when the treatment is taken into account.
Standard errors are based on a parametric bootstrap over the asymptotic
distribution of our estimates.
When we compare the simulation results in table 6.9 with transition
rates in the right bottom of tables 6.2 and 6.3 we find that state dependence
is far less important when observed and unobserved heterogeneity are
taken into account, especially for the self-employed. This is in line with the
relatively high variance of the random effect for self-employment found in
tables 6.4 and 6.5. Although the probabilities to enter self-employment are
low, this probability is higher for individuals in unemployment than for
individuals in paid employment or inactivity.
The last two rows of table 6.9 present the treatment effects. Job search
requirements between the ages of 58 and 63 reduced the probability to
stay in unemployment for men significantly with 15% (12%-points) and
for women insignificantly with 19% (7%-points). These individuals now
move to paid employment and inactivity. Because of the reform the
26The unemployment rate in 2006 was 3.6%
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probability for men to move from unemployment to paid employment
increased significantly with 93% (from 2.14% to 4.14%) and the probability
to move from unemployment to inactivity increased significantly with
63% (from 15.61% to 25.45%). For women the probability to move from
unemployment to paid employment increased significantly with 165%
(from 1.19% to 1.96%) and the probability to move from unemployment to
inactivity increased significantly with 8% (from 61.59% to 66.40%).27 In fact,
it seems that the mandatory search requirements increased the probability
of finding a paid job at older ages while decreasing the probability of
using unemployment as an early retirement route. Similar effects have
been found by Lammers et al. (2013) who focus on substitution effects
between unemployment and disability in specific. We find that most
treated individuals moving from unemployment to inactivity enter early
retirement (almost 60% for both men and women). About 27% of the
treated men and 17% of the women enter disability, and the remaining
13% (men) and 23% (women) enter social assistance or become dependent
on income from wealth or a partner. Self-employment (out of necessity)
did not increase because of the reform.
Our analysis also allows us to study the effect of job search require-
ments on the inflow to unemployment. Job search requirements reduced
the probability to enter unemployment significantly with about 40% for
men (from 2.77% to 1.65%) and about 59% for women (from 1.71% to
0.70%). Mandatory job search requirements, however, did not induce more
people to stay in paid-employment. Substitution effects towards other
exit routes are mainly observed, suggesting that these options are still
more attractive than using self-employment as an opportunity to reduce
working hours. The still relatively generous early retirement and social
insurance schemes may also explain the minor importance of for example
bridge-jobs, which are often found among elderly in the US.
27The relative increase of paid employment is higher than the relative increase of
inactivity, as was already suggested by the significantly negative coefficient δ2 in the
inactivity equation of table 6.5.
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Table 6.9: Simulation resultsab
Men Women
Year t
Year t− 1 PE SE UI IA PE SE UI IA
PE 73.13 0.19 2.77 23.90 48.86 1.09 1.71 48.34
(1.41) (0.03) (0.34) (1.44) (2.37) (0.19) (0.32) (2.43)
SE 12.67 4.58 0.52 82.23 7.94 17.34 0.36 74.36
(1.34) (0.57) (0.07) (1.57) (1.01) (1.84) (0.06) (2.14)
UI 2.14 0.29 81.95 15.61 1.19 1.12 36.10 61.59
(0.75) (0.12) (1.97) (1.88) (0.32) (0.59) (5.55) (5.61)
IA 1.75 0.22 0.07 97.95 0.63 0.28 0.03 99.06
(0.12) (0.03) (0.00) (0.13) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.06)
Treatment effects
PE -0.61 0.01 -1.12 1.72 -3.86 -0.11 -1.01 4.97
(2.01) (0.04) (0.35) (1.42) (2.18) (0.21) (0.29) (2.24)
UI 2.00 0.00 -11.85 9.84 1.96 -0.08 -6.70 4.81
(0.75) (0.16) (2.83) (2.73) (0.71) (0.71) (5.11) (5.34)
a This table presents a simulated transition matrix for a reference individual, which is a native male or female with a partner, without
children in the same household, and of age 60 in the year 2006.
b Standard errors in parentheses (1500 bootstrap replications).
Discussion 6.6
A few points remain for discussion. An explanation why unemployed
individuals have a higher probability to enter self-employment than paid-
employed individuals may be that part-time employment is widely avail-
able in the Netherlands and is an effective way to reduce working hours
for those in paid-employment.28
Another explanation for necessity reasons outweighing opportunity
reasons may be that moving from paid-employment to self-employment
can have a negative effect on occupational pension accumulation. Since oc-
cupational pensions are generally not accumulated during unemployment,
pension accumulation considerations are far less important for transi-
tion from unemployment to self-employment. Zissimopoulos and Karoly
(2007) find that having access to pension coverage in paid-employment
reduces the probability to enter self-employment. Moore and Mueller
(2002), on the other hand, find no effects of pensions in paid-employment
on self-employment entry.
28Emmanoulidi and Kyriazidou (2012) indeed find that in Britain part-time paid
employment is more often used as an exit from paid employment than self-employment.
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A final point of discussion is the absence of education and health
shocks in the analysis. The unobserved heterogeneity term corrects for
unobserved differences in education levels, but is unable to correct for
health shocks. Zucchelli et al. (2012) show that ill-health and health shocks
do not increase the probability of using self-employment as retirement
mechanism, however. Instead, health seems to be an important deter-
minant for retiring early. Therefore, including health indicators in the
analysis will likely be relevant for transitions to and from inactivity, but
probably does not affect our conclusions about the nature of choosing
self-employment as an exit route to retirement. All the more because in
the Netherlands those who are in bad health are selected into disability
insurance, which is financially more attractive than unemployment insur-
ance or early retirement schemes (De Vos et al. 2012) and probably usually
also more attractive than starting an own business.
For future research it would be interesting to investigate how income
develops when people make a transition from paid-employment or unem-
ployment to self-employment or inactivity. Substantial tax advantages of
self-employment (beyond the scope of this paper) are also relevant in this
context.
6.7 Conclusion
This paper examines whether individuals at the end of working life choose
self-employment out of necessity and to what degree the introduction of
search requirements for unemployment benefits induce people to become
self-employed. For this purpose we model transitions between labor
market states for people at older ages using a dynamic multinomial logit
model with unobserved heterogeneity.
Our empirical specification allows us to measure the role of necessity-
driven factors by analyzing the labor market position of people that
enter self-employment and, from a macroeconomic perspective, how the
unemployment rate affects inflow into self-employment. The effects of
search requirements are examined using a Dutch UI reform in 2004, that
introduced search requirements for people older than 57.5 years.
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The main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. After
correcting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, unemployed and
inactive individuals have a higher probability to enter self-employment
at the end of working life than those in paid-employment. Furthermore,
mobility from paid-employment to self-employment is relatively low and
does not increase with age (as would be the case when self-employment
would be chosen out of opportunity to reduce working hours at the end
of working life). This indicates that at older ages necessity reasons are
important to become self-employed. Moreover, the unemployment rate has
a positive effect on transitions from paid-employment to self-employment
among men. This is in line with the recession push hypothesis, which
suggests that men in paid-employment become self-employed at older
ages in order to avoid a period of unemployment. For women, on the
other hand, we find a negative effect of the unemployment rate on tran-
sitions from paid-employment to self-employment, which is consistent
with the prosperity pull hypothesis (e.g. they are more likely to start
self-employment when the unemployment rate is low). For inactive men
and women the prosperity pull hypothesis also holds. At lower ages,
self-employment entry is most likely from inactivity. In the highest age-
category, self-employment entry from unemployment and inactivity are
not significantly different, suggesting that transitions from unemployment
to self-employment become increasingly important over age.
The introduction of job search requirements at the end of working life
have stimulated people to exit unemployment and discouraged people to
enter unemployment. The reform, however, did not increase necessity or
opportunity driven self-employment. Individuals that are confronted with
search requirements are partly able to find a job, but there are also large
substitution effects between unemployment and inactivity (mostly early
retirement) which suggests that these options are still more attractive than
using self-employment as a retirement mechanism.
Taken together, our findings suggest that at the end of working life
individuals with a relatively weak labor market position are more likely
to switch to self-employment. The results do not suggest that self-
employment is used as a gradual retirement route. Job search requirements
in UI increase the outflow from unemployment and decrease the inflow to
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unemployment, but do not increase self-employment out of necessity or
opportunity.
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Pensioenen, Pensionering, en de Financiële Positie van Ouderen
Dit proefschrift is een bundeling van vijf studies met betrekking tot pen-
sioenen, pensionering en de financiële positie van ouderen, met als doel bij te
dragen aan onze kennis van daadwerkelijke pensioenopbouw, pensione-
ringsgedrag en de financiële positie gedurende pensionering.
Langetermijnontwikkelingen, zoals het verouderen van de bevolking,
de toename in de gemiddelde levensverwachting en de gevolgen van de
recente financiële crisis, hebben bijgedragen aan de discussie rondom de
houdbaarheid van het pensioenstelsel. De veroudering van de bevolking
zorgt voor een toename van het aantal gepensioneerden ten opzichte
van het aantal niet-gepensioneerden en daarmee voor een toenemende
belasting- en premiedruk op de beroepsbevolking. Deze druk wordt
versterkt door de lage geboortecijfers. De toename van de gemiddelde
levensverwachting zorgt er voor dat gepensioneerden gemiddeld genomen
langer pensioenuitkeringen ontvangen. De recente financiële crisis heeft
een grote negatieve invloed gehad op de kapitaalreserves van pensioen-
fondsen, met kortingen op pensioenuitkeringen tot gevolg. De huidige
pensioenstelsels lijken onvoldoende voorbereid te zijn voor deze langeter-
mijnontwikkelingen en korte termijn volatiliteit.
Veel OECD-landen hebben hervormingen in de pensioensystemen voor-
gesteld en geïmplementeerd om zodoende de pensioensystemen houdbaar
te maken voor eerdergenoemde ontwikkelingen. Veel van deze hervor-
mingen hebben betrekking op het verhogen van de effectieve en officiële
pensioenleeftijd, het verlagen van de pensioenuitkeringen en het verhogen
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van de pensioenbijdragen. De verhoging van de pensioenleeftijd heeft als
doel de periode waarin men pensioenuitkeringen ontvangt te verkleinen
en de periode waarin men bijdraagt aan de pensioenopbouw te vergroten.
De meest in het oog springende hervormingen ter verhoging van de ef-
fectieve pensioenleeftijd betreffen het minder aantrekkelijk of beschikbaar
maken van vervroegde uittreedroutes.
Deze hervormingen impliceren dat publieke- en private pensioenen
minder royaal zijn, met als gevolg dat er veel discussie is ontstaan omtrent
de financiële positie van huidige en toekomstige gepensioneerden. Dit
proefschrift heeft tot doel om de effecten van dergelijke ontwikkelingen
op pensioneringsgedrag en de toerekendheid van (toekomstige) pensioen
in kaart te brengen en beter te begrijpen.
Pensioensystemen zijn onderhevig aan padafhankelijkheid en langeter-
mijncontracten. Pensioenhervormingen, zoals de verhoging van de pen-
sioenleeftijd, zijn daarom veelal politiek controversieel en moeilijk te
implementeren. Als gevolg daarvan hebben veel landen pensioenen ge-
privatiseerd, wat zo veel wil zeggen als een verschuiving van het belang
van publieke pensioenen naar private pensioenen en van ‘defined benefit’
pensioenregelingen naar ‘defined contribution’ pensioenregelingen. Deze
verschuiving reduceert de druk van een vergrijzende samenleving op de
overheidsfinanciën, maar kan de inkomensongelijkheid onder ouderen
doen toenemen.
Hoofdstuk 2 analyseert in welke mate een verschuiving van publieke-
naar private pensioenen een grotere inkomensongelijkheid en hogere ar-
moede onder ouderen tot gevolg heeft. A priori is de verwachting dat een
verschuiving van publieke- naar private pensioenen een grotere inkomens-
ongelijkheid en armoede onder ouderen tot gevolg heeft, omdat private
socialezekerheidsarrangementen over het algemeen minder herverdelend
zijn dan publieke socialezekerheidsarrangementen. Een analyse van ma-
croeconomische data van 15 Europese landen voor de periode 1995-2007
bevestigt deze hypothese niet. Er is geen bewijs dat verschuivingen van
publieke- naar private pensioen gepaard gaan met een grotere inkomens-
ongelijkheid of armoede onder ouderen. Dit geldt voor een breed scala
aan methodologische benaderingen. De benadering in hoofdstuk 2 geeft
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enig inzicht in de gevolgen van verschuivingen binnen pensioensystemen
op het financiële welzijn van ouderen.
Om een beeld te krijgen van het financiële welzijn van ouderen ontwikkelt
Hoofdstuk 3 een integrale benadering om het totale beschikbare inkomen
te bezien tijdens pensionering, voor zowel huidige als voor toekomstige
gepensioneerden. Dit hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat deze integrale bena-
dering van belang is in de analyse van de toereikendheid van pensioenen,
omdat verschillende componenten mogelijkerwijs als substituten kunnen
fungeren. De benadering onderscheidt privévermogen naast het publieke-
en private pensioen. Privévermogen kan bestaan uit spaargeld, effecten,
een eigen bedrijf en de netto waarde van het eigen huis (woningwaarde
minus hypotheekschuld). Het niet meenemen van het privévermogen zou
leiden tot een onderschatting van het inkomen dat beschikbaar is tijdens
pensionering. Het privévermogen kan namelijk geconsumeerd gedurende
het pensioen.
Daarnaast laat het hoofdstuk zien dat het noodzakelijk is om de ana-
lyse van de toereikendheid van pensioen te baseren op microeconomische
data. Op deze manier illustreert de analyse de heterogeniteit in de daad-
werkelijke opbouw van pensioenen, gegeven de huidige regels omtrent
pensioenopbouw. De benadering in hoofdstuk 3 laat echter (ook) zien
dat zo’n 31% van alle huishoudens een bruto vervangingsratio heeft dat
minder is dan de 70%, een norm die in de internationale literatuur veelal
als voldoende toereikend wordt verondersteld. Een doorsnee huishou-
den heeft een bruto vervanginsratio van 83% en een gemiddeld totaal
beschikbaar pensioeninkomen van 33.000 euro (gestandaardiseerd). Het
publieke- en private pensioen draagt voor zo’n 75% bij aan het totaal
beschikbare inkomen gedurende het pensioen. Het huis draagt zo’n 10%
bij, waarbij aangenomen wordt dat het huis niet verkocht en opgegeten
wordt. Op basis van de analyse kan er gesteld worden dat er kwestbare
groepen zijn, waarvan het pensioen onvoldoende toereikend lijkt te zijn op
basis van bruto vervangingsratios en absolute niveaus van het beschikbare
pensioen gedefinieerd. Dit zijn zelfstandig ondernemers, alleenstaande
vrouwen, eerste-generatie immigranten en huishoudens waarin men een
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bijstandsuitkering, werkloosheidsuitkering of arbeidongeschiktheidsuitke-
ring ontvangt.
Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat zo’n 35% van het beschikbare inkomen tij-
dens pensionering afkomstig is van het werkgerelateerde pensioen. Dit
werkgerelateerde pensioen wordt opgebouwd over de levenscyclus en is
afhankelijk van het loon gedurende de levenscyclus. De relatie tussen loon
en pensioenopbouw is in andere landen, zoals Noorwegen, Frankrijk, het
VK en de VS ook aanwezig in het publieke pensioen. Daarmee bestaat er
een directe relatie tussen het loon dat men verdient gedurende de gehele
carrière en het pensioen dat beschikbaar is ten tijde van pensionering.
Inzicht in het loonprofiel over de levenscyclus is daarom belangrijk voor
de analyse van het pensioeninkomen. Loonprofielen spelen daarnaast
een centrale rol in levenscyclusmodellen van consumptie- en spaargedrag.
De conclusies van deze modellen hangen af van een correcte specificatie
van het loonprofiel. Echter, de meeste levenscyclusmodellen corrigeren
niet voor de mogelijke selectie-effecten in lonen terwijl lonen naar alle
waarschijnlijkheid niet aselect geobserveerd worden. Lonen worden na-
melijk alleen geobserveerd bij personen die werkzaam zijn in loondienst.
Personen die werken hebben mogelijk een ander potentieel loon dan per-
sonen die niet werken. Niet corrigeren voor deze selectie in lonen kan
de schattingen van loonprofielen beïnvloeden. Hoofdstuk 4 ontwikkelt
een nieuwe methode om te corrigeren voor dergelijke selectie-effecten
met paneldata. Deze nieuwe econometrische schatter corrigeert simultaan
voor participatiebeslissingen op de extensieve marge (keuze werk versus
niet-werk) en de intensieve marge (uren beslissing) waar andere schatters
slechts corrigeren voor participatiebeslissingen op de extensieve marge.
Het toevoegen van informatie omtrent part-time en full-time beslissingen
geeft extra informatie omtrent de niet-geobserveerde achtergrondkarakte-
ristieken die het loon kunnen beïnvloeden (bijvoorbeeld preferenties voor
werken, bekwaamheid en inspanning).
Het toepassen van de nieuwe schatter op Nederlandse data laat zien dat
het uitmaakt voor de resultaten of je deze extra informatie over participatie
op de intensieve marge meeneemt. Een verdere decompositie van het
loonprofiel naar part-time en full-time lonen en opleidingsniveau’s toont
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aan dat de grootte van de selectie-effecten kan verschillen tussen part-time
en full-time lonen en opleidingsniveau’s, maar dat selectie in zowel part-
time als full-time werk over het algemeen positief is. Het bestaan van
dergelijke selectie-effecten pleit voor het corrigeren voor selectie in lonen
in modellen die gebruik maken van het schatten van loonprofielen, zoals
het levenscyclusmodel.
Op basis van de empirische analyse in hoofdstuk 4 zijn er tevens
substantiële negatieve effecten van een carrièregat op het loon. Wanneer
mannen in totaal minimaal drie jaar niet gewerkt hebben, hebben zij een
loon dat gemiddeld genomen 21% lager ligt dan het loon van mannen
zonder carrièregat. Dit effect is 17% voor vrouwen. Daarnaast is er voor
vrouwen een substantiele substantiële discontering op part-time lonen:
part-time lonen zijn in verhouding gemiddeld 30% lager dan full-time
lonen gecorrigeerd voor geobserveerde en niet-geobserveerde kenmerken.
Waar hoofdstuk 4 zich concentreert op de selectie-effecten van part-time
werk, heeft hoofdstuk 5 betrekking op de mate waarin niet-standaard werk,
zoals part-time werk, leidt tot minder vervroegde uittreding op de arbeids-
markt. Vervroegde uittreding is een belangrijke verklaring voor de afname
van het aantal werkzame jaren in verschillende Europese landen. Een
hogere participatiegraad onder ouderen zou de financiële houdbaarheid
van pensioensystemen echter vergroten. Daarnaast leidt een hogere parti-
cipatiegraad onder ouderen ook tot een toename in de toereikendheid van
het pensioen voor huishoudens in pensionering. Allereerst betekent een
langere carrière dat men cumulatief meer pensioen opbouwt. Ten tweede
zorgt de mogelijkheid om volledige pensionering uit te stellen voor een
inkomensstroom naast het gebruikelijke pensioeninkomen.
De belangrijkste oorzaken voor de lage participatie onder ouderen
zijn de negatieve prikkels tot werken door formele (voorheen VUT) en
informele uittreedroutes (voorheen WW en WAO/WIA) voor vervroegde
uittreding. Hervormingen in deze uittreedroutes hebben de negatieve
prikkels tot werken ten dele weggenomen met als gevolg dat de parti-
cipatiegraad onder ouderen gestegen is ten opzichte van de jaren ’90.
Desondanks is de participatiegraad onder ouderen nog steeds relatief laag
in vergelijking met jongere leeftijdscategorieën. Tegelijkertijd is er een
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flinke toename in niet-standaard vormen van werk onder ouderen, zoals
zelfstandig ondernemerschap en part-time werk. Beide geven flexibiliteit
in het aantal uren dat men werkt en kunnen daarom gebruikt worden als
brug van full-time werk naar volledige pensionering. Hoofdstuk 5 laat
zien dat het relatief grote en groeiende belang van deze vormen van niet-
standaard werk leidt tot minder vervroegde uittreding op de arbeidsmarkt
in 13 Europese landen. Meer specifiek vindt hoofdstuk 5 dat een toename
van het percentage van werkende 55-64 jarigen dat part-time werkt van
1% leidt tot een reductie van vervroegde uittreding van 1,7%. Dit lijkt
voornamelijk een effect van een graduele tranisitie van full-time werk naar
volledige pensionering, aangezien het effect grotendeels verklaard wordt
aan de hand van de vrijwillige keuze voor part-time werk. Het effect van
part-time werk op de vervroegde uittreding onder vrouwen is kleiner of
zelfs afwezig afhankelijk van de gehanteerde specificatie. In de analyse
worden geen significante effecten van zelfstandig ondernemerschap op
vervroegde uittreding gevonden. De resultaten zijn uiterst robuust zowel
op de extensieve marge (participatie beslissing) als de intensieve marge
(uren beslissing).
De bevinding dat zelfstandig ondernemerschap niet leidt tot minder ver-
vroegde uittreding is in lijn met de resultaten van hoofdstuk 6. De keuze
voor niet-standaard vormen van werk hoeft niet per definitie een vrijwil-
lige keuze te zijn. Het kan ook een reactie zijn op het gebrek aan andere
mogelijkheden in (full-time) werk en uittreedroutes via werkloosheid en
arbeidsongeschiktheid. De internationale literatuur laat zien dat zelfstan-
dig ondernemerschap relatief belangrijk is bij 50-plussers. Eén van de
verklaringen hiervoor is dat ouderen een relatief sterke preferentie hebben
voor vrije tijd en dat zelfstandig ondernemerschap de flexibiliteit biedt
om het aantal werkzame uren te verminderen. Hoofdstuk 6 vindt echter
geen bewijs voor deze veelgebruikte verklaring. Middels drie empirisch
toetsbare hypothesen omtrent de arbeidsmarktdynamiek van ouderen
toegepast op Nederlandse microeconomische data, blijkt uit de resultaten
in hoofdstuk 6 dat er bewijs is voor zelfstandig ondernemerschap dat is
geboren uit noodzaak onder ouderen. Ouderen hebben moeite om na
werkloosheid een betaalde baan te vinden. De drie hypothesen omtrent de
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transities tussen werkloosheid en zelfstandig ondernemerschap suggere-
ren dat ouderen met een relatief zwakke arbeidsmarktpositie veelal kiezen
voor een periode als zelfstandig ondernemer. In de analyse van het hoofd-
stuk wordt er geen bewijs gevonden voor de veelgebruikte verklaring dat
zelfstandig ondernemerschap onder ouderen een brug zou vormen tussen
full-time werk en volledige pensionering. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat
part-time werk deze rol veelal vervult in Nederland; dit in tegenstelling
tot de VS, waar part-time werk minder gebruikelijk is.
De resultaten in hoofdstuk 5 en 6 tonen aan dat part-time werk mo-
gelijkerwijs gebruikt wordt als graduele uittreedroute in Nederland. Als
part-time werk leidt tot een hogere arbeidsparticipatie onder ouderen
(zoals gevonden in hoofdstuk 5) kan dit bijdragen aan de financiële houd-
baarheid van het pensioenstelsel en de toereikendheid van pensioenen
(zoals geanalyseerd in hoofdstuk 2 en 3). Desalniettemin geeft de analyse
in hoofdstuk 4 tegelijkertijd aan dat personen met relatief goede achter-
grondkarakteristieken zichzelf in part-time werk selecteren. Personen met
minder goede karakteristieken, die logischerwijs vaker een ontoereikend
pensioen krijgen, hebben minder mogelijkheden en/of kiezen er minder
vaak voor om de voordelen van part-time werk te benutten.
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Long-term trends, such as the aging of the population, the increased 
life-expectancy, and the consequences of the recent financial crisis, have 
raised concerns about the sustainability of pension systems. Consequently, 
many OECD countries have proposed and implemented reforms to 
alleviate the pension system from the pressure of demographic aging and 
to create sustainable pension systems for the future. Many of the reforms 
implemented are related to increasing both the statutory and effective 
retirement age, making pension benefits less generous and increasing 
contributions. As a consequence, the proposed and implemented reforms 
have raised a lot of discussion about the financial position of current 
and future retirees. This thesis collects five studies regarding Pensions, 
Retirement, and the Financial Position of the Elderly and aims to 
understand the effects of aging on people’s retirement behavior and the 
adequacy of their (future) pensions. The thesis focuses on the role of self-
employment and part-time employment in retirement behavior and the 
financial resources available at retirement.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This study is part of 
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